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Problem
A challenge faced by the theology-and-science dialogue is how to effectively
communicate across disciplinary lines. The community assumes that there is a methodology
or cluster of methodologies that allows for interdisciplinary conversation to take place.
However, the community is not in agreement about how this process should occur or the
hermeneutical principles that should guide it. Is it possible to surmount the problem of
methodological compatibility and to generate mutually beneficial and fruitful dialogue
through seeking a point of commonality between all the disciplines of the theology-andscience dialogue?

Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to discover a philosophical ground in a HebraicChristian concept of human being for building fruitful theology-and-science dialogue that is
sensitive to the physical (natural sciences), moral (philosophy and social sciences), and
spiritual (theology) attributes of human being.
Method
To aid me in the hermeneutical task, I turn to social scientist Roy Bhaskar, who
proposes (1) that the flow of knowledge proceeds from ontology to epistemology, or from
“manifest phenomena to the structures that generate them”; (2) that social constructs, due to
their ability to influence human behavior, have ontological characteristics; and (3) that
because reality is a unified stratification and that disciplines develop along these
stratifications, it is possible to work across them along points of commonality for the
purpose of interdisciplinary dialogue.
Conclusions
In this dissertation, I draw the following conclusions:
1. As relational beings, humans wield power to change the flow of history simply by
their presence and observation of the world; thus it would appear that the definition that
humans attribute to themselves is indicative of how they will approach and take care of their
environment.
2. While a philosophically influenced natural science is a positive step toward
resolving the problem of human being in relation to its environment, it is suggested that only
when a spiritual dimension is added to the definition of human being that the problem may
be addressed more completely.

3. Finally, I apply the definition of human being proposed by the Hebraic-Christian
perspective to interdisciplinary discussions regarding the problems of economy and ecology,
especially those that consist of hate crimes and other types of abuses against other humans.
Thus human being serves as a fruitful common ground for the theology-and-science
dialogue.
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PREFACE
It is the year 1944. The location is the cold and brutal landscape known as
Ravensbrück, a concentration camp in Germany, created during the Second World War to
house political and ethnically undesirable prisoners. Your task is to determine what will be
done with the creatures that stand ragged, scarred, neutered, and broken before you. Will
you render them subhuman entities unworthy of life, use them until they have no more
mechanical value, and then consign them to the fiery hell of the ovens? Or will you see
them, in spite of their repulsive and alien features, as complete human beings, created in the
image of God? The way that you define their being will determine their immediate fate. You
are the observer. With what lens will you choose to observe this scene?
Corrie ten Boom was both an observer and a victim of Ravensbrück. Sent there with
her sister Betsie for her part in aiding Jews, she viewed the suffering about her with horror.
Again and again, she plied Betsie with the questions, Why is there so much suffering? Why
must we go on suffering? Betsie’s answer was consistently the same: We must forgive. Corrie
could not understand this answer. Finally, in the deep of winter, Betsie’s body failed her and
as she lay on her deathbed, Corrie again asked, Why? Betsie’s nearly inaudible reply: “. . .
must tell people what we have learned here. We must tell them that there is no pit so deep
that He is not deeper still. They will listen to us, Corrie, because we have been here.”1
The role of the observer is of central importance to the way in which the world is
1

Corrie ten Boom, with John Sherrill and Elizabeth Sherrill, The Hiding Place (New
York: Bantam Books, 1974), 217.
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understood. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the type of beings that humans are, for
it is the starting point by which we compare and contrast the world. We come, all too often,
to the question of human being rather glibly and without due consideration for its
importance. Too often we brush aside the question with the response: “I cannot define it,
but I know it when I see it.”
When confronted with the task of determining the type of being that comprised the
prisoners of Ravensbrück, two possibilities emerge that have two different trajectories in
Western thought. The first proposes that humans are mere accidental occurrences, but
having come into existence as humanoid life forms they become fully human through the
impartation of a divine soul. But what happens if one’s beliefs are such that not all humanoid
life forms are human? What if some are savages or subhuman species who have not yet
attained that final capstone called human being? Might one be able to justify an inhumane
way of treating these less-than-human life forms? As Stephen Jay Gould illustrates in The
Mismeasure of Man,2 and as a multitude of historical documents demonstrate, the unthinkable
has already happened.
However, if we return to Betsie’s words, we come to another lens by which to view
and interpret the world. Betsie can forgive because the view from her observer’s outpost is
of an entirely different nature. When Betsie views the poor pitiable creatures who stand
before her, she sees them through the eyes of God as complete human beings,
simultaneously and necessarily spiritual and physical entities. In spite of their suffering, in
spite of the fact that their enemies have sought to strip away any trace of humanness and to
2

Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981); see
also Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin’s Sacred Cause: How a Hatred of Slavery Shaped
Darwin’s Views on Human Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
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reduce them to mere physical caricatures of humanity, Betsie sees them as they are, creatures
created in the image of God. But her view of humanity is not limited to those who suffer,
but also to those who cause suffering. Although Corrie does not understand Betsie’s words
and struggles against them, Betsie maintains her resolve to forgive their tormentors. For
what Betsie came to understand is that there is a choice that must be made about what it
means to be human. One must choose the lens through which one views the world. Betsie
can forgive only because she understands her role as a Christian observer. Others may claim
to be Christians. But the proof is in the actions that come forth as a result of choosing to
view the world through God’s eyes. That proof is to forgive, for there is no pit so deep that
God cannot reach into it and revive his original conception of being in the heart of the one
who flounders there, whether that person is prisoner or jailer.
Human being is not merely a location in space, nor is it a becoming. Human being is.
What it is comes from the hand of God: “Then God said, ‘Let us create man in our image, in
our likeness. . . . So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him;
male and female he created them” (Gen 1:26-27, NIV). What that means to me as a Seventhday Adventist observer of the world is the subject of this dissertation.
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INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
A challenge faced by the theology-and-science dialogue is how to effectively
communicate across disciplinary lines. The dialogue community assumes that there is a
methodology or cluster of methodologies that allows for interdisciplinary conversation to
take place. However, the community is not in agreement about how this process should
occur or the hermeneutical principles that should guide it. Is it possible to surmount the
problem of methodological compatibility and to generate mutually beneficial and fruitful
dialogue through seeking a point of commonality between all the disciplines of the theologyand-science dialogue?
Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to discover a philosophical ground in a HebraicChristian concept of human being for building fruitful theology-and-science dialogue that is
sensitive to the physical (natural sciences), moral (philosophy and social sciences), and
spiritual (theology) attributes of human being.
Development of Analytical Scope
and Procedures
In this dissertation, I propose that for effective dialogue to occur a point of
commonality at the philosophical level is needed that transcends disciplinary methodologies.
From this point, a mutually satisfying and effective dialogue may be generated. To aid me in
this task, I turn to the social scientist Roy Bhaskar, who proposes (1) that the flow of
1

knowledge proceeds from ontology to epistemology, or from “manifest phenomena to the
structures that generate them”; (2) that social constructs, due to their ability to influence
human behavior, have ontological characteristics; and (3) that because reality is a unified
stratification and that because disciplines develop along these stratifications, it is possible to
work across them along points of commonality for the purpose of interdisciplinary dialogue.
Building on such ideas, I propose that a concern that is common to all disciplines
and which has the capability of serving as a philosophical ground for building dialogue is
human being, here understood in a universal sense and which exhibits itself in relational
terms.
As I seek to demonstrate, a definition of human being that takes seriously the
physical, moral, and spiritual aspects of human being is integral (1) for establishing a fruitful
interdisciplinary dialogue that is built upon shared concerns and basic philosophical
concepts, and (2) for providing a basis for scientific exploration of my hypothesis that there
is a correlation between definitions of human being and the way that human beings interact
with their environment. These points are especially important as human beings are currently
seen as having culpability for the current economic and ecological crises. In order to develop
ways of dealing with these crises, it is necessary to have a shared philosophical approach and
language that is able to transcend, yet respect, disciplinary boundaries, questions, and
methodologies.
My dissertation, therefore, explores not only how a common philosophical concept
of human being can be used across the disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue, but
also notes the implications of any particular concept of human being upon the environment.
I term the concept of human being that I develop in this dissertation the “Hebraic-Christian
perspective” due to the ancient Hebrew cosmology that grounds it and which is used
2

consistently throughout both the Hebrew Bible and the Greek New Testament to not only
define human being, but also help to serve as the basis for determining human accountability
and culpability. This perspective, which is based on the notions that (1) human beings were
created in the image of God (Gen 1:26-28) and (2) that they are a unified and integrated
whole, which includes, without separation, physical, moral, and spiritual attributes (Gen 2:7),
provides a common orientation that may be applied and studied empirically across the
disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue.
Dialogue Partners
In this dissertation, I will interact with a number of dialogue partners3 from across
the disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue who play key roles regarding the
definition and role of human beings in relation to their environment, including:
The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus, who is one of the first to suggest that
being is the root of philosophy.
Augustine of Hippo, who saw and attempted to elucidate the potential for dialogue
between theology and natural philosophy, but whose approach to anthropology sets up a
potentially destructive concept of human being.
Immanuel Kant, who demonstrated the need for moral influence on the natural realm
and who suggested the complex relationship between the moral and physical elements of
human being.
Friedrich Nietzsche, whose philosophy represents to Martin Heidegger the logical
conclusion of the Platonic concept of being and thus the end of Western philosophy.
3

For the sake of convenience, I list the dialogue partners in chronological order.
However, in the dissertation, they are used in conjunction with the disciplines and ideas with
which they are associated.
3

Heidegger, who in response to proposals such as those of Heraclitus, Neitzsche, and
Kant, provides a radical reinterpretation of being as understood by the Greeks and moderns.
Roy Bhaskar, who sees the importance of separating the natural and human sciences
by proposing a stratified concept of reality that respects the contexts, concerns, questions,
and methodologies of each discipline, while seeking to find common elements upon which
to dialogue.
Alister E. McGrath, who finds room in Bhaskar’s stratified concept of reality for a
Christian theology of nature, which he terms “creation.”
Stephen Jay Gould and Adrian Desmond and James Moore, who provide the historical
context for the consequences of how we define human being. Gould, especially, proposes
that the resolution to the problem of human being is to remove all reference to religion,
particularly Christian theology. In so doing, one may attain objectivity.
John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, who attempt to build a working hypothesis of how
human being might be understood in terms of a humanistic and quasi-religious approach.
In this dissertation, I will use a canonical approach to Scripture, which is in essential
agreement with the retroductive approach to critical realism that I apply in this dissertation.
In this approach, we come to Scripture as it is now and are not concerned with the past
history of criticism. This allows us to hear it from its own perspective and to inform us of its
own concern with the relationship that human beings have with their environment and with
God. In other words, we allow Scripture to serve as a dialogue partner.
Justification
These dialogue partners, each in his own way, address some aspect of human
ontology, some with reference to theology, others to philosophy, and still others to the
natural and social sciences. However, none of them, or any other thinkers, fully explore a
4

definition of human being that takes seriously the physical, moral, and spiritual aspects of
human being that I propose is integral (1) for establishing a fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue
that is built upon shared concerns and basic philosophical concepts, and (2) for providing a
basis for scientific exploration of my hypothesis that there is a correlation between
definitions of human being and the way that human beings interact with their environment.
Method
The dissertation begins with a Preface and Introduction, in which the context and
approach to the dissertation are addressed.
Chapter 1 explores the need for establishing a methodology or cluster of
methodologies that allows for interdisciplinary conversation within the theology-and-science
dialogue to take place. Central to this discussion is the need for finding a common ground
upon which dialogue can be structured. I suggest that the question of human being is central
to all disciplines. This is because humans, who are relational and contrastive and comparative
beings, have necessarily physical, moral, and spiritual attributes. As such, human beings
require input from across the disciplines in order to gain a more reliable and accurate
ontological definition. In this chapter, I dialogue with the critical realist Roy Bhaskar, who is
informed by Kant and Heidegger in his ontological approach, and who in turn influences
McGrath’s scientific theology. Finally, I introduce my own Hebraic-Christian perspective of
human being.
Chapter 2 addresses the question of human being as social observer. As
demonstrated by Barrow and Tipler, the human observer wields power to change the flow of
history simply by his presence. McGrath carries this idea beyond the natural sciences and
philosophy by addressing the theological significance of humans as not only moral and
physical beings, but as spiritual ones. Barrow and Tipler and McGrath are united in seeing
5

the possibility for fruitful dialogue centered on the anthropic cosmological principle, which,
in its weak statement, suggests that “our location in the universe is necessarily privileged to
the extent of being compatible with our existence as observers.”4 In its strong form, the
anthropic cosmological argument states that “the Universe must have those properties which
allow life to develop within it at some stage in its history.”5 These dialogue partners arrive at
different strong arguments: Barrow and Tipler build their quasi-religious understanding of
the social observer on the anthropic cosmological arguments. A question that emerges from
their concept of the human observer is whether a morally (i.e., philosophically) informed
definition of human being is sufficient. McGrath argues that an added spiritual dimension is
needed and thus turns to Christian theology. He builds his understanding of theology upon
the Augustinian tradition. While Augustine’s approach to interdisciplinary dialogue is
important and lays the ground for the theology-and-science dialogue, his anthropology is
lacking in terms of a truly relational and personally accountable human being. In order to
formulate a definition of human being that addresses the moral, spiritual, and physical
attributes of human being, it is necessary to establish a common philosophical ground on
which the disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue may meet.
Having demonstrated the importance of a philosophically and theologically informed
natural science, in chapter 3 I turn to the question of human being to begin formulating the
4

Brandon Carter, “Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle,” in
Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data, ed. H. S. Longair (Boston: D.
Reidel, 1974), 291. The formal statement of the weak anthropic argument is: “The observed
values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on
values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and
by the requirement that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so” (John D.
Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle [Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1988], 16, emphasis supplied).
5

Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 21, emphasis supplied.
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common philosophical ground by which the disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue
will engage together. In this chapter, I dialogue with Heidegger concerning his concept of
human being. It appears that Heidegger makes room for a spiritual attribute of human being,
but before accepting his concept it is first necessary to ask in what ways his concept of being
might inform theology-and-science dialogue, particularly in regard to how his ideas might be
applied to problems in the natural environment.
Having established that his concept of being is helpful in this regard, in chapter 4 I
turn to Heidegger’s concept of God and its relationship to his understanding of human
being. As Heidegger explores the problem of human being in regard to the concept of God,
he dialogues with Nietzsche, drawing the conclusion that Nietzsche’s concept of being
signals the end of Western metaphysics that is grounded on the Platonic concept of being. In
response, Heidegger turns from the Platonic-influenced concept of God as understood by
Christendom (the social and political force of Western Christianity) to that of the preSocratic concept of being as understood by Heraclitus. The materialistic god that emerges
from Heidegger’s concept of being as the ground of all beings is not sufficient. It is therefore
necessary to begin exploring the possibility of a theology of human being that will both
sufficiently meet the needs of a relational human being in terms of physical, moral, and
spiritual attributes and which is faithful to the original roots of Christianity.
In chapter 5, I recognize the central role that Augustine has had in laying the
groundwork for the theology-and-science dialogue, but because I am troubled by his
anthropology, if is necessary to more fully investigate and critique it. I identify two main
areas of investigation: (1) the immortal soul and original sin, and (2) the meaning of history
and the concept of predestination. To aid in this critique, I turn to Anna Case-Winters, who
is concerned about the problem of dualism. I point to the way in which Augustine
7

formulates human being as a composite of body and immortal soul and allow Case-Winters
to demonstrate the negative results that can occur both economically and ecologically when
a dualistic concept of human being is used as a grounding principle of interpretation. In
regard to the question of history and predestination, I turn to Rudolf Bultmann, who
critiques the Augustinian tradition on the basis of its lack of moral accountability. Bultmann
bases his criticism on the lack of free will in the Augustinian anthropology. God, from the
depths of eternity, chooses humans for salvation or perdition. Humans therefore have no
real choice in their destiny and thus, Bultmann contends, no accountability for their actions.
It would thus appear that there is a need for further refining the theological aspects of
human being, but before doing so I will first examine the negative implications that can and
have resulted from dualistic concepts of it. It is important to the discussion of human being
to realize how definitions of human being can destroy lives and render beings that were
meant for higher destinies to subhuman status.
Therefore, in chapter 6, one is alerted once again to the problem of dualism,
particularly in regard to the treatment of human beings who are considered somehow less
than human due to their mental, social, or physical capabilities or because of their ethnic
background. In this discussion, I allow Stephen Jay Gould, with his research into the
problem of human profiling and scientific racism, and Adrian Desmond and James Moore,
with their historical critique of the African slave trade, to provide the orientation for
exploration. In this chapter, I demonstrate how dualistic conceptions of the immortal soul
and physical body set the stage for the development of scientific racism and allowed for
African slavery, the Holocaust, and other incidents of genocide. Theology’s argument over
the origin of the body and soul, led to concepts that were based upon dual creations and
resulted in two main positions: creationism, in which the soul was specially implanted in each
8

physical body, and traducianism, in which the immortal soul is inherited in some special way
through the generative actions of the parents. When combined with the closely related ideas
of monogenesis (the origin of all human beings from one ancestor) and polygenesis (the
multiple origins of human beings from a variety of ancestors), the stage was set for
theologically acceptable crimes against humanity and scientific racism.
In chapter 7, I conclude the search for a definition of human being that is relational
and which takes seriously the physical, moral, and spiritual attributes of that being. I discover
that there is a methodological approach that satisfies these criteria, which I term the
Hebraic-Christian perspective. In this approach, a canonical understanding of Scripture, such
as proposed by Brevard Childs, is used. An examination of the Hebrew Bible and the Greek
New Testament shows that there is a consistent definition of human being throughout.
Based on the idea that (1) human beings were created in the image of God (Gen 1:26-28)
and (2) that they are a unified and integrated whole, which includes, without separation,
physical, moral, and spiritual attributes (Gen 2:7), I explore possible ways that the HebraicChristian perspective fills voids in the theology-and-science dialogue.
A Conclusion and Appendix conclude the dissertation.

9

CHAPTER 1
A CASE FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES
Introduction
The contemporary theology-and-science dialogue has roots that extend to the early
days of the Patristic era of church history. In the second century, Origen, in Hom. Exod.
IV.6, becomes the first to see parallels between the treasures of Egypt and pagan learning.6
But it is Augustine of Hippo (354-430), regarded as the period’s most influential Latin father,
who most develops this idea and recommends that Christian scholars use these treasures for
the benefit of theology and society, but also proposes how to do so.7 Thus he argues
allegorically that “a Christian, as he separates himself in spirit from their [pagan
philosophers’] wretched company, must take away and apply all this [pagan learning] to the
right use of preaching the Gospel, as if it were the gold and silver of the pagans, which they
did not create but dug, as it were, from the mines of divine providence, which is
6

Pier Franco Beatrice, “The Treasures of the Egyptians: A Chapter in the History of
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everywhere.”8 “Human institutions,” which are “appropriate to human society, [and] which
in this life we cannot do without,” were to be “accepted and kept for conversion to Christian
purposes.”9
Augustine’s suggestion for how to understand properly and apply pagan philosophy
and the institutions of society within a Christian context also remains in the language of
allegory. The road to wisdom, he contends, especially for those whose eyes of the soul
cannot yet see the full brightness of wisdom’s glory, is a long and gradual one. Such
individuals must be trained in a manner that allows them to progress steadily toward a full
understanding of wisdom. “It is the task of good science,” he posits, “to arrive at wisdom by
a certain ordered procedure, without which happiness can hardly be attained.”10
Frederick Van Feletern discovers that even this method of learning is plundered by
Augustine from the “Egyptians,” finding a parallel in Porphyr’s Life of Pythagorus, in which
Pythagoras develops a method for training the mind to contemplate the incorporeal realm.
Such training must be gradual, Pythagoras proposes, because otherwise it would overwhelm
the learner.11
There is, then, a long tradition in Christianity that pagan philosophy, in its various
disciplines, is a source to be harvested and used to the betterment of Christian theology.
8

Augustine, De doctr. christ. 2.144-145 (R.P.H. Green, Augustine. De doctrine christiana,
Oxford Early Christian Texts [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995], 124-127).
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However, there is a lack of clarity about how to draw together the corporeal physical realm
with the incorporeal realm of morals (philosophy) and spiritual experience (theology) for the
benefit of dialogue.
In this chapter, I will explore the possible relationship of theology and the natural
and social sciences for the purpose of determining (1) if a methodological relationship
between them can be achieved, and if so, (2) whether a common philosophical ground can
be discovered that will make fruitful discussion possible between the disciplines of the
contemporary theology-and-science dialogue.
To aid in this task, I will explore Immanuel Kant’s proposals that reality consists of
two realms—the physical realm of human experience and the inner realm of human
morals—and that one comes to understand his own existence only when these two realities
are understood as standing together in essential relationship.
Kant’s perspective influences the social scientist Roy Bhaskar, who provides three
valuable insights into how interdisciplinary study might be possible, including the notions (1)
that the flow of knowledge proceeds from ontology to epistemology, or from “manifest
phenomena to the structures that generate them”; (2) that social constructs, due to their
ability to influence human behavior, have ontological characteristics; and (3) that because
reality is a unified stratification and because disciplines develop along these stratifications, it
is possible to work across them along points of commonality for the purpose of
interdisciplinary dialogue.
Next, I will examine the thoughts of Alister E. McGrath, who is encouraged by
Bhaskar’s proposal that the social concepts that guide society have ontological value. He
extends Bhaskar’s ideas to theology, thereby legitimizing its use as a source of scientific
knowledge in the theology-and-science dialogue.
12

Finally, I will introduce my proposal that it is possible to establish a common
philosophical ground from which the theology-and-science dialogue may proceed. I am
influenced in this by McGrath’s contextualization of nature as creation.12 This common
ground is, I suggest, human being, understood in its universal, philosophical sense, and
which is applicable in some respect to all the disciplines of the theology-and-science
dialogue.
I will now begin with the question of whether a methodological relationship between
the disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue can be achieved.
The Possibility for Interdisciplinary Methodology
The theology-and-science dialogue assumes that there is a methodology or cluster of
methodologies that allows for interdisciplinary conversation to take place. However, the
community is not in agreement about how this process should occur or the hermeneutical
principles that should guide it. Is it possible to find a common philosophical ground upon
which to build an interdisciplinary methodology that can help the theology-and-science
dialogue to address critical issues given the fact that the disciplines of the dialogue address
different aspects of reality?
Some, such as older continental hermeneutical systems, approach questions from a
philosophical-theological perspective and emphasize the intuitive elements of
hermeneutics,13 while others, such as with many British and early American systems, come
from an empirical/positivist perspective, emphasizing the objective approaches based upon
12
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Hans-Georg Gadamer provides a philosophical history of hermeneutics that finds
its climax in Martin Heidegger’s completion of the Western philosophical quest to
understand being (Truth and Method, 2d ed., trans. Joel C. Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshall [New York: Continuum, 1997]).
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observation and experimentation.14 Opinion is divided as to whether these two approaches
are antithetical or compatible with one another. Is it possible to envision a methodological
approach that preserves the integrity of a particular discipline, while allowing it to transcend
disciplinary boundaries and be methodologically informed by others?
In order to begin answering these two questions, I will turn to Kant, who, though
recognizing the gap between the physical and moral realms, also saw the potential for moral
influence upon the physical.
Kant’s Concept of Human Being: “The Starry Heavens
Above and the Moral Law Within”
In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant takes into account the relationship between the
physical and moral realms, noting:
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener
and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. I
have not to search for them and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness
or were in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and
connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence.15
Here Kant notes two ontological perspectives that find their connection in the
epistemological realm of the conscious knowledge of his own existence: the questions
concerning the nature, composition, and relation of the natural and moral phenomena that
comprise human being. Humanity has often looked to the starry heavens to understand its
own origin and place within the universe, and has sought evidence in the heavens to better
14
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discern how the universe functions; it has turned to the composition of the human mind for
understanding the process of cognition, sense of moral acuity, and identity.
Why is humanity fascinated with these external and internal worlds? Kant proposes
that
the former begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and enlarges
my connection therein to an unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and systems of
systems, and moreover into the limitless times of their periodic motion, its beginning
and continuance. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits
me in a world which has true infinity, but which is traceable only by the understanding,
and with which I discern that I am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and
necessary connection, as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds.16
Kant’s proposal that the relationship between the physical and moral realms lies
within the question of existence or being is intriguing.17 On one hand, there is a rich genetic
connection that is shared with the external world and that connects humans to the greater
universe beyond itself. On the other, there is the ability of humans to sense this deep
connection with the external realm and to understand more about it through reflection and
contemplation of physical phenomena. Therefore, there is a relationship between ontology,
which examines the deeper and intransitive elements of objective knowledge, and
epistemology, which studies how the ontological properties “make themselves possible
objects of knowledge for us”;18 together these two realms play an important and unified role
in human being and its relation to other entities.19
16
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Kant is not alone in his understanding of being. Lea F. Schweitz argues that
Leibniz builds on Augustine’s notion that humans have a unique relationship that comes
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Kant describes the complex relationship between the moral and natural realms in his
introduction to the Critique of Judgement. He warns that there is “a great gulf fixed” between
them, “so that it is not possible to pass from the former [physical realm] to the latter [moral
realm] (by means of the theoretical employment of reason).”20 According to Kant, reason,
gained from an examination of the natural realm, is not directly influential in creating a moral
sense. “Still the latter [moral realm],” he proposes, “is meant to influence the former—that is
to say, the concept of freedom [or the moral realm] is meant to actualize in the sensible [or
natural] world the end proposed by its law; and nature must consequently also be capable of
being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to the law of its form it at least is
according to the laws of freedom [or of the moral realm].”21 Here, in the ability of the moral
to influence the physical realm, lies the basis of idealism, the notion that reality is a mental
construct of the human mind. It is in this regard that idealism also proposes that human
concepts and values play a role in shaping society, 22 including how human beings interact
with the natural environment.
If we build on Kant’s idea that the moral realm influences the physical, it is possible
to have a glimpse into the relational aspects of human being. When humans observe the
from being citizens of the City of God. Therefore, there is a necessary link between
metaphysics and morals (“The Difference between the Mirror and One Who Sees: The
Theological Anthropology of G. W. Leibniz” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago
Divinity School, 2007). Martin Heidegger recognizes the hereditary line extending from
Leibniz to Kant to his own thought (The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly
[Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996]).
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realm of nature, they discern it through the process of reason. Understanding takes place by
reading a particular meaning into the data coming from the natural world. This is not merely
an esoteric way of philosophizing, but provides insight into the way that the mind processes
information and responds to phenomena. We know, for example, that the object in our yard
is a tree because we have come to know it through indirect information (someone first
identified a tree for us) and through direct experience (we experience various types of trees
that contain specific qualities and properties that are common to all trees and unique ones
that differentiate a particular tree from its universal form).23
However, perception is not simply about correctly identifying objects. Objects may
also be categorized according to their moral significance and meaning. The judgment bridges
the gap between the cognitive processes that govern the moral and physical realms, giving
human beings the ability to interpret the external world and act in accordance with their
judgments.24
V. S. Ramachandran, a neuroscientist, provides a description of how this process of
perception takes places. The brain creates symbolic descriptions for each object that a
23

While Immanuel Kant rejects the notion that there is an innate knowledge present
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human encounters. Part of this process is the influence that moral, as well as spiritual,
presuppositions have in creating symbols in the human mind that aid in the interpretative
process. For example, the human brain contains multiple areas for processing images, with
each area having its own specialized network of neurons that are devoted to the process of
extracting certain types of information from an image. A unique pattern, something like a
digital photograph, is created for each image so that when an object is viewed, a particular
set of “nerve activity” takes place.
However, as Ramachandran points out, “if vision were simply a faithful copy of
reality in the same way that a photograph captures a scene, then your perception should
always remain constant if the retinal image is held constant. But this is not the case. Your
perceptions can change radically even when the image on your retina stays the same.”25 This
is because, he continues, “every act of perception, even something as simple as viewing a
drawing of a cube, involves an act of judgment by the brain.”26 The brain assumes that the
world that we encounter is not “chaotic or amorphous,” but is composed of “stable physical
25

V. S. Ramachandran and Sandra Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries
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properties.” It is thus able to make judgments, including moral/ethical ones, about the
patterns that it sees and identify those patterns as more than merely coincidental. Therefore,
when one sees a group of dots moving in unison, such as the spots of a leopard, the brain
assumes that they belong to a single object and because this inference is made, a single
object is seen.
But beyond this, moral and ethical presuppositions also help to influence the way in
which a phenomenon is interpreted. Upon encountering a leopard, one might ask: Should
the leopard’s coat be harvested for an elegant coat? Or should the leopard be protected; if
so, in what manner?
Kant’s and Ramanchandran’s perspectives lend important insights into the way that
the physical and moral attributes come together to form a relational human being: (1)
Humans are complex, relational beings, (2) who are not simply physical entities, but also
moral beings with the ability to create worldviews built upon social concepts by which they
may better understand themselves and others, and (3) because they are able to think, reflect,
and make judgments, humans may be held accountable for their actions.
We will now examine these points in more detail:
First, the grand complexity of humanity, with its many levels of “integrated, stable,
and self-regulating” hierarchical systems, interacts with one another at the same and higher
and lower levels.27 These levels include (1) structural (particle, atom, molecule,
macromolecule, organelle, cell, organ, organism, and ecosystem); (2) functional
(reproductive—gene, genome, organism, and population; and neural—molecule, synapse,
27
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neuron, neural network, and brain); (3) social; (4) cultural;28 and (5) moral and spiritual.29 The
human being is not only a physical individual, but also a member of a community.
Second, these organizational levels are not simply physical, even though they make
use of physical processes in their carrying out. The human brain is able to take “formal,
holistic, historical, and probabilistic patterns”30 and create a conceptual view of the world
that shapes how objects are seen, including the moral/ethical implications of behavior. In
other words, the brain, in ways that we do not yet totally understand, is able to see order
within a moving, changing environment and not only identify an object, but react morally
toward it. Kant recognizes the deep moral implications of the concept of judgment as it
helps to bridge the gap between the moral and physical realms. The notion that humans can
be divided into completely separate realms—physical and moral—is, for Kant, ultimately
impossible. Thinking of this connection in terms of neuroscience, it is easier to see how this
might be because thinking may be described as a result of nerve activity or it may be thought
of as some nonphysical process as in the construction of immaterial social constructs.
However, to think of one aspect of thinking without reference to the other would be
incomplete because thinking is simultaneously and undividedly one series of integrated
processes.
28
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Third, with the ability to judge, reflect, and make choices built upon experience
comes a moral imperative to act so that there is both a personal and corporate accountability
to which humans may be held. Due to the relational nature of their being, humans can be
held morally accountable for their physical actions.
In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant brings concepts about human
nature into his understanding of a normative ethics. Lara Denis, in her interpretation of
Kant’s moral philosophy, notes that “if we are to know what our duties are as human moral
agents, we must apply the categorical imperative to us,” which means that we must come to
terms with the totality, both physical and moral, of what it means to be human, a task that
“requires understanding our various natural predispositions, needs, capacities, and
vulnerabilities—right down to biological and psychological facts about us. . . . So though
Kant does not think empirical research can lead us to the supreme moral principle, he thinks
empirical information is indispensable for figuring out what this principle actually demands
of us in our treatment of ourselves and one another.”31
Two ways in which this empirical information can help to shape the morality of an
individual, according to Kant, is (1) understanding the role of autonomous (free) choice—to
do the morally right thing in spite of the inherent propensity of humans to be evil; and (2)
the role of the community in not only demonstrating what (a)moral behavior is, but in the
banding together of ethical (such as religious, governmental, cultural, and social)
31
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communities that work together against the inherent propensity of human nature to do and
tempt others to carry out evil acts.32
What if we consider that Kant’s perspectives could have the potential for worldforming, the idea that thought underlies action and that to think is to act and to shape the
world around us into the image of our thought.33 The human mind is capable of reflection.
Taking its a priori notions, based upon a history of experiences and culturally, socially, and/or
religiously induced notions about the world, the human mind then interprets its present
experiences of the natural realm and uses this vast array of a priori and a posteriori concepts to
form the basis of action upon the natural realm. Thus it is that the world becomes shaped
into the image of the moral realm. Heidegger comments that “in metaphysics reflection is
accomplished concerning the essence of what is and a decision takes place regarding the
essence of truth.”34 Therefore, even though the study of human being has become
increasingly devoted to the study of the physical attributes of being, with even the moral
ones being attributed in one way or another to physical processes,35 nevertheless, as HansGeorg Gadamer argues, the need for a moral philosophy, no matter how separated from its
original starting point it has become, still remains.36
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Kant thus reminds us of the importance of the inner world of morals and the
external world of physical objects. He also points us toward the possibility of human beings
as world-formers, whose social concepts about the world are influential in how we approach
it. Thus the moral realm is not merely an isolated place of imagined realities which
subjectively and arbitrarily produce the natural realm, but instead reflect the vast collection
of direct and indirect experiences of the individual so that he may have a basis upon which
to understand the physical realm that he encounters. Thus Kant presents possibilities for
extending his work into new social horizons, such as has been done by Bhaskar. Before
turning to Bhaskar’s critical realism, however, we will consider briefly the shift from Kant’s
individualist approach to human being to Bhaskar’s understanding of human being as a
social being.
The Social Observer: Toward Bhaskar’s Critical Realism
Bhaskar, who is influenced by Kant, sees the possibility for turning Kant’s
individualistic observer into a social one who is clearly apprised of the differences that exist
between reason and experience. Kant understands that humans are not disinterested
bystanders in the process of coming to know being—their own or others.37 However, as
McGrath points out, Kant belongs to the Enlightenment tradition that “proposed an
‘objectivity’ of both judgement and knowledge which overlooked the role of both history
and culture in their shaping and transmission.”38 Kant, it appears, forgets that his “knowing
subject” is a social being and that humans acquire their knowledge about being through
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“socially transmitted patterns of rationality.”39 In spite of this problem, Bhaskar contends
that “if philosophy is to be possible (and I want to contend that it is in practice
indispensable) then it must follow the Kantian road,”40 but, among other tasks, “it must
reject the idealist and individualist cast into which Kant pressed his own inquiries.”41
Bhaskar’s goal here is to avoid the trap that humans develop their understanding of reality
from primarily their own individual constructions. He reinterprets Kant from a social
perspective, that is, from the perspective of the social observer.
As Bhaskar points out, epistemology traditionally has been overrun by competing
claims regarding experience and reason; Kant teaches us that both are equally needed in the
task of unveiling human being. But for Bhaskar, neither experience nor reason is
“sufficiently differentiated to yield the premises needed to produce an account capable inter
alia of generating a real definition of science.” He thus proposes substituting concepts that
more specifically address his concerns: “experimental activity” and “scientific
development.”42
In regard to experimental activity, Bhaskar points out, in agreement with Kant, that
in the experimental process scientists are not disinterested bystanders. Rather, they are “coresponsible” for the “pattern of events” that come from carrying out the experiment itself.
That scientists, who are ultimately social observers, are involved in creating patterns through
their activities is not special because humans help to create events all the time. But what is
39
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special about patterns generated under “meticulously controlled” laboratory conditions is
that scientists are able to “identify the mode of operation of natural structures, mechanisms
or processes which they do not produce.” Significantly, what distinguishes phenomena
actually produced in the laboratory from the “totality” of what could be produced is that when
the experiment is successful, it is an “index” of what the scientist does not produce. “A real
distinction between the objects of experimental investigation, such as causal laws, and
patterns of events, is thus a condition of the intelligibility of experimental activity.”43 This is
because the Humean account is dependent, Bhaskar proposes, on “a misidentification of
causal laws with their empirical grounds. Notice that as human activity is in general necessary
for constant conjunctions, if one identifies causal laws with them then one is logically
committed to the absurdity that human beings, in their experimental activity, cause and even
change the laws of nature!”
Bhaskar’s concern is certainly valid and he is not alone in it. Heidegger, for example,
also reads Kant in terms of affirming both experience and reason. His reading of Kant
brings him to embrace an aspect of Kantian idealism that sees the mind not as a “worldmaker,” but rather as a “world-former,” meaning that the mind does not create the world,
but, through individual and social mediums, helps to shape, rather than make, the
interpretation of it.44 Therefore, he proposes, “metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a
specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to
43
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that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion
over all the phenomena that distinguish the age.”45 This is essentially in agreement with
Bhaskar’s understanding of “socially transmitted patterns of rationality.” For Heidegger, this
means that Being is the ground of all beings and that as essential as the cultural and social
aspects of hermeneutics are, they can and do ultimately obscure Being. Therefore, Being is to
be sought in “the history of being,” meaning that as the history of beings is investigated,
Being is revealed one aspect at a time.46 Humanity, as the collective of social observers, is not
to be the grounding principle of being—human being is not the point of reference for
human being; rather human being stands in reference to Being itself.47
For Bhaskar, the way past an individualistic idealism is to clearly differentiate
between intransitive objects, which correspond roughly with that studied by ontology and is
concerned with “what knowledge is about,” and transitive objects, which correspond
roughly to that which is studied by epistemology and addresses the “antecedently existing
knowledge from which new knowledge is formed.”48 In order for the social sciences to enter
the realm of scientific knowledge, they “must first know what kinds of things societies (and
people) are before we can consider whether it is possible to study them scientifically.”49 They
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must also develop a methodology that will address properly the way in which the ontological
identity of both natural objects and social constructs is gained.
Part of this process, then, is realizing that a human being is not an island, but is a
part of a greater context and environment that includes spiritual, moral, and physical aspects
of being. If we understand humanity in this way, it may be possible to find a call for an
interdisciplinary methodology that will address the underlying conditions for ontology in all
disciplines.
Some scholars, however, propose that while a respectful conversation between
disciplines is possible, there is no possibility for an overarching interdisciplinary
methodology. In this type of dialogue, each discipline retains its own magisteria because each
discipline addresses its own questions and areas of specialty. While other disciplines may see
that a particular discipline’s insights are important, a discipline can speak only to its own
concerns while listening respectfully, but largely without input, to what others propose from
within their own magistera. Therefore, for example, when considering the definition of
nature and its objects, including human beings, it is to the natural sciences that one turns.50
What role is there for theology or even philosophy to play if ultimately all things human
reduce to physical processes? Is there an approach that respects the integrity, methodology,
and context of a discipline, while simultaneously allowing it to participate and be informed
by others?
Bhaskar’s Critical Realism
Bhaskar, who answers in the affirmative, points to two traditions that openly debate
this question with the hope that he can find some midpoint between them: (1) a “naturalist
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tradition,” which claims that “the sciences are (actually or ideally) unified in their
concordance with positivist principles, based in the last instance on the Humean notion of
law”; and (2) an “anti-naturalist tradition,” which finds a “cleavage in method between the
natural and social sciences, that is grounded in a differentiation of their subject-matters.”51
Bhaskar hopes to avoid the inherent problems common to both traditions, which are
best demonstrated, he believes, in “their acceptance of an essentially positivist account of
natural science, or at least (and more generally) of an empiricist ontology.”52
Since the question of naturalism figures prominently in interdisciplinary dialogue, he
begins his task by defining “naturalism” as “the thesis that there is (or can be) an essential
unity of method between the natural and the social sciences.”53 His methodology integrates
the various hermeneutical approaches of the particular disciplines without denying the
significant differences of methodology employed or the aspects of reality that are studied by
each discipline.54 His methodology does so from the “social location of the observer.”55
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By introducing the notion of the social observer, Bhaskar wants to grant real
scientific status to the social sciences, even though it appears on the surface that their
primary concern is not so-called ontological intransitive reality, but transitive social concepts.
He argues that it is not only the natural sciences that search for scientific knowledge, but also
the social sciences, albeit in a different way.56 Thus “the subject-matter of the social sciences
consists essentially of meaningful objects, and their aim is the elucidation of the meaning of
these objects.”57 Social concepts, which have the power to influence society, take on
representative roles by reflecting their originating objects, human beings. In this way, social
concepts are said to have their own ontology and thus may be studied scientifically.58
In order to accomplish this task, Bhaskar lays down a revised philosophical system.
He agrees with the positivist tradition that science is “unified in its essential method,” and
with the hermeneutical tradition that science is “essentially differentiated in (or specific to)
its objects. However, he contends that his understanding of scientific method is
“diametrically opposed to that of positivism; and partly (though not only) in virtue of this,”
he proposes, “my account of the specific differences of the social sciences also departs in
fundamental respects from that of the hermeneutical tradition.” He thus differentiates his
position from others in the social sciences and hermeneutics along three broad philosophical
horizons—epistemology, logic, and metaphysics—all of which are in subjection to ontology.
He proposes that
to posit an essential unity of scientific method is to posit an account which conceives the
sciences as unified in the form that scientific knowledge takes, the reasoning by which it
56
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is produced and the concepts in terms of which its production can be most adequately
theorized or reconstructed. (These aspects correspond roughly to the traditional fields of
epistemology, logic and metaphysics respectively). Now the transcendental analysis of
science sketched above reveals that its essence consists in the movement, at any one
level of inquiry, from manifest phenomena to the structures that generate them.59
In order to make room for the social sciences within the grand dialogue of scientific
disciplines, there must be a way to understand how they gain scientific knowledge. Bhaskar
proposes that as with the natural sciences, a “transcendental analysis of science” yields a
basic trajectory of inquiry that moves from an engagement with “manifest phenomena to the
structures that generate them.”60
The process that begins the movement of a social concept from the realm of the
arbitrary is the construction of rules that delineate an ontological definition of a particular
social concept in such a way as to make it possible for it to be empirically studied. This is
because ontology precedes epistemology, which is not an arbitrary development, Bhaskar
notes, but “reflects the condition that, for transcendental realism, it is the nature of objects
that determines their cognitive possibilities for us. . . . Thus it is because sticks and stones are
solid that they can be picked up and thrown, not because they can be picked up and thrown
that they are solid (though that they can be handled in this sort of way may be a contingently
necessary condition for our knowledge of their solidity).”61
After a social concept has been properly defined, then it may be studied against other
social realities (such as religious, economic, political, or cultural concepts). “In any event,”
Bhaskar notes, “in preserving the sociological reality of their object, the sociologist’s practice
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is directly analogous to that of the biochemist who identifies the chemical structure of genes
with DNA molecules, or that of the physicist who explains secondary qualities in terms of
primary ones.”62 Therefore, in spite of the differences in the way that the social sciences
approach and define social phenomena, “once a hypothesis about a generative structure has
been produced in social science it can be tested quite empirically, although not necessarily
quantitatively, and albeit exclusively in terms of its explanatory power.”63
The process of testing whether a social concept has ontological viability involves two
presuppositions:
1. The conditions for the phenomena (namely social activities as conceptualized in
experience) exist intransitively and may therefore exist independently of their appropriate
conceptualization, and as such be subject to an unacknowledged possibility of historical
transformation.
2. The phenomena themselves may be false or in an important sense inadequate (for
example, superficial or systematically misleading).64
Critical realism thus is able to address phenomena that do not conform to the demands of
the natural sciences. According to the first point, social phenomena come into being through
historical experience. They do so as intransitive objects. Here intransitive objects “exist and
act independently of our knowledge of them (except when we use our knowledge to
intervene), so knowledge is irreducible to what it is about and constitutes an object with its
own level of social causality.”65 Bhaskar explains further that
the human sciences like any other, take intransitive objects. But the processes of
production of their intransitive objects may be causally connected, and internally related,
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to the processes of production of the knowledge . . . of which they are the objects (so
that one could say that one is dealing with object, not process, intransitively here). The
human sciences and philosophy thus appear as distinct moments of the very same
totalities they describe and explicate.
Here the process of enacting a social concept in time (i.e., in history) brings to life
that concept, thereby allowing it to become, in its distinct moments, ontological. Thus,
Bhaskar contends that “subject and object of knowledge are now neither—as in the
materialism of the Enlightenment (on the whole still plausible for the experimental sciences
of nature)—unconnected; nor are they, as in absolute idealism (or its materialist alter ego),
identified.”66
Therefore, in the study of social concepts, humans, as the subject, study the manifest
phenomena, which present themselves as social concepts and which are then the objects of
our investigation. However, in contrast to the natural sciences, the subject does not stand
over against the object as a distinct entity. This is because social concepts take their ontology
from their human creators and thus the object is also the subject. The subject and object of
social concepts remain, then, essentially unidentified, leading to Bhaskar’s second
presupposition.
In regard to presupposition 2, Bhaskar explains why social phenomena are so
difficult to define precisely, noting that
what has been established, by conceptual analysis, as necessary for the phenomena may
consist precisely in a level (or aspect) of reality which, although not existing
independently of agents’ conceptions, may be inadequately conceptualized or even not
conceptualized at all. Such a level may consist in a structural complex which is really
generative of social life but unavailable to direct inspection by the senses or immediate
intuition in the course of everyday life. It may be a tacit property of agents (such as
knowledge of a grammar) utilized in their productions; or a property of the relationships
in which agents stand to the conditions and means of their productions, of which they
may be unaware. Now such a transcendental analysis in social science, in showing (when
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it does) the historical conditions under which a certain set of categories may be validly
applied, ipso facto shows the conditions under which they may not be applied.67
One of the problems of defining basic, foundational concepts is that they are both
familiar to us (we know them when we see them) and foreign to us (we struggle to precisely
define them). The problem of definition may be made more difficult because the object of
study may not be available for “direct inspection by the senses or immediate intuition in the
course of everyday life.” This is especially true of social concepts, which, due to their
difficulty to define precisely, may not easily conform to the requirements of scientific
knowledge. And yet, in order to reach the status of scientific knowledge, social concepts
must demonstrate the historical conditions by which they become manifest phenomena. In
other words, they must be defined in such a way that they may be analyzed and critiqued,
which is the process by which hypotheses are tested.
So the same condition of falsification needed for natural scientific hypotheses also
applies to social concepts. But the social sciences refer to their social constructs as
ideologies. A concept can become ideology only if its necessity can be demonstrated,
meaning that not only can it be explained but also criticized. However, the social sciences go
beyond the natural sciences in their critique of concepts. Something more is needed than
saying that beliefs under investigation are false or superficial in some way, which, Bhaskar
notes, “normally entails having a better explanation for the phenomena in question. It
involves, in addition, being able to give account of the reasons why the false or superficial
beliefs are held—a mode of explanation without parallel in the natural sciences. For beliefs,
whether about society or nature, are clearly social objects.”68
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Epistemologically, two things are needed, then, to bring social concepts into the
realm of objective knowledge:
1. “The historical and independent character of social activities implies that the social
world must be open, and the requirement that social activity be socially explained implies
that social science is part of its own subject-matter,” and thus “generally implies
commitment to a principle of epistemic relativity,” which, for example, “lends to moral and
political argument in particular something of a necessarily transitional and open character.”69
2. “Experimental and practical activity entails an analysis of causal laws as expressing
the tendencies of things, not conjunctions of events.”70
In regard to point number 1, we might consider an example from the U.S.
Declaration of Independence, which proclaims: “We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal.” Such language is immediately understood, and had immediate
historical outcomes that clearly differentiated American society from all others. But yet this
presupposition also remains open for further understanding. What was meant by these
words has changed and it has expanded the meaning of the terms “all,” “men,” and “equal.”
Today, this phrase has come to be applied to all American citizens by right of birth, both
male and female, white and non-white, and by courtesy to all visitors. It has become the
rallying cry of many politicians, who have hoped to make it the right of all people
everywhere.
In this sense, social constructs are relative because their historical nature means that
they are malleable within certain circumstances and situations. Thus Bhaskar notes that
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the same structure (say that of the nation-state or the family) may be reproduced (or
transformed) by the joint activity of a number of different mechanisms. Another
consequence is that just as the same type of event may be determined by a (disjunctive)
plurality of mechanisms . . . , so (i) the same kinds of mechanism may sustain alternative
structures and (ii) the same structure may be reproduced by a variety of different types of
mechanism.71
Especially important to point (2) is the redefinition of causal laws. By allowing the
social sciences to approach causal laws from the tendencies of things, the social sciences are
able to trace the development of social concepts, which are not governed by the universal
laws of physics, such as govern the predictable movement of celestial bodies. Human
behavior does not conform to causal laws in the way that celestial bodies do because social
concepts are fluid and reflect their human makers. Thus, as Bhaskar points out, the socialsciences researcher must “establish a non-arbitrary procedure for generating causal
hypotheses.”72 Part of that process in the study of social constructs is not reducing
populations to the level of individuals. The ontology of society thus embraces society as a
whole and not as an entity made up of multiple components of individuals. To study society
then is to approach it as one complete unit.73
In anticipation of our final topic in this chapter, my proposal of human being as the
common philosophical ground upon which to begin theology-and-science dialogue, a similar
proposal can be made. We need to realize that human behavior can, in the individual sense,
be capricious and seemingly unpredictable. Therefore, in order to understand human
behavior, it is necessary, first, to take into consideration how human choice plays a role in
behavior. Because human beings are free-will agents, they may, even under duress, express a
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variety of individual responses that bring about unexpected results. Therefore, in order to
study the causes of human behavior we need to follow Bhaskar’s lead in moving to the level
of the population and in doing so understand the meaning of causal laws “as expressing the
tendencies of things.”74 Human behavior, when understood causally from the perspective of
tendency, becomes scientifically possible when humans are studied as a population; in other
words, how might a population tend to respond to a particular stimulus, even with the
possibility of individual free will.
Therefore, to briefly summarize, the first and crucial step in formulating causal laws
within the social sciences is “an attempt at a real definition of a form of social life that has
already been identified under a particular description.”75 Without definition, “any hypothesis
of a causal mechanism is bound to be more or less arbitrary. Thus social science attempts
real definitions that will in general precede rather than follow successful causal hypothesis—
though in both cases they can only be justified empirically, viz. by the revealed explanatory
power of the hypotheses that can be deduced from them.”76
Logically, then, according to a Bhaskar-influenced critical realism, “scientific
discovery and development entails that scientific inferences must be analogical and
retroductive, not simply inductive and/or deductive.” Retroductive reasoning is defined by
Sayer as a “mode of inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying)
mechanisms which are capable of producing them.”77 Retroduction is similar to induction.
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Induction, like retroduction, is inferential in mode, but where induction is concerned with
“discovering and predicting regular sequences of events,” retroduction is “concerned with
what kinds of thing exist, what their make-up, powers and liabilities are and hence with
explaining what happens rather than predicting what will happen.”78 This approach is
consistent with what we have already observed in regard to Bhaskar’s epistemological
proposal. The task at hand is not prediction in the natural sciences’ sense of the word.
Rather one is concerned about events as they occur.
Sayer explains further that “the postulation of causal powers involves not induction
but retroduction. If subsequent investigation of the nature and constitution of objects shows
the retroduction to be successful, so that we can claim to know the causes of some process,
then we don’t need to rely on inducing from past sequences.”79 What this means is “where
causal relation is suspected but not confirmed, we may choose to heed inductive inferences
if possible outcomes are sufficiently important to us.”80 Therefore, as he points out, if people
working with a particular chemical become sick, it is wise to infer that future outcomes will
be similar and people will again become sick if exposed to it. As he points out, “Such
inferences carry no warrant derived from logic: there are no logically valid reasons for
refusing to work with the chemical. But then they are not simple inferences that a regularity
observed for a finite sequence of instances will be universal. Rather our reasons depend on
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judgements of possible causal powers and possible consequences of either heeding or
ignoring them.”81
Metaphysically, then, Bhaskar is concerned with “a conceptual system based on the
notion of powers.”82 As we have previously explored, critical realism brings together two
apparently incompatible systems: “the human being as causal agent, who makes things
happen, the other as ‘meaning maker’, who interprets the world in innumerable ways.”83
However, as Sayer points out, while such a proposal is an improvement, “it still fails to
confront our nature as human animals, that is, beings who have continually to reproduce our
conditions of life to survive, and who are capable of flourishing and suffering.”84 Thus human beings
are not simply “causal agents and meaning makers,” but are “needy, desiring beings
(characterized by deficiency), dependent on others, having an orientation to the world of
care and concern.”85 This neediness is to be understood in a broad sense and as fundamental
to the understanding of human being both biologically and culturally. In this, Sayer proposes
that critical realism goes beyond hermeneutics because whereas hermeneutics “enables us to
view people as meaning makers,” it does not enable us to understand what it is about them
that makes them care about something.86
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In this sense, Bhaskar concludes that “were I to rewrite PON today I would stress
the way in which social order is embedded and conditioned by the natural order from which
it is emergent and on which it in turn acts back. An ecological orientation to social life is as
important as is recognition of our biological being.”87
This approach to the study of human being is crucial to the task of this dissertation.
It is not enough to simply and objectively recount the historical deeds of human beings, but
to understand them from the depths of ontology because it is only when we are able to come
to some common ontological ground that the process of theology-and-science dialogue can
truly begin. But Bhaskar’s conclusion begs further reflection. What is it that drives and
motivates human being to relationship? Is it simply the necessity for survival? Or is there an
ontological component that lies at the foundation of what it means to be human and which
goes beyond the physical concerns of the natural sciences and the moral perspectives of
philosophy? If so, then what is the source of this ontological definition of human being? In
order to begin answering that question, we will turn to McGrath, who is influenced by
Bhaskar’s critical-realist approach, especially his understanding of a stratified reality.
Making Room for Theology in Critical Realism: McGrath’s
Ontological Definition of Nature as Creation
McGrath proposes that at the core of the concept of nature, there is an ontological
component that Christian theology alone can identify and address. While this concept of
nature is not a totally socially or culturally determined construct, it is, for McGrath, “partly
shaped by socially mediated factors,” which is why it not only differs from other natural and
social science definitions of nature, but also from other religions.
87

Ibid., 173-174.

39

Because the processes that shape our concept of nature are “covert,” we are denied
“direct access to an allegedly neutral or self-sufficient notion of ‘nature’ itself.”88 In light of
this, McGrath asks, “How can nature shape our values and ideas, when that same nature has
already been shaped by them? How can we construct a philosophy based on nature, when
nature has been constructed by our philosophical ideas?”89 As we have discussed in regard to
Bhaskar’s critical realism, conceptual ideas run the danger of being arbitrary due to the
broadness of their meaning and the lack of proper definition. The way to escape such
socially mediated relativism is to define explicitly what one means by “nature.” For McGrath,
as a Christian theologian, nature is creation.
While McGrath’s desire to give theology a place of significance at the theology-andscience dialogue is admirable, his understanding of theology as a discipline that addresses
objective reality might seem rather ludicrous to the natural sciences community. McGrath,
who is himself a natural scientist, recognizes the impossibility of attempting to fit theology
within the same methodological category as the natural sciences. This is why he turns to
Bhaskar’s definition of scientific knowledge, which allows for social constructs, when
properly defined, to have ontological value, which is the first step toward developing a viable
theory about nature as creation.
As we have seen, Bhaskar brings the social sciences to scientific objectivity by
insisting that they meet the criteria of scientific knowledge: the study of “the movement, at
any one level of inquiry, from manifest phenomena to the structures that generate them.”90
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He then differentiates between the natural and social sciences’ approaches to this knowledge.
He grants ontological significance to social concepts by providing rigorous rules of
definition, which includes notions such as falsification. Finally, he also demands, as we have
seen above, that the social sciences provide evidence for why they hold certain beliefs.
McGrath has thus taken the first step in this process by giving nature an ontological
identity as creation. Having established the philosophical ground for a theological
understanding of nature, McGrath begins the task of constructing a creation-based concept
of reality. From his perspective of critical realism, he proposes that theology is “an a posteriori
discipline”91 and that the bridge between theology and the natural sciences is natural
theology.92 From this position, he places theology within Bhaskar’s concept of a stratified
reality, proposing that “the observable and unobservable universe is best understood when
each discipline, working within its own limits, presents its own particular collection of data.
This data is then interpreted under the magisterial direction of divine revelation as ‘God’s
creation.’”93 By restricting the concept of nature to “creation,” “Christian theology
necessarily limits probable explanations to those that correspond with divine revelation.”94
Further, it gives theology a context upon which to enter into discussion with other
disciplines.
By contextualizing the concept of nature under the purview of theology, he thereby
“allows the Christian tradition to offer an account of why truth, goodness and beauty are
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pursued in other traditions, and accounts, to a limited yet significant extent, for the specific
forms that these take within those traditions.”95 Therefore, while it may be possible to apply
many different interpretations to data from the natural world, Christian theology limits its
explanations to those that correspond with divine revelation.96 By demanding rigor of this
definition, he moves it toward scientific knowledge, such as Bhaskar proposes in regard to
social constructs. McGrath’s approach to scientific knowledge is by grounding the definition
of nature in a scientific theology, meaning that “a scientific theology cannot rest its case
solely upon the physical sciences. The challenge is to develop an account of, and identify the
theological implications of, the working methods of the natural sciences as a whole, rather
than privilege one specific group as normative for the entire enterprise.”97 Each discipline
develops methodologies that are appropriate to their ontologies—that is to say, that the
proper working method of any given science is determined by the character of its objects
of investigation, and cannot be determined a priori on the basis of some implicit
foundationalism. Methodology is consequent upon ontology, and is hence to be
determined a posteriori. The stratification of reality demands different working methods
and assumptions across the spectrum of the sciences, despite the critical commonalities
that may be identified.98
McGrath recognizes the differences between the natural and social sciences, which
call for greater “constructivism” than do the natural sciences. With regard to theology, there
is a closer affinity of it to the psychological and sociological sciences than to physics or
biology. Therefore, “the location and mutual relation of theological resources with a
stratified reality cannot be evaded.” Yet this does not deny the existence of theological
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reality, but is rather a representation of the way that Christianity is itself embedded in the
world.99 Theology, then, exists within Bhaskar’s concept of a stratified reality.
Having placed nature as creation within Bhaskar’s concept of a stratified reality, he is
now able to begin the task of constructing a theory about nature as creation. Within the
theological discipline, theories are known as “doctrine,” or “theory.” Here McGrath
confronts the modern and postmodern distaste for theological doctrine and dogma, arguing
that it is an entirely appropriate task to create a theoretical framework by which Christian
theology may understand the world.100 In response to critics of formalized Christian
doctrine, he proposes that
to demand an ‘undogmatic’ Christianity often involves confusion over the tone and
substance of Christian doctrine. ‘Dogmatic’ can rightly be understood as meaning
‘enclosed within a framework of theoretical or doctrinal beliefs’, and in this sense, I must
insist, reflects some integral themes of the Christian faith. Yet the term can also bear the
meaning of ‘uncritical’, ‘unreflective’ or ‘authoritarian’—referring, in other words, to the
tone or voice in which Christian theological affirmations are made, rather than to their
substance. I have no interest in supporting shrill, strident, imperious and overbearing
assertions of Christian doctrine, which demand silent unthinking compliance on the part
of their audiences, and lead to conflict and tension. Yet I remain convinced that such
statements are necessary and legitimate, while insisting that they can and should be stated
in a more reflective tone. After all, the purpose of Christian doctrine is partly to inspire
awe and worship, not to silence and threaten its audiences.101
Although Christian theology may have in the past, and even in the present,
represented itself badly, there is no need for it to necessarily continue on in such a state.
Rather, McGrath urges theology to re-engage with its divinely appointed task of inspiring
awe and worship. Ultimately, doctrine should be as awe-inspiring as a Gothic cathedral. Its
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form should sweep one upward to a vision of God that should evoke “a sense of mystery”
that “both affirms the vitality of the vision of God, while at the same time suggesting that
there are limits to the extent that any theoretical accounts of such a mystery can hope to
represent it.”102
To help him complete his argument for the possibility of a doctrinally or
theoretically informed scientific theology, McGrath turns to Jürgen Habermas and
Heidegger, who present apparently contradictory notions of “theory.” On one hand,
Heidegger suggests that “the Greek word qewre,w could have been derived originally from
the word qeo,j and o`ra,w, implying that “‘theory’ was essentially a beholding of the divine—
an idea perhaps more naturally expressed in the Latin term complatio.”103 Habermas, on the
other hand, “sought to reconceive the notion [of theoria] in a purely social context, relocating
an ostensibly theological activity within the public discourse of knowledge concerning the
universe. The theoros was the representative sent by Greek cities to public celebrations whose
function of theoria . . . [was] to behold what was taking place.”104 McGrath’s goal is to bring
reconciliation between these two approaches by joining together the human and divine in
the process of revelation, as expressed in doctrine. “Doctrine is thus built upon divine
revelation, but because humanity cannot see the complete scope of reality, doctrine is also at
least partially socially constructed.”105
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McGrath hopes that by defining creation as nature, he may be able to strike a delicate
balance between divine revelation and observed reality.106 When considered within the
context of the social sciences, which must also seek to find objectification in their equally
intangible social concepts, the task does not seem so impossible. The proposals of divine
revelation take on the role of social concepts that may be studied and evaluated scientifically.
It gives human validation of divine revelation by demonstrating the value of a proposal to
define nature as creation.
McGrath’s proposal that there is room for significant theological contribution in the
theology-and-science dialogue inspires my approach to the dialogue. Whereas McGrath
establishes a place at the table for theology, I hope to move beyond this to consider how
theology might help to shape and influence the dialogue in meaningful ways. It is not enough
to simply participate in theoretical discussions, but to bring those discussions into practical
action in ways that can help to influence and shape society itself. The gospel commission
given by Jesus is not simply to preach to the choir, but to carry the gospel in meaningful
ways to the utter ends of the earth (Acts 1:5).
If, as McGrath suggests, the point of theology is to inspire awe and worship, then
theology can bring a sense of respect and awe for the Creator God and for the world of
nature and its occupants. Christians who treat nature and all its creatures with respect can
have a significant positive influence on society, and in this way they help to give credence to
McGrath’s suggestion that nature is creation.
However, nature as creation will always remain a theological construct. In other
words, other competing concepts, such as materialistic concepts of nature, will always
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compete directly with a concept of nature that places God at its center. Is there a way to
create a common philosophical ground that does not begin dialogue with the doctrine of
God?
This point may appear to be controversial. Why would a theologian want to begin
with some other topic than God? I argue that if one wants to establish dialogue with those
who have no developed concept of God or who expressly reject all notions of God, there
will be no profitable dialogue about nature as creation. McGrath’s resolution to posit a form
of theistic evolution, in which God uses the processes of evolution to eventually bring forth
humans, is not helpful in this regard either, because it still requires the need for introducing
God at the beginning of a dialogue. So for true communication to take place upon ideas that
are held in common, one must begin with an even more basic concept that allows everyone
to immediately and profitably join the conversation. In this way, then, theology may
demonstrate its concordance with shared ideas, and having done so, may then possibly be
allowed to introduce its own perspectives in a less threatening way. It is to this task that we
now turn.
In the following section, I will introduce the Hebraic-Christian perspective, by which
I will argue the benefit of a concept of human being that is relational throughout the rest of
the dissertation.
Seeking a Common Philosophical Ground:
The Hebraic-Christian Perspective
In order to address the question of common ground, we must first consider an
appropriate starting point for any discipline:
Philosophical systems typically begin with logic, which is concerned with how the nature
of human reflective thinking and scientific knowledge come together with data from nature
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and society to form conceptual structures and provide the basis upon which to make valid
inferences.107
The natural and social sciences begin by contemplating the nature of life forms in their
various roles, functions, and behaviors from the point of view of the human observer.108
Observers then go on to create concepts that help to explain their observations and shape
society and the environment. Thus Bhaskar proposes that the common ground for gaining
knowledge about the world is “the movement, at any one level of inquiry, from manifest
phenomena to the structures that generate them.”109 At the center of this enterprise is human
being, which acts, I propose, as a point of comparison. In other words, humans are
comparative and contrastive beings, who see the world in terms of their own ontology.
Theological systems and the creedal statements of belief in Western Christianity are centered
on “the personal God of biblical revelation, the God who has acted concretely in the events
of biblical history and finally ‘in these last days’ in the history of Jesus Christ”110 that
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demonstrate his relationship to human beings. Thus the Hebrew Bible and Greek New
Testament propose that human beings are defined in terms of their relationship to God,
others, and the natural realm.111 The Hebrew Bible shows God coming to dwell with human
beings in the cultic system of ancient Israel (Exod 25:8). Thus Moses states, “What other
nation is so great as to have their gods near them the way the LORD our God is near us
whenever we pray to him?” (Deut 4:7, NIV). The Gospels of the Greek New Testament
begin their discussion of God with the incarnational birth of Jesus Christ, who is God in
human flesh.112 Now God comes down to human level so that human beings may better
understand who he is. God is no longer an abstract concept that is best understood in terms
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know my Father also (14:7), thereby implying not only his relationship to the Godhead, but
also his representative characterization of the Godhead. This is followed by his command to
his believers to be his witnesses throughout the entire world (Acts 1:8), a command that
carries moral imperative (1 Tim 6:12; 2 Tim 2:1ff.; Heb 11:1–12:1).
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of the symbols of the Hebrew cultic system as portrayed in the Torah or, even more
remotely, in the metaphysical terminology of Western Christian philosophical theology.
Rather he is now understood in terms of the original conception of human being, as
humanity created in the image of God (cf. 1 Cor 15:45; and Gen 1:26-27) and as the spiritual
and moral exemplar for human beings to follow (John 13:15). In this way, Jesus
demonstrates the relational nature of human being. Human beings are then to reflect the
being of God in their spiritual, moral, and physical ways of living.113
When we search for the philosophical common denominator in the disciplines, we
find that some aspect of human being is important in all of them. As comparative and
contrastive beings, humans understand the world about them in terms of who they are and
how they intersect with other beings both vertically in a spiritual sense and horizontally in
terms of their physical and moral relationships with other created life forms. In this sense,
the universe that we occupy is anthropically oriented.
Therefore, in this brief overview it is possible to view humans along three broad
disciplinary lines: the natural sciences, which are concerned with the complex relations of
human physical processes and the relational role that they have with their physical
environment; philosophy and the social sciences, which are interested in the way that
humans think and behave morally and the ways in which they create social constructs that
govern behavior and thereby impact their environment; and theology, which sees human
being in terms of its relation with God and others.
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Having found a common philosophical ground for dialogue, it is now necessary to
determine whether it is possible for theology to transcend its disciplinary boundaries so that
meaningful dialogue, in which the concept of humans as relational beings, can take place.
Because theology sees a vital and necessary connection between the spiritual, moral,
and physical ways that humans relate, it is able to enter into mutually beneficial dialogue with
other disciplines without needing to begin with a concept of God that is largely and even, as
in the case of the natural sciences, completely foreign to their approach.
Further, it gives theology the opportunity to demonstrate how its God-oriented
concepts provide viable solutions to critical crises such as those of the economy and ecology.
When, for example, one examines the blessings and curses that were recited by the ancient
people of Israel as they were about enter the Promised Land (Deut 28), it becomes obvious
that both a relation with God, one another, and others, including the natural environment,
can bring blessing, while abrogating these relationships brings the opposite effect. The Torah
provides a set of rules for establishing these relationships. Thus if one observes these rules,
you will be blessed in the city and blessed in the country. The fruit of your womb will be
blessed, and the crops of your land and the young of your livestock—the calves of your
herds and the lambs of your flocks. Your basket and your kneading trough will be
blessed. (Deut 28:3-5, NIV)
Conversely, failure to observe these relational rules will bring about negative results:
you will be cursed in the city and cursed in the country. Your basket and your kneading
trough will be cursed. The fruit of your womb will be cursed, and the crops of your land,
and the calves of your herds and the lambs of your flocks. (Deut 28:16-18, NIV)
In a manner fitting a concerned and worried environmentalist, it can be seen that
failure to respect our relationship with the natural environment can easily result in ecological
disaster. The Torah provides a set of criteria for keeping this relationship healthy. If
Christians and Jews alone would practice these criteria, how might they effectively influence
society at large? In conclusion to the presentation of the blessings and curses, God reminds
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the people that he has given these blessings and curses to them so that they can now
“choose life, so that you and your children may live” (Deut 30:19, NIV).
Is this not a concern of all human beings? Is it not the central principle upon which
the natural sciences are grounded: the problem of survival? But the difference of meaning
between the Hebraic-Christian perspective and the natural sciences is that the Torah does
not simply advocate survival, but genuine, authentic living.114 We may not be able in this
world to completely eradicate a “nature red in tooth and claw,” but we can through our
treatment of the Other, help to hold it at bay until the final restoration of all things (Rev 21).
The Hebraic-Christian perspective that I propose in this dissertation is an attempt to
take advantage of a concept—humans as relational beings—that is common to all disciplines
and use it not simply for interesting conversation opportunities, but for the purpose of
generating interdisciplinary solutions to critical situations. The prophet Jeremiah envisioned
something similar, noting, from God’s perspective, that, when people would ask why
disasters have come upon them, “it is because your ancestors forsook me. . . . They forsook
me and did not keep my law” (Jer 16:10-11, NIV). But there is always hope that if humans
restore their relationships, disasters can be averted. God promises that then “I will teach
them—this time I will teach them” (Jer 16:21a, NIV).
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have explored two primary issues: (1) whether a methodological
relationship between the disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue can be achieved,
and if so, (2) whether a common philosophical ground can be discovered that will make
114
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fruitful discussion possible between the disciplines of the contemporary theology-andscience dialogue.
Kant suggests that human beings can be understood only in terms of the necessary
relationship between their physical and moral attributes. Bhaskar builds a concept of the
social observer on this idea, and suggests that it is necessary, then, to have not only a
scientific knowledge for the natural sciences, but also for the social sciences. He therefore
demonstrates how social concepts can become scientifically viable, but in a way that is
different from the natural sciences. McGrath sees in Bhaskar’s proposal a place for theology
and, by placing theology at least partially within the social sciences, seeks to grant ontological
status to the concept “nature as creation.” Finally, I propose that while McGrath’s approach
is important, in order to initiate dialogue with other disciplines, theology must resist the urge
to start conversations with the doctrine of God, such as nature as creation. This is because
the Christian concept of God is philosophically foreign to other disciplines, particularly the
natural sciences. Therefore, an even more basic philosophical ground must be found. I
suggest that this ground is “humans as relational beings,” which is a common theme to all
disciplines as they study human relationship in various ways within their respective
disciplines.
In the following chapters, I will explore and critique the current philosophical
ground of the theology-and-science dialogue before presenting a more robust definition of
humans as relational beings. In the next chapter, we turn to the role of the social observer as
proposed by the anthropic arguments, one of which is interpreted philosophically and the
other, theologically.

52

CHAPTER 2
THE ANTHROPIC COSMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE AND ITS
RELATION TO HUMAN BEING AS OBSERVER
Introduction
What is a human being? As proposed by Kant, a human is a relational being that
exists somewhere between the starry heavens above and the moral law within, or as Bhaskar
expands Kant’s proposal, human beings are social observers. In this chapter, I will explore
the possibility that, in their role as social observers, human beings have a tremendous ability
to influence their environment and shape it according to their own presuppositions. I will
accomplish this task by turning to the anthropic cosmological argument of John D. Barrow
and Frank J. Tipler, who recognize the role of human interaction in this regard and attempt
to create a final anthropic argument that addresses the unity of human being in both its
physical and moral attributes. However, their attempt to create a theology of human being is
unsuccessful because they do not have a doctrine of God. Therefore, their proposals remain
not only futuristic, but philosophical rather than theological. In contrast, Alister E. McGrath,
who builds on the anthropic argument, finds the notion that the universe is fine-tuned to be
compatible with his own theology of nature as God’s creation.
Because the anthropic arguments fall within the category of teleological
argumentation, I will first examine the meaning of and relationship between universal order
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and purpose in nature before examining the final anthropic argument of Barrow and Tipler,
followed by the scientific-theological approach of McGrath.
Purpose (Teleology) and Order (Eutaxiology)
Modern theoretical cosmology suggests that the friendliness of the universe toward
life is due to its fine-tuned physical laws, which Brandon Carter refers to as the “anthropic
principle,”115 which is, in reality, a cluster of arguments ranging from “weak” to “strong” in
their proposals as to why and how this fine-tuning has occurred.116 The reason for such
plasticity in this principle is due to its theoretical nature and to the qualitative questions it
poses that cannot be directly addressed by an empirical approach.117
In its weak form, the anthropic cosmological principle proposes that humans can
exist only in a universe that is friendly toward carbon-based life118 and that our location in
the universe is “necessarily privileged to the extent of being compatible with our existence as
observers.”119 The questions that it raises regarding human being—the nature and definition
of human being, the role that humans play in the world, and whether they have an ultimate
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purpose—cannot be ascertained from the quantitative data alone, but requires an
interpretation.
Philosophers and theologians generally approach the question of human being
somewhat differently than scientists, especially in regard to questions pertaining to purpose
(telos) and order (eutaxis) in the universe.120 On one hand, philosophers and theologians tend
to ground their interpretation of natural phenomena in the assertion nihil est sine ratione
(“nothing is without a reason”).121 There are, they believe, at the very least, teleological-like
processes at work in the universe.122 But scientific approaches such as the principle of
mediocrity question whether there is indeed any ultimate purpose for why humans exist, and
therefore, they consider the appearance of purpose in the universe to be primarily a question
of order.123 When considered from the perspective of purpose and order, three possible
explanations for the fine-tuning of the universe emerge: (1) humans exist because the current
rules of the universe provide a certain directionality (i.e., a question of order or eutaxiology);
(2) humans are the result of the actions of an external agent (i.e., a question of purpose or
teleology); or (3) the two ideas are compatible and apply to different situations so that
humans exist because the current rules of the universe provide a certain directionality that is
the result of the actions of an (external) agent.
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Because these ideas are important to the anthropic arguments, we will consider
briefly the differences between teleology and eutaxiology. Since the difference between the
two words is subtle, a brief examination of their etymology is helpful.
Teleology comes from the Greek root tele-, meaning “end, purpose,” while
eutaxiology originates from the Greek adverb eu=, meaning “good” and the Greek noun
ta,xij, meaning “order,” as in “a fixed succession,” or a “right order” (“some give it here a
military sense, ‘orderly array’”).124 The emphasis in teleology is on the purpose, or the sake
for which an organism or process exists,125 while eutaxiology focuses on order without any
real concern for purpose.126 As Barrow and Tipler note in regard to eutaxiology, “the
intricate constructions of a watch can be appreciated without knowing anything of the ‘end’
for which it has been made.”127 It is not necessary to know exactly who the agent is that
designed and created the watch in order to understand that it is an artifact that has a certain
structure that allows it to work in a particular way. Such an idea is compatible with the
notion of complexity.
Due to the great complexity of living things, determining all the causal mechanisms
of an organism or natural process is virtually impossible, so as a working presupposition
eutaxiology makes sense. As Ian Barbour suggests, “When we speak of ‘the cause’ of an
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event we are selecting from among the many necessary and jointly sufficient conditions the
ones to which we want to direct attention in a particular context of inquiry.”128 Thus
scientists choose the particular areas that they wish to study, while intentionally ignoring
others. Further, they are also able to understand the structure and directionality of an
organism or process without knowing the exact causal laws or the initial conditions at the
point of origin.129
Therefore, to render a process eutaxiological does not necessarily mean that one
must reject a metaphysical or theological explanation; nor does it reflect the loss of a sense
of purpose in the natural realm. Louis Ezra Hicks, who first coined the term “eutaxiology,”
saw it as a “companion-word to teleology,” and did not see any conflict between their
approaches.130
Another related way that eutaxiological and teleological arguments differ, according
to Barrow and Tipler, is in their orientation toward anthropocentricism. They explain that
eutaxiological arguments are “based upon the presence of discernible order and mutual
harmony in Nature rather than the recognition of any conscious or unconscious
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anthropocentric purposes.”131 However, it is possible to think of the anthropic principle
without reference to anthropocentrism. The relational understanding of human being upon
which this dissertation is grounded is one of “nexus and connexio, the necessary connection of
the one with the other,”132 so that the relation of human beings with their environment is
one of respect and care-taking rather than dominance. Therefore, one can understand the
fine-tuning of the universe as being friendly to the human observer, but it is equally
appropriate to envision that the role of the human observer is not necessarily domineering
or damaging. Therefore, what appears to be a conflict of ideas concerning purpose and order
is not necessarily so.
We are now ready to turn to the question of the human observer as understood by
the various anthropic arguments.
The Anthropic Arguments
The Weak Anthropic Argument and the Human Observer
As a reaction against the principle of mediocrity, the weak anthropic principle
suggests that “our location in the universe is necessarily privileged to the extent of being
compatible with our existence as observers.”133 Therefore, the fact that humans are present is
because they have been privileged in some way to come into being in a universe that has all
the necessary physical laws needed for them to survive—including, importantly, the
intellectual capacity to observe. This proposal raises a number of questions, three of which
we will examine in this chapter: In what way are human observers privileged to exist in the
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universe? How does the notion of humans as observers help to define human being? Is it
possible to view human beings as fulfilling a purposeful role in the universe without
reference to theology?
The immediate scientific answer to these questions is addressed by the so-called
“Copernican principle”134 or, as it is more technically known, the principle of mediocrity,
which states: (1) “large number coincidences” exist, meaning that the physical constants of
the universe have such precise quantities that if they should be changed even slightly,
humanity, along with all other life forms dependent upon these same conditions, would
cease to exist;135 and (2) this fine-tuning of the physical constants is neither completely
random nor the result of “various exotic theories (e.g. involving departures from normally
accepted physical conservation laws),” but confirms “conventional” physics and cosmology,
“which could in principle have been used to predict them all in advance of their
observation”;136 and (3) the current state of the universe is not due to intent, although
everything follows rules, meaning that the “equations which govern the time development of
the ultimate constituents of the world are deterministic; that is, the state of these
constituents at a given time in the future is determined uniquely by the state of these
constituents now.”137
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The recognition of fundamental laws and principles in the formation of the universe
in general and of human beings in particular provides an initial answer to the qualitative
questions that surface in regard to human existence. The principle of mediocrity and the
weak anthropic argument are in agreement that there are certain conditions needed for
human life to exist. They both, however, leave the qualitative questions they have introduced
largely unexplored. To attempt to fill this gap, proponents of the anthropic arguments
attempt to provide answers that go beyond the disciplinary bounds of physical science and
biology to suggest in what way the fundamental laws of the universe exhibit purpose and
order. Barrow and Tipler’s strong anthropic argument provides philosophical speculation
about the role that human beings play in the universe, while McGrath’s argument reflects his
scientific theology.
Thus, for example, Barrow and Tipler explain that the “central problem of science
and epistemology is deciding which postulates to take as fundamental.”138 On one hand, the
modern idealists and ancient Greek materialists respectively considered Mind to be “logically
prior” to the existence of human being and the innate properties of matter “to allow—or
even require—the existence of intelligence to contemplate it.” These are, for the ancients
and idealists, fundamental principles that are necessary for life to exist.139 On the other hand,
physicists are against considering the question of Mind or intelligence in their theories.140
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This includes quantum mechanics, in spite of its concern about the role of the observer
because the observer does not need to have intelligence; it need only be a recording device.141
Nevertheless, in view of the growing consideration of natural scientists toward crises
of the environment and the role that humans play in these crises, as well as what will happen
to humans as the universe in its current state begins to wind down, a group of physicists and
biologists, many of whom come from the British perspective, have begun to seriously
consider the role of the human observer in their theoretical musings about cosmology.
Beginning with the weak anthropic argument, many go on to propose stronger arguments
that pierce more deeply into the qualitative questions raised there. We will now examine the
cluster of strong anthropic arguments used by Barrow and Tipler as the foundation for their
own theologically based final anthropic argument.142
The Strong Anthropic Arguments and the Human Observer
Barrow and Tipler’s Final Anthropic Argument
The more speculative strong anthropic arguments attempt to provide ultimate
reasons for the existence of human observers. Stated generally, the strong anthropic
arguments propose that “the Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop
within it at some stage in its history.”143 A number of radical approaches originate from the
strong anthropic argument, including the classical design, participatory, multiverse, and final,
which is Barrow and Tipler’s approach that is based upon the other three strong arguments.
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We will now examine the respective approaches of these arguments to the role of the human
observer before inquiring into how Barrow and Tipler apply the classical design,
participatory, and multiverse arguments to their own final anthropic principle.
The Classical Design Arguments propose that “there exists one possible Universe
‘designed’ with the goal of generating and sustaining ‘observers.’”144 Supporters of this view
include the natural theologians of the past, as well as those of Harvard chemist Lawrence J.
Henderson,145 Cambridge physicist Fred Hoyle, and Anglican priest and former scientific
consultant to the British Ministry of Defense, Rodney D. Holder.146
Hoyle, for example, asserts that “the laws of nuclear physics have been deliberately
designed with regard to the consequences they produce inside the stars. If this is so, then my
apparently random quirks have become part of a deep-laid scheme. If not then we are back
again at a monstrous sequence of accidents.”147 For Hoyle, the “external universe” is the
materialistic creator of human observers148 and is comparable to LaPlace’s
supermathematician, who was able to completely understand “all the consequences of
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scientific law.”149 Such a perspective is theological, and Barrow and Tipler render it,
therefore, open neither to empirical proof nor disproof.150
Holder approaches the design argument apologetically as a defense against atheistic
applications of the Many-Worlds or Multiverse argument. He notes that some argue, on the
basis of Darwinian evolution, that because there is order and not purpose in nature, it is,
therefore, inappropriate to see evidence of design in the fine-tuning of the universe.
Speaking from the perspective of God-directed evolution, he counters that “whilst evolution
may be regarded as ‘naturalist’ in the sense that it explains how complexity can be built up
through the interplay of genetic mutation and environmental selection, the laws of nature
must be special for this to occur. . . . The appeal is to the specialness of the laws of nature in
both cases, not to a ‘God of the gaps.’”151 Therefore, for Holder, God is at work in the
evolutionary process, but God does not simply fill in the gaps where needed. Rather the
whole process is generated through nature working under God’s direction, which is provided
through the laws and processes of nature.
In regard to human observers, Holder believes that since God has allowed for a
discoverable universe, he has also arranged for there to be beings who are capable of
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discovering the mysteries of the universe. It should not be surprising, then, to need a “very
special being,” God, to provide both the elements of nature and human observers.152
The Participatory Anthropic Argument states that “observers are necessary to bring the
Universe into being.”153 As John A. Wheeler, who coined the term “participatory anthropic
principle,” explains, quantum mechanics lends insight into the way that the observer
interacts with the environment, noting that “the act of measurement [at the quantum level]
typically produces an unpredictable change in the state of the electron. This change is
different according as one measures the position or the momentum.” He surmises that this
ability to effect change by observation is not limited to the microscopic world, but also
applies to the macroscopic world in which daily life takes place. Therefore, the presence of
human observers changes the flow of history, leading Wheeler to propose that “the observer
[in the process of observing] is elevated from ‘observer’ to ‘participator’. . . . In some strange
sense this is a participatory universe.”154
Barrow and Tipler conclude, however, that Wheeler’s participatory argument has not
yet developed experimental capabilities and, therefore, must remain “a particularly strong
form of SAP [strong anthropic principle].”155 Although physicists would not generally see
these observers from the perspective of human beings, but rather natural or technological
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devices, if we extend participation to human observers or see their devices as human artifacts
invested with meaning,156 then the participatory argument seems to carry moral ramifications
due to its observers’ abilities to change outcomes by their presence.
The Many-Worlds, or Multiverse, Anthropic Argument proposes that “an ensemble of
other different universes is necessary for the existence of our Universe.”157 According to this
view, physical reality does not exist independently from the observer and his or her
experimental apparatus. “Since it is the observer who ultimately defines which experimental
apparatus is employed, in effect the necessary presence of the observer in quantum physics is
recognized by an explicit axiom.”158
Whereas the participatory argument supports the notion that human participation in
the universe is essential to the flow of history, the multiverse argument was originally meant
to be a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics159 that was given in response to the
idealism of the Copenhagen interpretation.160 The role of the observer in the multiverse
argument is to record the states of the quantum mechanical system and to provide a
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historical account of this activity. There is, therefore, a need for a measuring and recording
apparatus whose memory will be complex enough to both recognize and record the states. 161
It is not clear what effect human observation has in the creation and carrying out of
history in the multiverse argument. It seems that the role of the human observer is, at least in
Barrow and Tipler’s description of it, largely passive—a recorder of events, but not
necessarily a direct, intentional, or reflective participator in the transformation of history. In
fact, in none of the anthropic arguments presented thus far does the observer need to be
human or even human-like, although the presence of a recording device does seem to imply,
or at least call for, some purposeful intelligence, as in Holder’s design argument. But one
thing Barrow and Tipler do seem certain of is that the recorders must obey the laws of the
universe in whatever state it is in for them to remain in existence.162
David Bohm and Basil J. Hiley’s theory of The Undivided Universe also falls within the
multiverse argument. They suggest that “there is no reason to suppose that physical theory is
steadily approaching some final truth.” Because there is no final theory, there is also no
reason to say that the universe is “either ultimately deterministic or ultimately
indeterministic. Therefore we cannot from physical theories alone draw any conclusions
about the ultimate limits of human freedom.”163 Thus, by necessity, the role of the human
observer is also neutral, in the sense that the observer is simply a part of the universe, which
acts like a “mirror” through which the universe is able “to observe itself.” Or conversely,
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they propose, “the universe could be regarded as continuous with the body of the human
being. After all, this latter, like the plant, gets all its substance and energy from the universe
and eventually falls back into it. Evidently the human being could not exist without this
context (which has very misleadingly been called an environment).”164
In this case, human being is immanent within the greater universe and is not in any
way ontologically distinct from it. In a certain sense, one might say that the universe is
“panenhumanistic”—humans are nature, but nature is more than humans. Thus there is no
clear dividing line between where humans end and the universe begins.
Building on the themes from these strong arguments, Barrow and Tipler’s Final
Anthropic Argument contends that “intelligent information-processing must come into
existence in the Universe, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out.”165 Barrow
and Tipler formulated this principle to help explain the relationship between science and
morality within the context of history—the ultimate qualitative questions regarding human
being.
They begin by proposing that if the strong anthropic principle is true and if the
universe “dies out at our stage of development, long before it has had any measurable nonquantum influence on the Universe in the large, it is hard to see why it must have come into
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existence in the first place.”166 Thus, they contend, while the final anthropic argument is a
physical statement and in itself has no moral or ethical content, it is, nevertheless, the
“physical precondition for moral values to arise and to continue to exist in the Universe: no
moral values of any sort can exist in a lifeless cosmology. Furthermore, the FAP [final
anthropic principle] seems to imply a melioristic cosmos,”167 meaning that the world can be
made better by human effort.
Barrow and Tipler have, in effect, expanded the participatory argument to include
the moral outcomes associated with the classical design argument, which allows for the
existence of intelligent life forms that can, then, influence the flow and outcome of history,
not just physically, but also morally. However, for Barrow and Tipler, there is a reversal in
the idealist and Greek materialist perspectives that Mind or intelligence is logically prior to
matter. Instead, Mind arises out of the evolutionary process.168 The final anthropic argument,
then, provides the basis not only for measuring and predicting the physical outcomes of finetuning, but also for identifying potential moral outcomes. There is then room for a robust
teleology that exhibits both physical and metaphysical characteristics.
There is, however, no supernatural perspective that guides and directs the meaning
and course of human history in the final anthropic argument, but instead Barrow and Tipler
find hope in the ability of humans to preserve their legacy through computer technology.
They propose that “from the behavioural point of view intelligent machines can be regarded
166
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as people. These machines may be our ultimate heirs, our ultimate descendants, because
under certain circumstances they could survive forever the extreme conditions near the Final
State.” Their hope is that when the human race comes to an end, human civilization itself
may be continued indefinitely by these technological devices, and the social values and
concepts of human being “may thus be transmitted to an arbitrarily distant futurity.”169
Hopefully, the memory of human beings and their moral and social perspectives will help to
jumpstart the universe to a higher level of intelligence at a quicker rate. Barrow and Tipler
make the observer to serve as a recorder of events as in the multiverse argument. They do
this by assigning humanity the task of creating supercomputers that will preserve human
culture and intelligence beyond the life expectancy of the human race.170 In one sense,
humans are neutral recording devices that provide a record that they were once present in
the universe. On the other, they will, hopefully, influence the next cycle of the universe due
to their intelligence. By having their memories preserved, the tape of human history can be
rerun and hopefully at a swifter and more efficient pace than in the current evolutionary
paradigm.
Barrow and Tipler’s final anthropic argument, then, takes on a form similar to that
proposed by the Stoics:
Socrates and Plato and each individual man will live again, with the same friends and
fellow citizens. They will go through the same experiences and the same activities. Every
city and village and field will be restored, just as it was. And this restoration of the
universe takes place not once, but over and over again—indeed to all eternity without
end. Those of the gods who are not subject to destruction, having observed the course
of one period, know from this everything which is going to happen in all subsequent
169
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periods. For there will never be any new thing other than that which has been before,
but everything is repeated down to the minutest detail.171
Like the Stoics, Barrow and Tipler find the universe to be cyclical in nature. The
preserved memories of human beings from the past cycle of the universe serve in much the
same way as the Greek gods who remain through multiple cycles of the universe. Because
everything is determined by physical law, from cycle to cycle there is the possibility that these
memories can help the universe along and allow future observers to know what awaits them.
However, if the Stoics are correct, there will only be an endless repetition of the past—in
fact, we are merely a repetition of past cycles of the universe. The discoveries of today are
only, in reality, illusional—there is indeed nothing new under the sun.
Barrow and Tipler find little difference between the human observer and the
supercomputers of the future. They demonstrate this in their use of two theological terms—
soul and eschatology—which they employ interchangeably for their recorders, human or
otherwise. Speaking of the “soul,” they propose that the human observer is “fundamentally a
type of computer, and is thus subject to the limitations imposed on computers by the laws of
physics.”172 The soul becomes a metaphor for “computer program,” because both are
defined as nonmaterial entities, which is “the essence of a human personality.” Therefore,
the “essence of a human being is not the body but the program which controls the body.”173
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Barrow and Tipler base their perspectives of the human being as a specialized
program on the immaterial soul of Aristotle and Aquinas. The so-called “soul,” or computerlike program, for Barrow and Tipler, may long outlast the external material that contains the
program because of its abstract, immaterial nature. One problem that presents itself
immediately to them, however, is Aristotelian in its structure: While “in principle” a
computer program can be stored in many different forms—“in books, on computer disks, in
RAM—and not just in the brain of a particular human body,” “a human being is a program
designed to run on very special hardware, and most of the subprograms of the human
program are present only because of the peculiar structure of the hardware, which will most
likely not be present in “non-human intelligent programs.”174 Barrow and Tipler are not clear
about how this problem might be surmounted, but this perspective does directly influence
their eschatology.175
They propose that the universe as a hospitable place, finely tuned to the needs of
human observers, will end.176 To save what we can of our essence as human observers,
supercomputers should be built that will survive the eventual decay of the universe—a time
when only the most basic building blocks of life (“in the form of electrons, positrons and
radiation”) will survive into the next cycle of the universe—and that will thereby preserve
something of ourselves as intelligent beings.177 Barrow and Tipler note that “the basic
St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul (Toronto: St. Michael’s College Press, 1934).
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problem of physical eschatology is to determine if the forms of matter which will exist in the
far future can be used as construction materials for computers that can run complex
programs, if there is sufficient energy in the future environment to run the programs, and if
there are any other barriers to running a program.”178
When we examine how the various anthropic arguments define the human observer,
we find a variety of ideas that appear, with the exception of Holder’s classical design
argument, to be centered on a materialistic theology. The human observer is not remarkable,
but is simply a part of the basic trajectories that emerge from out of the evolutionary
process. It can be replaced at any time by artificial intelligences that are able to (adapt? and)
survive where humans cannot. By way of contrast, we will turn to McGrath’s concept of a
fine-tuned universe.
McGrath’s Application of a Scientific Theology to
the Strong Anthropic Argument
The anthropic principle, for McGrath, brings to light the fact that there are “certain
aspects of the natural world that clearly require explanation—namely, evidence of finetuning within nature.”179 Such a task immediately calls for an investigation into the reason why
fine-tuning exists. The belief that nature is creation180 ties existence both to an external agent
who grants order to the creation and to purpose and intentionality. Further, the orderliness
of human existence (i.e., the physical and biological laws to which they are subject) and their
purpose for existence are compatible. However, he asserts, science neither proves nor
178
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disproves theology. Rather science is a profitable dialogue partner that helps to ground
theology in objective reality.181
The purpose of a scientific theology, then, is to “treat the working assumptions and
methods of the natural sciences as offering a supportive and illuminative role for the
Christian theological enterprise, both assisting theological reflection and identifying and
allowing exploitation of apologetic possibilities and strategies.”182 Further, an openness to
the study of nature as creation can help to prevent biblical and systematic theology from
losing their historical sense. It seems that the greatest danger for contemporary theology is
its loss of a historical sense both in terms of the divine revelation of the Scriptures and, as
McGrath notes, its theological traditions,183 which insist that there is a real, unobserved
reality that lies beyond human abilities with which to interact. Seeking evidence from nature
appears to be in agreement with the very foundations of Christian theology (e.g., Job 38–41;
Ps 8:3-4; Rom 1:20).
McGrath begins his anthropic argument, which he prefers to think of in terms of
fine-tuning, from his understanding of nature as “creation” and his revived concept of a
trinitarian natural theology and metaphysics. “‘I believe in Christianity,’” he proposes in
agreement with C. S. Lewis, “‘as I believe that the Sun has risen, not only because I see it,
but because by it I see everything else.’”184 Therefore, the world of nature comes into focus
and develops context as it comes under the lens of Christian theology. “While not in any way
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denying God’s direct or indirect causality in relation to the natural world, the particular style
of explanation offered by a Trinitarian natural theology is that of offering a unitary vision of
reality, which allows the correlations and interconnections of the natural world with itself
and with God to be grasped and appreciated.”185 Even further, McGrath contends, this
conception of natural theology provides justification for a trinitarian metaphysic.186
The foundation that McGrath uses to support his trinitarian metaphysic is classical
Augustinian, which he “deliberately” chose because of Augustine’s close reading of Scripture
and tradition and because Augustine developed his thought long before the scientific
revolution. Therefore, Augustine’s reflections were not a response to scientific thought, but
were a genuine response to his contemplation about the interaction between natural
philosophy and theology.187 Therefore, “Augustine offers us theological paradigms which are
deeply rooted in the Christian faith, offering us a way of engaging with modern scientific
knowledge without being constituted or determined by that knowledge in the first place.”188
McGrath’s human observer is, then, deeply rooted in the Augustinian understanding
of creation, which is itself grounded in the natural elements of causation that first originated
the universe.189 In Augustine’s concept of creation, there are two creative “moments”: (1) “a
primary act of origination” and (2) “a continuing process of providential guidance.” For
Augustine, creation is not simply a past event, but rather a process of sustenance and
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direction in “the unfolding of the ‘generations that he laid up in creation when it was first
established.’”190 According to McGrath, Augustine comes to this understanding through
Eccleisasticus (Sirach) 18:1, concluding that “‘God made all things together, disposing them
in an order based not on intervals of time, but on causal connections.’”191 McGrath
understands Augustine to mean by this that the creation follows certain “embedded”
principles of order, “which developed as appropriate at later stages.” Therefore, the creation
has the capacity to bring forth living things, that is, rationes seminales, which are “seedlike
principles that are present from the cosmic beginning, in each of which is contained the
potential for the later development of specific living kind.”192 Augustine understood this to
mean that creatures develop along predetermined paths in a teleological series of processes,
which are themselves independent of specific lengths of time in the process of coming to be.
In spite of the fact that time does not play a specific role in when species come forth, there
is, for Augustine, “fixity of species.”193
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McGrath suggests that even though Augustine clearly does not possess the scientific
knowledge that we have, nevertheless, “the ways in which he interacts with his scientific
authorities and personal experience suggest that, on this point at least, his views would be
open to correction in the light of prevailing scientific opinion.”194 For Augustine, the believer
is not to become stuck in a position merely for the sake of tradition. If, in a thorough study
of Scripture, greater light is shed upon a subject, then one should be willing to accommodate
this increased knowledge.195 Therefore, McGrath believes that Augustine, due to his belief in
the “ongoing creation,” would be open to the teachings of biological origination that are
found in Darwin’s Origin of Species.196
What does this mean in terms of the human observer? For McGrath, it is inevitable
that humans would evolve in a universe such as ours. The fine-tuning of the universe,197 the
directionality of the evolutionary process toward intelligent beings,198 the emergent creation
of a “multileveled reality,”199 all point toward a universe that was, at its point of origin,
McGrath proposes, “virtually instantaneously endowed with potentialities for anthropic
development.”200 The human observer is not an accidental occurrence.
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Therefore, when McGrath compares the anthropic argument against that of
Augustine’s he finds that
Augustine’s model elegantly enfolds the broad features of modern cosmology; though
weak on detail, as one might expect, the broad brushstrokes of his approach resonate
strongly with contemporary understandings of the origin and development of the
cosmos. The intellectually capacious notion of rationes seminales [i.e., lo,goi spermatikoi.]
is consonant with a universe that evolves and, as time progresses and conditions change,
unfolds potentialities that were present early, though not yet actualized. There is no
fundamental difficulty in affirming the autonomy of nature to develop on the one hand,
and providential divine agency on the other.201
As an evolutionary theist, McGrath embraces the notion that “evolution is to be understood
as God’s chosen method of bringing life into existence from inorganic materials, and
creating complexity within life.”202 Thus, where Darwinian evolution would grant right of
place to random events in the evolutionary process, “evolutionary theism sees the process as
divinely directed.”203 What does this ultimately mean for the definition of human being?
McGrath, like Augustine, finds that the image of God is found in the rational
processes of the mind, which may be thought of metaphorically as the “footprints of the
Trinity.”204 McGrath is further influenced by Athanasius, who proposed that “humanity was
created by God in such a way that, ‘by looking into the heights of heaven, and perceiving the
harmony of creation, they might know its ruler, the Word of the Father, who, by his own
providence over all things, makes the Father known to all.’” Therefore, McGrath proposes,
“although Athanasius holds that human nature has been corrupted by sin, his understanding
201
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of the dialectic of nature and grace is such that humanity retains a God-given capacity to
discern its creator within the created order.”205 But who is given this ability to discern God?
Only the predestined elect. If we return to Augustine, predestination means that
“God withholds the means of salvation from those whom he has not elected.”206 Out of all
the human beings destined by their fallen state (due not to their own chosen fallenness, but
as a direct consequence of their proto-ancestors’ original sin) for “perdition,” God chose to
save a few; the rest he ignored; in other words, “they were merely not elected to
salvation.”207 Those who were chosen may see God in his creation and believe.208 It seems
that these are the only “real” human beings, who have been restored from original sin to a
complete, or moving toward complete, restoration of their original being. But how do we
know who has been elected?
McGrath proposes that “for Augustine, God bestows justifying righteousness upon
the sinner, in such a way that it becomes part of his or her person. As a result this
righteousness, although originating from outside the sinner, becomes part of his or her
person.”209 While this is certainly good news for the elect, it must be remembered, however,
that such help is given only to those chosen few whom God has elected from eternity. If
humans are biologically determined, physically determined, spiritually determined, then by
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what means can they be held responsible for the inhumane treatment of the Earth and its
occupants?
Augustine’s anthropology poses important questions. While he certainly anticipates
the theology-and-science dialogue in his quest to draw together theology and natural
philosophy, his concept of human being and its relation both to God and others leaves
serious questions as to whether he will be able to resolve the problem of human
accountability and thereby fulfill the relational aspects of human being.
Conclusion
The anthropic arguments indicate that the universe is not only friendly toward life,
but that the human observer plays an important role in the way that history flows through
time, a point that is taken seriously by scholars such as Barrow and Tipler, who look for a
universe that will continue to nurture Mind and intelligence as a part of its emergent
properties. McGrath, who seeks to find a common ground upon which to engage in
interdisciplinary dialogue about nature as God’s creation, helps to open the door to fruitful
contributions from theology; however, his acceptance of the Augustinian view of human
being leaves questions about the role that humans play in the universe and whether they
have any real accountability for their actions.
If human beings have the capacity for shaping and influencing the flow of history
through the creation of social concepts and structures that govern human behavior, then it
appears that the definition of human being plays a central role in determining how humans
interact with their environment. In light of this significant insight, we will next examine
Heidegger’s twofold and integrated definition of Being/being and how this definition might
be influential in the human engagement with nature.
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CHAPTER 3
MORE THAN PURPOSE: RETHINKING TELOS FOR A RESPONSIBLE
ONTOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE ENVIRONMENT210
Introduction
There is a correlation between the way that human being is defined and the way in
which the human observer relates to the natural environment. In tandem with my hypothesis
is the notion that human beings are teleological in nature, meaning that as observers they act
purposefully. In other words, they may act positively or negatively toward their
environments, and through their actions (or lack thereof) effect change.
In light of this capability to influence and shape their environment, in the previous
chapter I explored the definition of human being from the perspectives of a natural science
informed by philosophical perspectives and one that was influenced by Christian theology.
In addition, I broached the question of human accountability as a necessary element of
human being. In order to begin answering the accountability question from within the
theology-and-science dialogue, I must first establish the possibility of a common ontological
ground of human being. To accomplish this task, I will begin by examining the definition of
human being proposed by Martin Heidegger. Heidegger, who examines the question of
being against the backdrops of human technology and the telic cause, is, as with my previous
210
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dialogue partners, concerned about how humans impact their environment as relational
beings.
Therefore, in contrast to contemporary scientific thought, which calls into question a
viable teleology of nature, Heidegger suggests not only the need for applying the telic cause
within the moral realm, but indicates the need for a wider application of it that respects the
bounds of scientific objectivity, while providing a basis for environmental responsibility
within the natural world. In other words, behavior toward the environment is directly related
to the way in which human being and purpose come together in definition.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Heidegger’s definition of telos and its
relationship to being and to discuss three possible implications of applying this
understanding of being toward a more responsible approach to the environment. I will begin
by briefly examining Heidegger’s understanding of the telos and the role that it plays in the
process of causation.
The Heideggerian Definition of Telos
In an examination of the modern understanding of technology in his essay “The
Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger suggests that the telic cause plays a
foundational role in Aristotle’s system of thought, underlying his entire structure of
causation. In his example of the development of a sacrificial vessel from concept to tangible
object, he points out that, for Aristotle, the telos is
above all responsible for the sacrificial vessel. It is that which in advance confines the
chalice within the realm of consecration and bestowal. Through this the chalice is
circumscribed as sacrificial vessel. Circumscribing gives bounds to the thing. With the
bounds the thing does not stop; rather from out of them it begins to be what after
production, it will be. That which gives bounds, that which completes, in this sense is
called in Greek telos, which is all too often translated as “aim” or “purpose,” and so
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misinterpreted. The telos is responsible for what as matter and for what as aspect are
together co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.211
Heidegger raises a number of intriguing suggestions about Aristotle’s telos: it is above
all responsible for the object; in advance the telos confines and circumscribes the object within certain
limits, that is, in the case of the sacrificial vessel as consecration and bestowal; by
circumscribing the object, it is given its bounds; the bounds, in turn, free the object to be, in its
postproduction phase, what it was in advance confined and circumscribed to be. Thus the
telic cause provides more than simply aim or purpose. In the act of placing an object within
bounds, it frees the object to become its intended self, and to pass from potentiality into
actuality.
In order to lay the ground for his discussion, Heidegger challenges several notions
that he believes have crept into philosophy in regard to the question of causation. First, he
wishes to challenge the meaning of the term “cause,” as “that which brings something
about,” thereby calling into question the notion that the efficient cause “sets the standard for
all causality.”212
Following Aristotle’s lead, that art imitates nature, Heidegger acknowledges that the
difference between art and nature lies with the role and identity of the so-called efficient
cause.213 In nature, Aristotle and Heidegger agree, the primary cause is the Supreme Being
called God.214 However, there are also secondary movers in the world. These movers, while
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not originating causes in and of themselves, are, nonetheless, capable, with the help of the
other causes, of directing, delimiting, and circumscribing the material objects of the world.215
While movers are not limited to intellectual beings, as in the case of self-replicating natural
processes, it is the secondary and specifically human causes that Heidegger addresses in “The
Question Concerning Technology.”
Heidegger’s goal, however, is not to differentiate between causal agents. His ultimate
goal is to examine the question of Being/being and he accomplishes this task by turning to
the question of causation, especially the telic cause. What defines the being of a thing?
Heidegger asks. To answer this question, he turns to what he believes to be the defining
characteristic of the modern scientific age.
Heidegger sees the modern scientific age as being technological in nature. However,
he asserts, “technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology.”216 What then is the
essence of technology? He states:
According to the ancient doctrine, the essence of a thing is considered to be what the
thing is. We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is. Everyone
knows the two statements that answer our question. One says: Technology is a means to
an end. The other says: Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of
technology belong together. For to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them
can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his
knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god” (Identity and Difference, 54ff.).
For further discussion of this materialistic concept of Greek theology, see Frederick
Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy, Volume 1, Greece and Rome (New York: Image Books,
1993); Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, Heraclitus Seminar, trans. Charles H. Seibert
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1994); Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology; and
Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature.
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is a human activity. The manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines,
the manufactured and used things themselves, and the needs and ends that they serve, all
belong to what technology is. The whole complex of these contrivances is technology.
Technology itself is a contrivance, or, in Latin, an instrumentation.217
According to Aristotle, the telos is an intimately connected process that brings
together the essence or being of a thing, its instrumentality, and the activity that sets it in
motion for the purpose of reaching its specified ends. This is because Aristotle sees the
formal and telic causes as essentially being two sides of the same coin. He notes that “the
definition (formal) and the final (telic) cause are the same.”218 Heidegger, who capitalizes on
this two-sided coin, contends, “Wherever ends are pursued and means are employed,
wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality.”219
This leads us to the second point of challenge. Heidegger questions the idea that the
four causes may work individually apart from one another, noting that “the four causes are
the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else.”220
Stepping back from an examination of the clearly observable (the particular) to contemplate
their ultimate meaning (the universal) is the goal that Aristotle has in mind.221 Thus the task
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This is what Aristotle has in mind when he discusses moving from a particular to
a universal mode of investigation: “When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have
principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge and
understanding is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted
with its primary causes or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its elements.
Plainly, therefore, in the science of nature too our first task will be to try to determine what
relates to its principles” (Physics 1.1.184a.10-15). To fully know an object, then, is to know
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of philosophy is to connect the physical (material cause) with the metaphysical (formal/telic
and efficient, whether divine or human, causes). In other words, metaphysics supplies the
hermeneutical circle—the grounds and limitations in which the process of interpretation
takes place. Heidegger notes: “Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific
interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age
the basis upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all
the phenomena that distinguish the age. Conversely, in order that there may be an adequate
reflection upon these phenomena themselves, the metaphysical basis for them must let itself
be apprehended in them.”222 In order to understand the true meaning of physical
phenomena—the “why”—it is necessary to contemplate the metaphysical basis upon which
they are grounded.
Integral to the process of understanding is the way in which causation works.
Heidegger sees the four causes as coming together in a mutually responsible way in order to
bring about causation. He considers the example of a silver chalice. The material cause of the
silver chalice is, obviously, silver. Thus the chalice is indebted to the silver because without
the silver it would not exist as a silver chalice. The silver chalice, as a sacrificial vessel, is not
only indebted to the material cause. It is indebted to the aspect which the vessel takes as a
chalice, which gives it its “chaliceness”; in other words, the silver did not become a ring or a
brooch. Thus the formal cause also comes into play in the formation of the silver chalice.223
the relationship of its existence with its primary causes or first principles, and thus the “first
task” of scientific observation is “to try to determine what relates to its principles.”
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The material and formal causes are not all that pertain to the making of the silver
chalice. There are two other causes: the telos and the so-called efficient. As noted above, the
telos performs a number of important functions in the process of causation: It is “above all
responsible for the sacrificial vessel.”224 In confining, circumscribing, and bounding an
object, the telos limits and gives directionality in the actual coming forth of the object. The
object takes its shape, form, and function from the totality of causation, of which the telic
cause is the foundation: “The telos is responsible for what as matter and for what as aspect
are together co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.” 225
Heidegger notes that “there is a fourth participant in the responsibility for the
finished sacrificial vessel’s lying before us ready for use, i.e., the silversmith—but not at all
because he, in working, brings about the finished sacrificial chalice as if it were the effect of a
making; the silversmith is not a causa efficiens.”226 The role of the silversmith is not an
originating cause. Heidegger sees the silversmith as an artisan using technē as the means by
which the silver chalice is brought about. While in nature an object appears to come forth in
itself, as in a blossom bursting into bloom, in art (technē) the silver chalice does not come into
being on its own as a silver chalice.227 Rather, the silver chalice exists because “the
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movers), there still remains above all the Unmoved Mover (Physics, 8.5.257b.24-26, “the
necessity that there should always be motion makes it necessary that there should be some
mover that is either unmoved or moved by itself”), for, according to Heidegger,
“metaphysics is onto-theo-ology” meaning that there is always a mover who moves or there
would be nothing (Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 54). Heidegger and Fink address this
issue in lectures 1 and 2, referring to the directedness of the One in bringing forth being as a
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silversmith considers carefully and gathers together the three aforementioned ways of being
responsible and indebted [i.e., the material, formal, and telic causes].” As such, the
silversmith is responsible for the point of departure in which the silver moves toward
becoming a silver chalice that is circumscribed for the purpose of use as a sacred vessel.
“The three previously mentioned ways of being responsible owe thanks to the pondering of
the silversmith for the ‘that’ and the ‘how’ of their coming into appearance and into play for
the production of the sacrificial vessel.”228 But what happens when the efficient human cause
comes to consider itself as both the beginning and end of causation? This leads to a third
reason for re-examining Aristotle.
The third and primary reason for Heidegger’s wish to restore Aristotle’s true
understanding of the telos in “The Question Concerning Technology” is that he wishes to call
into question the purely instrumental and nonpsychological understanding of causation that
has become the hallmark of modern technological understanding.229 His proposal, while
“steering” and debating the nature of that steering in terms of coercion (i.e., determinism).
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allowing for the possibility of divine action in the world,230 is also a call for moral,
responsible action on the part of humanity as tenants within and caretakers of the natural
environment.231 Heidegger’s biographer, Rüdiger Safranski, states: “Heidegger’s ideas in Being
and Time can be summed up in one sentence: Do whatever you like, but make your own
decision and do not let anyone relieve you of the decision and hence the responsibility.”232
The responsibility that belongs to humans is to contemplate the meaning of Being. Being is
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Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. Ewald Osers
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 166. This idea of “do whatever you like, but
make your own decision and do not let anyone relieve you of the decision and hence the
responsibility” finds its roots deep in seventeenth-century European thinking. For example,
it is stated in a foreman’s speech at the induction of a printing apprentice to the level of
journeyman: “‘Live as you like but be an honnête homme [an honest person], no hypocrisy’”
(Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History [New
York: Basic Books, 1984], 89). Darnton notes that “hypocrisy turned out . . . to be the main
characteristic of the bourgeois, a superstitious religious bigot. He occupied a separate world
of pharisaical bourgeois morality. The workers defined their ‘republic’ against that world and
against other journeymen’s groups as well—the cobblers, who ate inferior cuts of meat, and
the masons or carpenters who were always good for a brawl when the printers, divided into
‘estates’ (the casse and the presse) toured country taverns on Sundays. In entering an ‘estate,’
[the journeyman] assimilated an ethos. He identified himself with a craft; and as a fullfledged journeyman compositor, he received a new name. Having gone through a rite of
passage in the full anthropological sense of the term, he became a Monsieur” (ibid.).The
journeyman, who was supposed to have moved beyond the superstitions of the general
peasantry, is, however, still caught somewhere between superstition and objectivity. Darnton
successfully shows how the popular culture of seventeenth-century France was still deeply
mired in the superstition of the medieval period, even as the Enlightenment sought to bring
the light of science that would make superstition extinct. Even the printers, who had some
level of literacy and thus a certain liberating education, he points out, “lived and breathed in
an atmosphere of traditional customs and beliefs which permeated everything” (ibid., 92).
Bringing together Darton’s discoveries with Heidegger’s musings on being, it seems that
knowledge itself, here in the form of some literacy, is not enough to break the bands of
superstition entirely; nor is it enough to move higher within society. Heidegger here
proposes that only an intentional search for the meaning of Being will provide an antidote to
superstition and hypocrisy.
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not merely the domain of metaphysics or theology, but is necessary for science to be
possible. This is because one of the tasks of science is to identify as accurately as possible the
objects of nature. Heidegger notes in Identity and Difference:
What the principle of identity, heard in its fundamental key, states is exactly what the
whole of Western European thinking has in mind—and that is: the unity of identity
forms a basic characteristic in the Being of beings. Everywhere, wherever and however
we are related to beings of every kind, we find identity making its claim on us. If this
claim were not made, beings could never appear in their Being. Accordingly, there would
then also not be any science. For if science could not be sure in advance of the identity
of its object in each case, it could not be what it is. By this assurance, research makes
certain that its work is possible. . . . The claim of the identity of the object speaks,
whether the sciences hear it or not, whether they throw to the winds what they have
heard or let themselves be strongly affected by it.233
Heidegger here brings together the two sides of the formal/telic coin, uniting them
systemically. Without these two elements, identity would not be possible. The form,
investing to material its objectness, and the telos, bringing with it the circumscription,
bounds, and directionality are not only inseparable from one another, but also are, according
to Heidegger, necessary for identity to take place. The problem of the acting efficient,
human cause in modern society and the mark that it leaves upon nature is the point to which
Heidegger next turns.
The final and crucial point, for Heidegger, is that we must examine thoughtfully and
carefully the reality of the universe which we inhabit. To correct the problems that we face,
we must do more than simply acknowledge the symptoms. Rather we must understand the
underlying meaning of being.
Heidegger outlines two phases of Being/being in Identity and Difference: being, as in
the belonging to the totality of being; and Being, as present to humanity in the unique sense
233

Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 26.

89

of reason and thought.234 He describes these two phases as “belonging together” and “belonging
together.”235
In regard to the first point, “belonging together,” Heidegger notes:
If we think of belonging together in the customary way, the meaning of belonging is
determined by the word together, that is, by its unity. In that case, “to belong” means as
much as: to be assigned and placed into the order of a ‘together,’ established in the unity
of a manifold, combined into the unity of a system, mediated by the unifying center of
an authoritative synthesis. Philosophy represents this belonging together as nexus and
connexio, the necessary connection of the one with the other.236
Thus it is that humans, as beings within the united whole of nature, are connected with all of
the rest of nature. We share its abundance, but also share in its problems and crises.
However, this is not the sum totality of being. There is also the phase of Being, in which
there is a “belonging together.”
For Heidegger, the “belonging together” plunges beneath the surface of being in
search of Being:
When we understand thinking to be the distinctive characteristic of man, we remind
ourselves of a belonging together that concerns man and Being. Immediately we find
ourselves grappling with the questions: What does Being mean? Who, or what, is man?
Everybody can see easily that without a sufficient answer to these questions we lack the
foundation for determining anything reliable about the belonging together of man and
Being.237
To put the matter in its most simple terms, for Heidegger, the “belonging together” is
a direct reference to the soul. The soul is able to transcend the clearly observable to
understand its deeper meaning. Referring to Thomas Aquinas’s demonstration of the
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transcendence of Being, Heidegger remarks that Thomas accomplishes this task “by
invoking an entity which, in accordance with its very manner of Being, is properly suited to
‘come together with’ entities of any sort whatever. This distinctive entity, the ens quod natum
est convenire cum omni ente [“the being whose nature it is to meet with all other beings”], is the
soul (anima). Here the priority of ‘Dasein’ [Being] over all other entities emerges.”238
To further highlight the difference between the two phases of Being/being,
Heidegger states: “Man obviously is a being. As such he belongs to the totality of Being—
just like the stone, the tree, or the eagle. To ‘belong’ here still means to be in the order of
Being. But man’s distinctive feature lies in this, that he, as the being who thinks, is open to
Being, face to face with Being: thus man remains referred to Being and so answers to it.”239
Of all created beings, Heidegger avows, humanity alone possesses the ability to think,
judge, reason, to ponder and reflect.240 “A belonging to Being prevails within man, a
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belonging which listens to Being because it is appropriated to Being.”241 Therefore,
Heidegger urges, we must learn the true meaning of Being. The purpose of science is not
simply to acknowledge the activities of nature or to use it for instrumental purposes, but to
understand its underlying meanings. Because humans are endowed with a capacity for moral
reasoning, the task of understanding lies not only in seeing humanity as part of the
systematic whole of nature, but of understanding the connection between ourselves and the
other components of nature—what it is that connects us together.
Failure to do so places humanity (and nature) within harm’s way. Heidegger
illustrates his point in a classic example by contrasting premodern and modern relationships
to the land:
a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals
itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly
cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to
take care of and to maintain (emphasis supplied). The work of the peasant does not
challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping
of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the
cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order,
which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is
now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to
yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy,
which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use.242
Heidegger suggests that there are ways to be a part of the living system of the world
without doing it irreparable harm by remembering all organisms’ intrinsic causes of being.
However, the tendency of the modern age is not to take care of or maintain the Earth, but to
challenge it. Through human activity that challenges rather than cares for and maintains,
Heidegger contends, the meaning of the land, air, the ore, indeed the meaning of life itself,
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has been changed, redefined. This point is further emphasized by considering an airplane
that stands ready for use on the runway: “Revealed, it stands on the taxi strip only as
standing-reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to ensure the possibility of transportation. . . .
Seen in terms of the standing-reserve, the machine is completely unautonomous, for it has
its standing only from the ordering of the orderable.”243 But should it concern us that
airplanes are viewed as “unautonomous” “standing-reserves”? Heidegger contends that it
indeed should, for here lies the heart of the society built upon a purely instrumentalist
technology: “Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the
energies of nature can this ordering revealing happen. If man is challenged, ordered, to do
this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standingreserve?”244 To the extent that humanity loses sight of its Being (“And God said, ‘Let us
make man in our image, after our likeness,’” Gen 1:26),245 so, too, it loses sight of its
responsibility toward its being as a unity within nature. Such a state is reflected not only in
the emergence of environmental crises, but in the treatment of humans toward one another.
Ultimately, Heidegger’s understanding of the telos, with its deep intertwining with the
material, formal, and efficient causes, which it underlies, is a challenge to consider carefully
the role of the telos in moving toward a more responsible approach to the environment.
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Heidegger quotes the passage from Genesis in the note following his equation of
“soul” with “Being” (Being and Time, 34, n. vii). It can also be added that humanity, even in its
high connection to God, is not a separate entity from nature in that “God formed man from
the dust of the ground,” but there is always that something other as well that separates
humanity from all other earthly creatures: its image, granted by God, and “the breath of life,”
placed there by God (Gen 2:7). So there is always a tension in humanity.
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Telos: Toward a More Responsible
Approach to the Environment

How, then, might we apply the lessons of Heidegger toward real life? Toward what
applications might the telos lend itself? Three possible suggestions emerge:
1. The telos supports the notion that Earth’s resources are limited and proposes seeking more than
a simply instrumental, economic approach toward natural resources, of which humans are a part.246
Environmentalist Bill McKibbens muses that “the earth is a museum of divine intent, and as
the museumgoers we should be responsive not just to the beautiful mosaic but also to the
specifications. For example, the planet we live on is not so large after all.” While the
circumference of the globe may still seem quite large, vertically, however, the world is very
small. “Just a few miles above—a couple of hours walk if we could walk straight up—you
come to the end of the useful atmosphere. . . . Into this narrow envelope between ground
and atmospheric ceiling is squeezed pretty much everything that maintains life.”247
E. O. Wilson concurs, noting that because “Homo sapiens is a species confined to an
extremely small niche,” and because “alien planets are not in our genes,” then “it follows that human
self-interest is best served by not overtly harming the other life forms on Earth that still
survive.” 248 While Wilson’s comments here are pointed to the inability of humanity to
tolerate “much tinkering,”249 the same warning also applies to all life things. With the Earth
poised to witness the massive “extinction of a quarter of the species of plants and animals on
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the land by mid-century” from “climate change alone,”250 there is a need to ponder carefully
the ways in which we live and challenge the Earth. While humans may not have intended
such terrible consequences, the fact remains that human activity, in the process of creating a
safer and more desirable environment for itself, has placed the entire system at risk. As
Wilson points out, human activity has presented a number of crises that must be attended to.
These destructive activities include: “habitat loss, including that caused by human-induced
climate change; invasive species (harmful aliens, including predators, disease organisms, and
dominant competitors that displace natives); pollution; human overpopulation, a root cause
of the other four factors, and overharvesting (hunting, fishing, gathering).”251
But with Wilson’s list of environmental crises comes a corresponding series of moral
dilemmas. How should humans respond to the environment? If, for instance, ethanol
becomes the transportation fuel of the future for the express purpose of reducing
greenhouse gases, does it really make the environment safer? In what ways will agriculture
change as a result, including food production, land allocation, soil and water conservation?
In terms of human overpopulation, the possibilities for committing grave and unforgivable
grievances are frightening to consider. Heidegger’s call to reflection on the ontological
character of life is, therefore, timely.
2. Because the ontological being of each object of nature is acknowledged within the concept of telos,
there is a moral imperative to care for all natural resources with respect and not simply as a means to an
end.252 Heidegger’s two-phase concept of Being/being highlights the unique place that
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humanity occupies in the Earth: as beings, humanity belongs within the delicate system of
Earth. Simon Conway Morris aptly highlights the interconnectedness of life, pointing to the
necessary size and location of the Earth (i.e., the “Circumstellar Habitable Zone”),253 the size
of the Moon,254 and the role of Jupiter as a gate-keeper and protector from invading
comets,255 and even comets themselves256—all these and more preserving a delicate and
fragile concept called “life.”
What is life from this universal perspective? Molecular biologist Tibor Gánti finds
three physical indicators, which must all be present simultaneously, and which are the
minimum differentiation between living (i.e., “chemoton”) and nonliving systems: the
presence of a metabolic (i.e., the supply and transformation of nutrients for the whole animal
such as the digestive tract, secretory organs, blood circulation, and reproductive system)
subsystem, a membranous, geometrical subsystem (which provides well-defined borders
such as skin and bones), and an informational and control subsystem (i.e., nervous
system).257 Gánti notes that “the existence and co-operation of these three subsystems is the
keeping of truth.”
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prior condition for the presence of life at the prokaryotic level. If any of them is absent, the
system is no longer alive.”258
Gánti expands his basic units of life, the chemoton, into more complex units that
make up “biological supersystems, whose elementary units are living cells themselves.”259
Thus, for Gánti, there are two basic levels of life: primary life, which is life at the prokaryotic
level (the chemoton), and secondary, or “real,” life, which is characterized by a higher level
of organization as laid out above to ensure the coordinated working of the organs under
given internal and environmental conditions.”260 Because Gánti believes that “the secondary
life is the real life of the animal,”261 he finds moral imperatives, especially in regard to human
life, to be inherently necessary. Questions regarding the beginning of real life, its ending, and
the care and maintenance of it in the in-between stages become essential.
Heidegger maintains that humanity as Being cannot escape the moral dilemma of
being on Earth. The way that we treat the crops in the field eventually spills over into the
way in which we relate to the Other, whether that Other be ourselves or other living
creatures, extending even to prokaryotic life forms.
3. The extreme anthropocentrism of a purely instrumentalist technology may be called into a
responsible relationship with nature, including humanity itself, through a cooperative effort on the part of all
disciplines.262 How, then, should we look at the Earth? Alister E. McGrath suggests that
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The telos, while respecting scientific objectivity and the need to limit its scope of
reality to the observable, makes it possible for broader applications to be made across the
97

the Christian understanding of creation leads directly to the conclusion that there is a
correspondence—the degree of which requires clarification—between the works of God
and the being of God. Creation and redemption are not merely interconnected within
the economy of salvation; they can each be argued to embody the character of God. For
the Christian, the creation is not divine, but bears the hallmarks of divine crafting. The
fundamental assumption of a responsible natural theology . . . is that we are authorized
by Scripture to seek a partial disclosure of the glory of God through the works of God in
creation. God is rendered in and through the creation.263
The imperative to care for and maintain the creation is, according to the Scriptures,
the first task given to humanity (Gen 1:28). This imperative is not a license to exploit and
dominate in terms that have become all too familiar, but is rather, according to McKibben,
“the call to humility and the call to joy.”264 He muses: “This nonrational world of smells and
sounds and sights, of immersion, of smallness and quietness, answers to some of our deepest
yearnings.”265 Why? Because ultimately, we are Being and being. Necessarily we are linked to
the creation through the shared rarity of life, which is carefully orchestrated in such a way
that life is possible against the greatest odds, and to the divine, who is the one who
orchestrates, allowing humanity the right to step up to the task of creating a more
responsible approach to the environment.
Heidegger’s understanding of the telos thus extends far beyond the realm of the
merely philosophical. Instead, it reaches into the heart of scientific and theological
investigations as they seek to understand the “why,” the “how,” and the “what for” of
disciplines. Following the perspective of a stratified reality, as used by McGrath, each
discipline brings to the table its own methodology and scope of reality (Reality). Cf. my
review of McGrath’s work, “Review Article: Alister E. McGrath’s A Scientific Theology,” 341355. McGrath is influenced in his approach to a stratified reality by Bhaskar, The Possibility of
Naturalism.
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nature. Most importantly, however, the telos demands respect and a sense of personal
accountability for all of life in all its multifarious forms. For no matter how small, seemingly
insignificant, or grotesque a life may appear to be, it is, in the end, an integrated and
necessary part of the greater whole.
Conclusion
I have shown in this chapter that there is a necessary relationship between concepts
of human being and the telos. Being/being is an active state that requires purpose. Therefore,
the way in which humans define themselves in terms of being has a moral impact on the
world because being itself is geared toward purpose. However, it is necessary to ask if
Heidegger’s ontology goes far enough.
As we have argued, humans are not simply physical beings, they are also moral
beings. But, as was suggested in the previous chapter, humans recognize their full potential
as spiritual beings only when they encounter the Creator God. It is important, then, to take
into account the intensely theological nature of human being.
Heidegger appears to make room for a theologically grounded concept of human
Being/being by taking seriously the relational nature of human being. It is not difficult to
envision ways that this understanding can be used to address critical problems in the
environment as it brings together the physical and moral attributes of human being.
However, in order to determine whether it fulfills the requirement of also recognizing and
integrating a spiritual dimension of human being, we will need to turn, in the following
chapter, to Heidegger’s concept of God and its relationship to human being.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PRE-SOCRATIC CONCEPT OF GOD AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON HEIDEGGER’S CONCEPT OF BEING
Introduction
Heidegger proposes that the question of human Being/being is central to our
understanding of life itself and for defining the role that humans play in the greater realm
beyond themselves. His treatment of both the moral and physical attributes of human being
provides a foundation from which humans may envision a care-taking role in their
engagement with the environment. However, does his ontology go far enough? Does it allow
for a spiritual dimension within the concept of human being?
To answer this question, I will examine Heidegger’s concept of God and how it
relates to his understanding of human Being/being. I will allow Heidegger to dialogue with
the nineteenth-century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche, whose philosophy
Heidegger considers to be the conclusion of the Western concept of being, provides the
opportunity for Heidegger to carry his own concept of being to its logical conclusion.
Nietzsche’s mantra that “God is dead” is indicative, Heidegger asserts, of how Western
Christianity has lost its own sense of being by becoming a social political force Heidegger
terms “Christendom.” However, just when one expects that Heidegger now will address the
value of apostolic Christianity as a possible tool for bringing corrective to the Western
history of interpretation of human being, in an ironical turn of events he does not seek the
lost roots of Christianity in the foundational Scriptures of the Hebraic-Christian tradition.
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Instead he turns to the roots of Western Greek philosophy and, in particular, to Heraclitus,
reasoning that in doing so he has removed all the problems and presuppositions of
Christendom that Nietzsche so ably sheds light upon. In doing so, Heidegger abandons
Christian theology, leaving his concept of Being/being uncompleted.
Therefore, in this chapter, I will continue my investigation of Heidegger’s concept of
human being. To accomplish this task, I will examine Heidegger’s encounter with and
evaluation of the Western concept of being that dominated Christian and natural
philosophical thought from the Pre-Socratics through Nietzsche’s revelatory word that
“God is dead.”
We now turn to Heidegger’s thoughts about Being and the history of Being.
The History of Being
. . . dh/lon ga.r w`j u`mei/j me.n tau/ta (ti, pote bou,lesqe shmai,nein o`po,tan o] fqe,gghsqe)
pa,lai gignw,skete( h`meij de. pro. tou/ me.n wv|o,meqa( nu/n d v hvporh,kamen . . .
“For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the
expression ‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become
perplexed.”266
As observers who long to understand the world beyond them, humans often find themselves
serving as the standard by which they compare and contrast the Other, the external natural
world in which they reside. In order to accomplish this task, it is necessary to understand
what one means by the term “being.” Plato’s Theaetetus here notes the ambiguity that
surrounds the question of being, pointing to the fact that being is simultaneously so familiar
that we innately recognize what it is, but yet, perplexingly, can provide no concrete definition
for it. Heidegger elegantly details this problem in his classic work, Being and Time,267 but later
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in life comes to the realization that the metaphysical genre from which he has argued
concerning being is itself problematic. “Metaphysics,” he proposes, “grounds an age, in that
through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it
gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete
dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish the age.”268
What are these phenomena that humans consider so vital for grounding the question
of being? Heidegger provides five instances of human activity that help to unveil human
being in the present age: science, machine technology, aesthetics, culture, and the loss of the
gods.269 These grand schema are often thought to provide the structure upon which modern
human being has progressively evolved to become. It would appear, Heidegger notes, that
human being, expressed as modern technological and scientific society, has sought the ability
to change the meaning of not only the things of nature but nature itself270 and to do so, as
Edward O. Wilson proposes, “without reference to religion or ideology and upon massive
scientific evidence.”271 These activities, it would appear, are the ultimate cultural elements
that provide the entry into defining human being.272 Or are they?
Heidegger addresses what appears from the surface to be an emergence of human
being from a theistically centered to a humanly centered concept that he sees reaching its
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climax and completion in Friedrich Nietzsche’s proposal “God is dead,”273 which is itself
anchored in the “human will to power” that is to Nietzsche the true essence of being.274 In
this proposal, “metaphysics is thought of as the truth of what is as such in its entirety, and
not as the doctrine of any particular thinker,”275 meaning that while Nietzsche’s perspective
may be thought of as the accurate depiction of an anthropocentrically centered (i.e., selfcentered, narcissistic, and nihilistic) concept of human being, it is actually only one
perspective that reflects its Western cultural roots. Therefore, while Nietzsche’s perspective
on being is certainly profound and induces one to reflection, Heidegger limits the scope of
Nietzsche’s depiction of being from a universal to a primarily local, cultural sphere of
influence. He proposes that although Nietzsche’s understanding of being is certainly
indicative of its Western roots, it is also “a reflection on the situation and place of
contemporary man, whose destiny is still but little experienced with respect to its truth.”276
The failure of Nietzsche, and perhaps the good news for the concept of human being, is that
his thought merely reflects a particular orientation, a certain culture and society; it is not the
final and most authentic depiction of being, human or otherwise.
Nevertheless, Heidegger believes that Nietzsche’s proposal is a powerful force with
which to be reckoned, for it is the culmination toward which the whole of Western society
and culture have been building, including even that grand bastion of Truth, the Christian
church, described by Heidegger and Nietzsche as a social, political force they call
273
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“Christendom.”277 Heidegger finds that Truth, for Nieztsche, becomes a value, which is itself
the essence of “the [human] will to power.”278 “Truth is now.” 279 Therefore, it is relative to
the situation, rather than normative. What comes higher in value than Truth? For Nietzsche,
“‘Art is worth more than truth’ (Will to Power, Aph. 853, 1887-88).”280 Human activity—science,
machine technology, aesthetics, culture, the loss of the gods—is the unveiling of human
being; however, it is an unveiling that has no ultimate grounding in Truth, but is, rather, a
constant cultural development of being. 281
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The Greek word for art is technē, from whence comes the English word
“technology.” Heidegger notes that “technē is the name not only for the activities and skills of
the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Technē belongs to bringforth, to poiēsis; it is something poietic” (The Question Concerning Technology, 13). Technē also is
linked “from earliest time until Plato” with the epistēmē. “Both words are names for knowing
in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at home in something, to understand and be
expert in it. Such knowing provides an opening up. As an opening up it is a revealing”
(ibid.). However, whereas epistēmē is knowledge, technē is “a mode of alētheuein. It reveals
whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can look
and turn out now one way and now another. Whoever builds a house or a ship or forges a
sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be brought forth, according to the perspectives of the
four modes of occasioning. This revealing gathers together in advance the aspect and the
matter of ship or house, with a view to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and from
this gathering determines the manner of its construction. Thus what is decisive in technē does
not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the
aforementioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that technē is a
bringing-forth” (ibid.). In other words, knowledge is knowledge, but in order to understand
what it means it must be put into context. Western society has made technē a means of
revealing what this knowledge means. It is the hermeneutical circle or horizon from which
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For Heidegger, the meaning of being is found in the historical manifestation over
time and not simply in the present instance, that is, not in Nietzsche’s or even his own
conception of it; rather it is found in what he understands to be the “history of being.” The
history of being reveals that we have moved from a concept of being to a concept of beings.
Therefore, while medieval scholastic metaphysics spoke of beings as entia creatum (“created
things”) and grounded them in en perfectissimum (“the perfect being,” God), likewise presentday metaphysics makes technology the ground of all being.282 In other words, Heidegger
proposes, being has become misidentified with beings 283—water to one philosopher, fire to
another, earth and air to yet others.
What is needed, Heidegger opines, is “the courage to make the truth of our own
presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be
called into question.”284 In what he calls the “Turning,” he recognizes that coming to
understand being from within the general realm of metaphysics is, therefore, “dangerous”
because in viewing human being only from within a particular cultural context, some element
of being remains hidden and veiled; the true essence of human being is lost.285 Speaking of
the “loss of the gods,” he finds that “whether the god lives or remains dead is not decided
by the religiosity of men and even less by the theological aspirations of philosophy and
interpretation takes place.
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natural science. Whether or not God is God comes disclosingly to pass from out of and
within the constellation of Being.”286
The question is, From whence does this conception of God arise? For Heidegger, it
arises from the roots of Western philosophy and it is here that he returns, especially to its
pre-Socratic origins, which he believes had not yet become corrupted by a socially and
culturally mediated metaphysics and thus preserves a truer, more fundamental sense of
being.287 Heidegger is interested in understanding how being extends itself beyond
metaphysics. He discovers that what draws together all the disciplines, Heidegger finds, is
their dedication to the study of being, which is reflected in the last syllable of each discipline,
“-ology”: ontology (the study of being), theology (the study of God), psychology (the study
of the mind), biology (the study of organic, living beings), cosmology (the study of the
origins of the universe), and archeology (the study of past civilizations). “The last syllable,”
he proposes,
means broadly and usually that we are dealing with the science of the soul, of living
things, of the cosmos, of ancient things. But –ology hides more than just the logical in
the sense of what is consistent and generally in the nature of a statement, what
structures, moves, secures, and communicates all scientific knowledge. In each case, the
–Logia is the totality of a nexus of grounds accounted for, within which nexus the
objects of the sciences are represented in respect of their ground, that is, are conceived.
Ontology, however, and theology are “Logia” inasmuch as they provide the ground of
beings as such and account for them within the whole. They account for Being as the ground of
beings. They account to the lo,goj, and are in an essential sense in accord with the lo,goj-,
that is, they are the logic of the lo,goj. Thus they are more precisely called onto-logic and
theo-logic. More rigorously and clearly thought out, metaphysics is: onto-theo-logic.288
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Because Heidegger’s concept of Being originates in pre-Socratic philosophy, it is from here
that he draws his descriptions. Referring back to the mythical high God, Zeus, he proposes
that it is “the lightning-flash of Being,”289 “the ground of all beings,” that is reflected in the
Western understanding of human being and the ways in which human technology, science,
aesthetics, culture, and, even, the loss of the gods have come to be understood. Heidegger is
not here speaking of the later Christian theology, but of the ancient theology of the preSocratic Greeks, which attempted to understand being through its trifold concept of
theology—theologia fabulosa (mythology), theologia civilis (civil law), and theologia naturalis (natural
theology)—all of which have their epistemological and ontological foundation in the Greek
notion that came to be called “providence” by the Stoics.290 If we can no longer see the gods,
or more importantly, God, then we cannot see who we are, we cannot see how to be, or
where our aspirations and activities take us because we no longer have a normative standard
of comparison; we have only ourselves to serve as a standard. It is in this sense that
metaphysics, for Heidegger, is onto-theo-logic and the reason why all logi,a become part of
the history of being.
Heidegger finds Nietzsche’s madman to be a particularly helpful metaphor of the
ultimate outcome of the Western concept of being. Nietzsche’s madman announces that
God is dead, then asks, “Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did
we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? . . . Is not night and more night coming
289
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on all the while? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning?”291 These four iconic questions set
the tone for our investigation into human being. The nature of their questioning is the
foundation of all reflective thought—if the first principle of interpretation is lost, if the
entire horizon upon which a society orients itself is wiped away, then upon what fixed point
shall we train the compass? Bereft of map and stars, we are left merely to drift into a night
that grows darker by degree.
Nevertheless, in spite of Nietzsche’s deep pessimism, Heidegger is confident that
there is a deeper reality that lies below any cultural expression of being. What is most often
thought of as being proclaimed dead by Nietzsche’s madman is the theistic God of
Christianity, which leaves humans to be the masters of their own fate and evolution. But a
closer look at the language used by both Nietzsche and Heidegger is revealing, pointing
instead to the death of Western civilization and the Greco-Roman roots upon which it is
built. Heidegger’s critique of “Christendom” is that Western Christianity has built its massive
theological, political, and scientific structure upon this Greco-Roman, that is, Platonic,
rock.292 Heidegger notes, “Metaphysics, i.e., for Nietzsche Western philosophy understood
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as Platonism, is at an end. Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the
countermovement to metaphysics, and that means for him a movement in opposition to
Platonism.”293 Then, evocatively, he cautions that Nietzsche’s nihilism is not directed against
what is truly Christian:
Hence, also, nihilism in Nietzsche’s sense in no way coincides with the situation
conceived merely negatively, that the Christian god of biblical revelation can no longer
be believed in, just as Nietzsche does not consider the Christian life that existed once for
a short time before the writing down of the Gospels and before the missionary
propaganda of Paul to belong to Christendom. Christendom for Nietzsche is the
historical, world-political phenomenon of the Church and its claim to power within the
shaping of Western humanity and its modern culture. Christendom in this sense and the
Christianity of New Testament faith are not the same. Even a non-Christian life can
affirm Christendom and use it as a means of power, just as, conversely, a Christian life
does not necessarily require Christendom. Therefore, a confrontation with Christendom
is absolutely not in any way an attack against what is Christian, any more than a critique
of theology is necessarily a critique of faith, whose interpretation theology is said to be.
We move in the flatlands of the conflicts between world views so long as we disregard
these essential distinctions.294
The key to better understanding the Western Christian concept of being depends then not
only on the rediscovery of Christianity’s own unique philosophical roots, but particularly in
understanding the way in which it lost touch with its original Hebraic-Christian roots.
In order to understand Heidegger’s final conception of being and the history of
being, we will turn to his confrontation with Nietzsche’s nihilism that takes its form in his
conception of the madman.
Heidegger and the Roots of a Greek
Theology of Human Being
Heidegger turns to Nietzsche’s madman as the ultimate example of a philosophy of
being that is firmly anchored in Platonism. Nietzsche’s metaphysics is “probably [Western
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philosophy’s] final stage.”295 The reason for this is quite clear to Heidegger: “The
suprasensory is transformed into an unstable product of the sensory. And with such a
debasement of its antithesis, the sensory denies its own essence. The deposing of the
suprasensory does away with the merely sensory and thus with the difference between the
two. . . . It culminates into meaninglessness.”296 What Heidegger means here is that man has
become a god and in a complete reversal of the Greek New Testament sense of Jesus
Christ’s incarnation (this is Nietzsche’s revelatory “word”). Human being has been separated
from its source of Being. Nietzsche’s madman rushes to the town square in the brightness of
the noon day with his lantern held aloft. A whole story of the degradation of a society is told
in this simple act by the madman.
Nietzsche not only uncovers the pre-Socratic roots of being with the madman’s
references to the lantern, but he goes beyond this to call into question the ancient Greek
anthropomorphism of the gods that ultimately leads to the overcoming of Greek
mythology297 and to demonstrate that what lies at stake in this overcoming is the role of
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Heidegger and Nietzsche argue that the downfall of the gods (i.e., mythology)
came with Plato’s development of ethics, which itself comes to an end with Nietzsche
(Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 61). However, Wolfgang P. Kunze, professor
emeritus, Andrews University, notes, in a private email dated 2 February 2012, that
Heidegger is incorrect on this point. The pre-Socrates also had an ethic, in spite of the
immorality of the gods, who behave badly in Homer’s and Hesiod’s writings and who were
themselves humans who had attained immortality through the founding of cities and other
heroic acts in prehistoric Greece (Will Durant, The Story of Civilization, Part II, The Life of
Greece [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1939], 38ff.). The gods simply reflect their human
origins and the ethics and morality of their creators (A Fine-Tuned Universe, 20, 24). For
example, when Patroclus dies and is cremated in the custom of the Achaeans, “games are
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human being in setting the hermeneutical horizon. Heidegger speaks of Nietzsche’s act of
unveiling as “the destining of two millennia of Western history.”298 But in his unveiling,
Nietzsche also obscures not only human being, but Being itself. In an effort to revive the
concept of Being/being that he so carefully constructed early in his career, Heidegger turns
chariot race Achilles offers ‘a woman skilled in fair handiwork’; and on the funeral pyre
horses, dogs, oxen, sheep, and human beings are sacrificed to keep the dead Patroclus well
tended and fed.’ Achilles treats Priam with fine courtesy, but only after dragging Hector’s
body in mangled ignominy around the pyre. To the Achaean male, human life is cheap; to
take it is no serious matter; a moment’s pleasure can replace it” (Durant, The Life of Greece,
48). McGrath notes that “By the time Varro [a Roman philosopher, 116 B.C.-27 B.C.] was
writing, mythology was seen as being primarily of dramatic rather than moral or intellectual
interest” (A Fine-Tuned Universe, 24). Nevertheless, in spite of the immorality of the gods,
there was an ethical system. Fredrick Copleston, S.J., notes of pre-Socratic society that “early
Greek philosophy, though naturally the work of individuals, was also the product of the City
and reflected to a certain extent the reign of law and the conception of law which the preSocratics systematically extended to the whole universe in their cosmologies. Thus in a sense
there is a certain continuity between the Homeric conception of an ultimate law or destiny
or will governing gods and men, the Hesiodic picture of the world and the poet’s moral
demands, and the early Ionian cosmology. When social life was settled, men could turn to
rational reflection, and in the period of philosophy’s childhood it was Nature as a whole
which first occupied their attention” (A History of Philosophy, Volume 1: Greece and Rome: From
the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus [New York: Doubleday, 1993], 14). Nature becomes the anchoring
point of Greek ethics, rather than the behavior of the gods, who rise no higher than the
humans. As McGrath notes, “immortality denoted only the infinite extension of existence,
not of moral qualities (A Fine-Tuned Universe, 24). This understanding is not even the
invention of the pre-Socratics, but has an even older tradition. As Copleston also points out,
even the earliest extant Greek writings are only “early” from our perspective. They reflect an
even more ancient and mature civilization (Greece and Rome, 14; for further discussion of
these even more ancient people and their beliefs, see Durant, The Life of Greece, 14f.).
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around us and in us.” It is thus in passion that we come to understand the will to power. The
immediate consequence of hate is the loss of the ability to reflect, the needed element for
building relationship. “The angry man loses the power of reflection. He who hates intensifies
reflection and rumination to the point of ‘hardboiled’ malice” (Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche,
Volumes 1 and 2, trans. David Farrell Krell [New York: HarperCollins, 1991], 1:48).
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to the ancient Western roots, which are to be found in the fragments of the pre-Socratic
philosopher Heraclitus.
Heidegger and Eugen Fink, in their Heraclitus Seminar, attempt to outline this process
of re-centering Western philosophy on its pre-Socratic roots. In a passing tribute to the
theology of the ancient pre-Socratic Greeks and its connection to the concept of being, Fink
remarks that when confronted by Heraclitus’s texts, “we are not so much concerned with
the philological problematic, as important as it might be, as with advancing into the matter
itself, that is, toward the matter that must have stood before Heraclitus’s spiritual view. This
matter is not simply on hand like a result or like some spoken tradition; rather, it can be
opened up or blocked from view precisely through the spoken tradition.”299 Fink here
reiterates a favorite position of Heidegger, that somewhere in the course of questioning after
this spiritual sense of Being, being itself became obscured in the very act of clarification. It is
no wonder, then, that Nietzsche’s madman provides Heidegger with such a compelling
characterization of the decline of Western thought—this society had lost its ability to see and
to know in the very act of becoming Enlightened.300 It had done so in its commitment to
uncover the truth of the natural realm and human being through the dismissal of traditional
forms of religious revelation and its seeking to empirically define being as mere phenomena,
observed and experienced.301 It is for this very reason that Heidegger reaches back to the
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By “becoming” I mean here, similarly to Heidegger, that there is a progression
and development of thought that comes to fruition and culmination in Nietzsche. Nietzsche
is the end of the Enlightenment, even though, as the madman states, his “time has not yet
come.”
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Heidegger laments that the broad approaches to causality and being as evidenced
in, e.g., the Aristotelian causes, have been reduced to the physical efficient cause alone (The
Question Concerning Technology, 7). There are two basic approaches that, broadly outlined, are
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beginning of pre-Socratic thought—to Heraclitus—in order to attempt to recapture the
essence of the Western conception of being, which is itself a “spiritual” task, not simply an
empirical, rational one.302 He hoped that he could find the “sweet spot” that once existed
before philosophy obscured the meaning of being. Nietzsche’s madman becomes, for
Heidegger, the mediating figure that opens the way back to this ancient conception of being,
while yet standing, without true knowledge or understanding, in the midst of his own being.
the older continental approach that is centered on philosophical theology and the
British/American empirical approach (McGrath briefly alludes to this difference in A FineTuned Universe, 22-23). While Heidegger is concerned about the obfuscation of being in both
approaches, he is especially concerned that the empirical approach has reduced the question
of being to a purely physical approach (here we distinguish between a “physical” and a
“natural” understanding of being. As we shall discuss below, the natural approach to Greek
thought overtly and deliberately includes both physical and metaphysical elements, while
modern scientific approaches seek to dismiss the metaphysical elements). For further
discussion of the difference between the structure of continental philosophy, see John E.
Murdoch, “The Analytic Character of Late Medieval Learning: Natural Philosophy without
Nature,” in Approaches to Nature in the Middle Ages, ed. Lawrence D. Roberts (Binghamton,
NY: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1982), 171-213; and for the
British/American approaches to natural theology and ultimately the question of human
being, “which stressed the importance of the providential ordering of nature and the
consequent lawful operation of the universe as a proof of divine superintendence and the
power of the divine will,” see McGrath, A Fine-Tuned Universe, 22-23; for McGrath’s deeper
analysis of concepts of nature, including his own, see Nature). I have had the privilege of
being tutored in both the philosophical-theological and empirical perspectives: the
continental view under the private tutoring of Wolfgang P. Kunze, professor emeritus,
Andrews University, Berrien Springs, Michigan, and the empirically based approach under
my doctoral adviser, John T. Baldwin (see, e.g., “The Argument to Design in British
Religious Thought: An Investigation of the Status and Cogency of Post-Humean Forms of
Teleological Argumentation with Reference to Hume and Paley” [Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago, Divinity School, 1990]).
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The problem of seeking an empirical answer to the question of being is
determining whether one has isolated the actual true nature of an object so that its true being
(i.e., its primary or intrinsic being) has been found or if it has had a secondary or extrinsic
being added to it in such a way that its primary being has been altered. Technology, e.g., to
Heidegger is a “revealing” of being rather than a “manufacturing” process. In other words,
technology reveals its human maker and in so doing places a new meaning upon the matter
or organism which it alters (see, e.g., Heidegger’s discussion in The Question Concerning
Technology, 13ff.).
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In order to better understand this point, let us here imagine what lies behind the actions of
Nietzsche’s characters as they gather in the marketplace (for the complete passage, see
Appendix A at the end of this dissertation).
The madman who lights a lantern in the bright morning hours is, it would appear,
the counterpoint to Enlightened man. He is the one who recognizes that the Enlightenment
is still bathed in darkness and so he brings his lighted lantern. In spite of the struggle to find
that original sense of being in mythology (Greek or otherwise), or the “common sense” of
civil law (granted by providence to human society)303 and the bursting forth of natural
theology in the Enlightenment and scientific revolution (expressed through teleology and
history), it appears to Nietzsche’s madman that darkness is drawing on, that the very
foundation of Western society is collapsing around about him.
I suggest that the symbols that Nietzsche employs to convey this collapse are
evocative of ancient Greek theology: The madman’s lighting of the lantern and his cry, “I
seek God! I seek God!” point to the deep underlying theological roots of Western thought,
but leaves the question, Who is the god that the madman seeks (theologia fabulosa)? His
running to the marketplace points toward the secularization of Western theology and the
roots of modern Western politics (theologia civilis). The “bright morning hours” refer to the
triumph of Enlightenment and the scientific revolution (theologia naturalis). But still there is
the darkness. Human beings have become untethered from their source of Being—“God is
dead.”
There is, then, a deep symbolism in this introductory scene. The lantern, which
appears to be the erstwhile and badly chosen tool of the madman, is in actuality the
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grounding symbol of the ancient Greek concept of being—to reiterate Heidegger’s words,
“it is the ground of all beings.”
In both the theology of ancient Greece and that of Christianity (cf. John 8:12; 1:14;
also Matt 5:14), the concept of light plays an important grounding role, so it is not surprising
that Greek theology has been considered an appropriate dialogue partner throughout the
ages by Christian philosophers and theologians seeking an apologia for their systems of
thought.304 In order to understand the deep ties that lie between not only the theology of the
Western church and ancient Greek philosophy, but also the relation between natural
theology, natural philosophy, and the natural sciences, it is necessary to “unveil” the meaning
of the lantern, for it serves as both nexus and connexio in bringing together the various
manifestations of human being across the disciplines.
As we have noted, Heidegger finds a starting point for the Western conception of
being in the pre-Socratics, especially the philosopher Heraclitus, who is best known for his
belief, as recorded by Aristotle, that “all things are in motion, nothing steadfastly is.”305 John
Burnet proposes that, while Heraclitus does not seem to have made this direct statement,306
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I will be guided in this process by Heidegger and Fink’s Heraclitus Seminar, given
during the winter semester of 1966-1967 at Freiburg University. Although they use Hermann
Diels’s translation and arrangement of Heraclitus’s fragments as their text for the seminar,
they choose a new arrangement of the fragments because they wish to “cast light on an inner
coherence of the fragments’ meaning, but without pretending to reconstruct the original
form of Heraclitus’ lost writing, Peri. fu,sewj [On Nature] (ibid., 4). For the English
translation of Diel, see Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete
Translation of the Framents in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1966). “Though Freeman has been consulted, Diels’ rendition of the fragments are
newly translated throughout the present work [Heraclitus Seminar]” (Heidegger and Fink,
Heraclitus Seminar, 163, n. 3).
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nevertheless his understanding of fire as the essence of all things fits well within this idea,
noting that “fire burns continuously and without interruption. It is always consuming fuel
and always liberating smoke. Everything is either mounting upwards to serve as fuel, or
sinking downwards after having nourished the flame.” The logical conclusion, then, is that
the whole of realty is “like an ever-flowing stream, and that nothing is ever at rest for a
moment. The substance of the things we see is in constant change. Even as we look at them,
some of the stuff of which they are composed has already passed into something else, while
fresh stuff has come into them from another source.”307 Heraclitus’s understanding of flux—
change and movement—appears to be reality. For Heraclitus, as well as the later Stoics who
borrowed from him, the essence of all things (ta. panta,) is fire.308 The burning fire changes
everything it touches.
However, there is a nonintuitive element in Heraclitus’s philosophy. While it appears
that the essence of all things is change and movement, Frederick Copleston, S.J., warns that
Heraclitus does not see things only in terms of flux and change, “for this is contradicted by
the rest of his philosophy. Nor is the proclamation of change even the most important and
significant feature of his philosophy.”309 Rather, Heraclitus has a revelatory “word” for
humanity—a revelation about being—that loses its value immediately, Copleston proposes,
if it is only the pronouncement that everything is changing.310 The underlying message that
Black, 1920), Burnet notes that this does not seem to be direct quotation by Heraclitus (ibid.,
70).
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the essence of all things is change and movement “consists in the conception of unity in
diversity, difference in unity.”311 This unity in diversity is the basis of the partitive view of the
human being: a body and an immortal soul, unified in their diversity, and is reflective of how
Heraclitus envisions the One.
For Heraclitus, the One—the impersonal god-force of the universe—“only exists in
the tension of opposites: this tension is essential to the unity of the One.”312 It is “Identity in
Difference.”313 For Heidegger, the principle of identity that is speaking here is “the Being of
beings. As a law of thought, the principle is valid only insofar as it is a principle of Being that
reads: To every being as such there belongs identity, the unity with itself.”314
What is the One-in-Many, the unity in diversity? For Heraclitus, and the Stoics who
later used his concept, the essence of being is Fire; that is, the presence of the One’s
movement within the Many.315 Fink notes that “Heraclitus speaks of pa.nta [the many] vis-ávis Kerauno,j [lightning]. In so doing, he enunciates a connection between many things
(pa.nta) and the one of lightning. In the lightning bolt, the many, in the sense of
“everything,” are lit up by the illumination of the lightning, thereby showing that
“‘everything’ is a plural.”316
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While the early church fathers would often comment on how the Greek concept of
God mirrored their own conceptions of the Christian God, the relationship between Fire
(Lightning), the One, and Zeus is not the manifestation of a personal God.317 Rather,
Heraclitus proposes, “the wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the
name of Zeus.”318 For the sake of demonstrating some aspect of the divine, Zeus is used in
an anthropomorphic sense, but the One, in neither its abstract sense or in Zeus, is ever
personal and the people would never have believed that he is the actual manifestation of
God. The One, for Heraclitus, is “the universal Reason (lo,goj), the universal law immanent
in all things, binding all things into a unity and determining the constant change in the
universe according to universal law.”319
The way in which the One (i.e., Universal Reason) works is through movement, or as
Fink describes it, “in the lighting of lightning, in the outbreak of brightness,” which “goes
out from e]n to. sofo,n [“the wise is one thing only”] and continues on in the many things in
entirety.”320 The task of the lightning is to go out from the Wise One to “diversify things in
movement,” which is the “coming-to-being” of things.321
In Fr. 1, Heraclitus speaks of the coming-into-being of all things. Here there is a
differentiation between ginome,nwn (i.e., coming-to-be) and ge,nesij (genesis). While
“ginome,nwn [coming-to-be] belongs to ge,nesij [genesis],” it differs in meaning from that
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used in the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures. “When the Bible speaks of ge,nesij, it means by
this the Creation, in which things are brought into existence [ex nihilo],”322 and by a personal
Creator God. But what does the word mean in the Greek sense?
Heidegger proposes that what the Greeks meant by ge,nesij “we can also label as
ontic.”323 Heidegger distinguishes between “ontic knowledge” and “ontological knowledge”:
“Ontic knowledge is knowledge pertaining to the distinctive nature of beings as such, it is
the knowledge of the sciences, whereas ontological knowledge is the basis on which any
such theory (of ontic knowledge) could be constructed, the a priori conditions for the
possibility of such sciences.”324 For the Greeks, then, the coming-to-be of things is not the
coming-to-be of material things, for matter is eternal.325 Likewise, so is Being as the ground
of all beings. Rather, coming-to-be means that eternal matter is illuminated and moved, that
is, steered, by the lightning, which in its act moves things by bringing them into the light and
thereby diversifying them. The lightning is not the source of Being—Being comes from the
lo,goj.326 The lightning is the agent of Being and with its lighting up of matter, the beings
themselves become differentiated into their respective types. The coming-into-being is the
phenomenal occurrence of being, which the natural sciences study. Fink uses the following
analogy to help illustrate this point:
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As lightning on a dark night lets us see everything individual in its specific outline all at
once, so this would be in a short time span the same as that which happens perpetually
in pu/r avei,zwon [ever-living fire] in Fr. 30. The entry of entities in their determinateness
is thought in the moment of brightness. . . . Now we can say that it [the movement of
lighting in the lightning bolt] is the movement of bringing-forth-to-appearance. But
bringing-forth-to-appearance, which lightning accomplishes in entities, is also a steering
intervention in the moving of things themselves. Things are moved in the manner of
advancing and receding, waxing and waning, of local movement and alteration. The
movement of lightning corresponds to the moving of e]n to. sofo,n [the wise is one
thing only]. . . .
As the captain, in the movement of the sea and winds to which the ship is exposed,
brings a course to the movement of the ship, so the steering bringing-forth-toappearance of lightning gives to all entities not only their outline but also their thrust.
The steering bringing-forth-to-appearance is the more original movement that brings to
light the whole of entities in their manifold being moved and at the same time withdraws
into it.327
Thus there is a process deep at work within nature that imputes being to matter.
Heidegger likens this process to that of cybernetics,328 “the science of communications and
automatic control systems in both machines and living things.”329 The process at work is not
God, working as an efficient agent steering matter through the creative act of genesis: “The
Greeks did not have faith in their gods. There is . . . no faith of the Hellenes.” And in spite
of the fact that the Greeks had myth, myth is something other than faith.330 Rather than a
theistic understanding of a personal Creator God who intervenes in history, the One of
Greek theology is a material force. The One is, Heidegger and Fink suggest, the material of
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inheritance, that is, genetics,331 and it is this concept of being that they ultimately accept as
the grounding of Western thought. Heidegger’s concept of Being/being comes to its
culmination in a materialistic force, genetics.
Heidegger’s understanding of the thinking, reflective, relational being that humans
are becomes muddied by his desire to abandon the traditional roots of Christianity with its
concept of the image of God. In reality, it is Heidegger, even more than Nietzsche, who
renders God dead. W. J. Korab-Karpowicz concludes that as with many of his
contemporaries, Heidegger
adopts a Eurocentric perspective and sees the revival of German society as a condition
for the revival of Europe (or the West), and that of Europe as a condition for the revival
for the whole world; like them, while rejecting God as an end, he attempts to set up
fabricated ends for human beings. . . . Like being, which he describes as ‘disclosing selfconcealing, after making a disclosure he withdraws. . . . He says: ‘only a God can still
save us,’ but the God for whom, in the absence of philosophical thought, he now looks
is clearly not that of the Christians or of any contemporary religion.332
By rejecting God as an end, Heidegger seems to actualize the opposite of his earlier
philosophical potential. His thought is not in continuity with the rest of Western thought;
rather it is “a history of radical transformations. Christianity challenges the classical world,
while assimilating some aspects of it, and is in turn challenged by modernity. Modernity
overturns the ideas and values of the traditional (Christian and classical) culture of the West,
and, once it becomes global, leads to the erosion of nonwestern traditional cultures,”333
which Heidegger, in his joining of the Nazi party, helped to accomplish. His concept of
being without the image of God has nowhere further to go.
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Heidegger has proven to be a helpful dialogue partner. However, he cannot
ultimately stand as the “master of being,” for he bludgeons his own concept of being in his
rejection of the image of God. He is not incorrect in understanding the physical mover of
human beings to be genetics, but his concept of Being/being, which is so helpful from the
moral and physical perspective, needs a truly spiritual (i.e., Christian theological) perspective.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored Heidegger’s concept of human Being/being as it
relates to his concept of God. Heidegger, at the critical juncture in his confrontation with
Nietzsche, turns from what has thus far appeared to be a theistic concept of God to a
materialist concept of God as understood by the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus.
As Heidegger’s commitment is no longer to a theistic concept of God, I will retain
his thoughts on Being/being as presented in the previous chapter, but move on toward a
theology of human being that is based upon Christian theology. In the following chapter, I
will explore whether the theological foundation of the Augustinian concept of human being
is sufficiently relational.
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CHAPTER 5
RETHINKING THE AUGUSTINIAN CONCEPT
OF HUMAN BEING334
Introduction
Human being provides an appropriate common ground from which interdisciplinary
dialogue may commence. However, even though moral and scientific perspectives can
provide reasonable possibilities for dealing with critical relational problems relating to
human being, such as those of the economy and ecology, it has been suggested that a
theological perspective is also needed to address the relationship between God and human
being.
Within the theological perspective, Alister E. McGrath discusses the possibility of a
theology-and-science dialogue grounded on the Augustinian tradition. However, I concluded
that Augustine’s anthropology, particularly in relation to the problem of human
accountability, was not sufficient for my definition of humans as relational beings.
In this chapter, I will explore more fully Augustine’s approach to human being,
particularly in regard to (1) his dualistic approach to the immortal soul and body and the
concept of original sin, and (2) the meaning of history and the concept of predestination.
Next, I will explore two critiques of these concepts: (1) Anna Case-Winters explores how
334
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dualistic concepts have negatively impacted the concepts of God and humans, as well as
relationships between humans and their environment; (2) Rudolf Bultmann investigates how
the Augustinian concepts of history and predestination seriously impinge upon human free
will and accountability.
The Augustinian Concept of Human Being
Two central ideas in Augustine’s perspective that are important to the Christian
theology-and-science dialogue are, first, the twin notions of the special creation of the
immortal soul and original sin, and second, the problem of history and predestination.
Augustine’s views on these areas are, briefly, as follows:
1. The immortal soul and original sin. The soul is immortal for Augustine for two
reasons: “It is the subject of a science which is eternal;335 and “it is the subject of reason,
which is not changed,” that is, is timeless as God is, and thus it cannot become mortal.336
Augustine’s complete human being is not a dual being as Descartes would later describe it;
nor was it based upon the idea that the body was a corrupt vessel that “trapped” the pure
soul within it. Rather, a true human being, according to Augustine, was a composite of body
and soul. As Michael Mendelson notes, Augustine does not see the material world as
inherently evil in and of itself. We are not “trapped” in the world as in the Manichean
proposal. “Rather, it is a more subtle problem of perception and will: we are prone to view
things materialistically and hence are unaware that the sensible world is but a tiny portion of
what is real [Confessions IV.xv.24], an error Augustine increasingly attributes to original sin [De
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Libero Arbitrio III.20; De Civitate Dei XIII.14-15].”337 Humans become accustomed, due to
this limited insight, to focusing only on the sensible world and so it becomes a place of
“moral danger, one wherein our will attaches itself to transitory objects that cannot but lead
to anxiety [Confessions VII.xi.17-18].”338 For Augustine, then, immortality was lost due to
Adam and Eve’s free choice to disobey God: “Man’s nature . . . was created at first faultless
and without sin.”339 Now, however, this original sin is passed on through “natural
propagation.”340
When challenged by the Pelagians on the passing on of original sin by “natural
propagation,” Augustine contended that while human procreation is motivated “by the
concupiscence which is in his members, and the law of sin is applied by the law of his mind
to the purpose of procreation,” the righteous do not “carnally beget, because it is of the
Spirit, and not of the flesh, that they are themselves begotten.”341 Adam and Eve thus lost
their first access to a limited immortality through sinning, and this tendency to sin was
passed on in some mysterious way to their offspring, and on to the entire human race
through the act of human willing to disobedience. Now humanity must find salvation
through the subjugation of the will to God. For Augustine, then, the human being only
reaches its true actuality when it subjects its will to God’s will and reunites the changeless,
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immortal soul with the changeableness of the human body and corrupted mind. The
immortal soul becomes the true nature of the restored human being.342
Immortality belongs to the soul, or mind, for, as Augustine proposes in a subtitle,
“Mind is Life, and Thus It cannot Lack Life.” “For whatever dead thing is said to be
abandoned by life, is understood to be deserted by the soul. Moreover, this life which deserts
the things which die is itself the mind, and it does not abandon itself; hence the mind does
not die.”343 Here Augustine’s Platonism comes to the fore. Plato, in Phaedo, records
Socrates’s final conversation before his execution, noting that Socrates stated: “I want to
make my argument before you, my judges, as to why I think that a man who has truly spent
his life in philosophy is probably right to be of good cheer in the face of death and to be
very hopeful that after death he will attain the greatest blessings yonder.”344 He then asked,
“Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?” Having received an affirmative answer,
he asked, “Is there anything else than the separation of the soul from the body? Do we
believe that death is this, namely, that the body comes to be separated by itself apart from
the soul, and the soul comes to be separated by itself apart from the body? Is death anything
else than that?”345 Socrates, after a discussion concerning the way that the body impedes the
acquisition of knowledge, notes that “freedom and separation of the soul from the body is
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called death.”346 The soul, Socrates proposes, after being imprisoned in the body becomes
polluted by its association,
having always been associated with it and served it, bewitched by physical desires and
pleasures to the point at which nothing seems to exist for it but the physical, which one
can touch and see or eat and drink or make use of for sexual enjoyment, and if that soul
is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is dim and invisible to the eyes but
intelligible and to be grasped by philosophy—do you think such a soul will escape pure
and by itself?347
The punishment for impurity is for such souls to wander, “paying the penalty for
their previous bad upbringing. They wander until their longing for that which accompanies
them, the physical, again imprisons them in a body, and they are then, as is likely, bound to
such characters as they have practiced in their life.”348 Thus the soul becomes reincarnated in
another body similar to the bad one that died. The goal is, then, to live a good life while it is
possible to do so, for the soul is life itself. Socrates said, “What is it that, present in a body,
makes it living?—A soul. . . . Whatever the soul occupies, it always brings life to it?—It
does.”349 For Socrates, death was only, then, of the body; his soul, he believed, would live on,
enjoying the benefits of the afterlife.350
If the soul and body, then, have different origins, from where does Augustine’s soul
come? The Catholic Encyclopedia proposes that Augustine takes a moderate position between
traducianism, the heretical doctrine which proposes that, “in the process of generation, the
human spiritual soul is transmitted by the parents,” and creationism, “the [orthodox Roman
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Catholic] doctrine that every soul is created by God.”351 Augustine’s own position is known
as “generationism,” which is a mild form of traducianism. “When a distinction is made
between the terms traducianism and generationism, the former denotes the materialistic
doctrine of the transmission of the soul by the organic process of generation, while the latter
applies to the doctrine according to which the soul of the offspring originates from the
parental soul in some mysterious way analogous to that in which the organism originates
from the parent’s organism.” The Catholic Encyclopedia goes on to note that both traducianism
and generationism are against the notion of emanationism352 and evolutionism due to the
fact that both traducianism and generationism posit that “the first human soul originated by
creation. They differ only as to the mode of origin of subsequent souls.”353
The Catholic Encyclopedia contrasts the pros and cons of generationism, which
Augustine held. Speaking in favor of the view, generationism preserves, as does creationism,
the “union of body and soul, which constitutes the human being. A murderer really kills a
man, although he does not destroy his soul.” Further, humans differ and are hierarchically
superior to animals due to humans’ “spiritual nature which requires that it should be created
by God.” The argument against generationism is that the “organic process of generation
cannot give rise to spiritual substance” because “the soul is immaterial and indivisible,” thus
“no spiritual germ can be detached from the Parental soul (cf. St. Thomas, “Contra gent.” II,
c. 86; “Sum. theol.” I:90:2, I:98:2, etc.). As to the power of creation, it is the prerogative of
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God alone (see Creation, VI).”354 Roman Catholicism, then, while not explicitly condemning
generationism, is opposed to it and it cannot “be held without temerity.”355
2. History and predestination. For Augustine, “predestination involves God withholding
or making available, according to the divine will, the means by which salvation is possible.
Augustine stresses that the divine judgment which determines who will be allowed to be
saved in this manner is beyond human understanding.”356 Turning to the biblical examples of
Tyre and Sidon, he proposed that God knew from eternity that they would not believe, thus
he did not make their eventual, eternal punishment worse by forcing upon them a direct
knowledge of himself. For Augustine, predestination is from eternity and, therefore, beyond
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(Christian Theology, 361).
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the choice of humans, unless so empowered from eternity by God in his foresight of
individual human beings.357 Augustine saw this as a merciful act by God, noting:
Therefore the mercy is past finding out by which He has mercy on whom He will, no
merits of His own preceding; and the truth is unsearchable by which He hardens whom
He will, even though His merits may have preceded, but the merits for the most part
common to Him with the man on whom He has mercy. As of two twins, of which one is
taken and the other left, the end is unequal, while the deserts are common, yet in these
the one is in such wise delivered by God’s great goodness, that the other is condemned
by no injustice of God’s. For is there unrighteousness with God? Away with the
thought!358
Human free will and the nature of the human being are called into question by the
Augustinian worldview. If humans are dual organisms, even composite unions of body and
soul as in the Augustinian perspective, then some evangelicals argue that classical theology is
at risk for even greater dualisms in social orderings that lead to the subjugation of humans
on the basis of issues such as gender or ethnicity and social classism (see Anna Case-Winters
below). Others worry that the Augustinian worldview leads to the notion of fate in regard to
human destiny and thus to a lack of human accountability (see Rudolf Bultmann below).
These two concerns are also important to the Hebraic-Christian perspective, and CaseWinters and Bultmann help to lay a foundation for discussion of these issues.
Anna Case-Winters: A Critique of Reformed Theology
and the Relation of God to the World
A growing number of evangelical theologians express concern about the ecological
and economic crises that assail the planet. As a result, a number of these theologians and
scientists-turned-theologians have come to embrace forms of feminist philosophical
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theology (e.g., Rosemary Reuther, Sharon Welch, Nancy Frankenberry, and Vandana Shiva)
and Process thought (e.g., Charles Hartshorne, Ian Barbour, John Cobb, John Haught, Philip
Clayton, and David Griffin).
Anna Case-Winters, a professor of theology at McCormick Theological Seminary,
Chicago, shares her concerns about the current ecological crisis that is facing planet Earth
and searches for a way for Christian theology to address the problem.359 Writing from
insights she has gained from feminist theology and Process thought, as well as from the
religion-and-science dialogue, she argues that Christianity has much to say about a theology
of nature and encourages Christians to search for ways to live more conservatively and
sustainably for the sake of the planet, especially for those who are most vulnerable. She rises
to the challenge brought forth by critics of Christianity, particularly those regarding
Christianity’s “desacralization of nature, its dualisms and elevation of the spiritual over
material reality, and its habit of ignoring or resisting scientific understandings of the natural
world,” believing that it is important to study such critiques so that if there is even a
modicum of truth in them that Christianity should recognize and correct its theological
expression(s) and approach(es) to nature.360
Case-Winters begins by contemplating “Why We Need a New Theology of Nature,”
which includes deconstructing the traditional Christian views of “the state of nature” and
“the state of theology.” She finds a necessary relationship between the “companion crises”
in ecology and economy, noting that “the work of eco-justice (eco-logical and eco-nomic) is
359

Anna Case-Winters, Reconstructing a Christian Theology of Nature (Aldershot, England:
Ashgate, 2007).
360

Ibid., see esp. chap. 2.

131

one work.”361 Thus her goal is to better grasp human self-understanding in relation to the
rest of nature.
In her book, Reconstructing a Theology of Nature, Case-Winters addresses a number of
important deconstructive elements in the Augustinian worldview, three of which are
important to this study: (1) “a critical appreciation of Christian tradition should be
evidenced”; (2) “the anthropocentric and dualistic habits of thought that are embedded in
Christian tradition should be addressed”; and (3) “an accounting that is fully conversant with
scientific perspectives on the origin and operation of the natural world should be
developed.”362
“A Critical Appreciation of Christian Tradition”
One of the most important points in Scripture is that God is involved intimately in
the creation, sustenance, and maintenance of life in the universe. Case-Winters believes
strongly in this point and draws a careful line between a pantheistic perspective, in which
God is the world, and a wholly transcendent God, who is completely other than the world.
Here she is heavily influenced by Process thought, which “maintains divine immanence
alongside a reconstructed understanding of transcendence [she has] called ‘relational
transcendence,’”363 which means that there is a two-way relationality between God and the
world. She notes, “God is not the world and the world is not God. But neither are these two
mutually exclusive. God is in the world and the world is in God. There is a genuine relation
of mutual influence because God and the world are internally related. Internal relations
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between entities entails there [sic] being co-constituted in such a way that what happens in
one affects what happens in the other and vice versa.”364 Case-Winters’s perspective stands in
contrast to the classical Augustinian view in which “the world is internally related to God
(subject to divine influence) while God, on the other hand, is externally related to the world
(not influenced by the world, impassible).”365
While I strongly agree with Case-Winters’s first point, that we must return to
Scripture as our source for understanding God’s relation to the world and with her
contention that classical Christian thought needs to be thoroughly deconstructed in regard to
God’s impassivity to the world, I am uncomfortable with her reliance upon Process and
feminist thought to accomplish her perspectives, primarily because it directs her away from a
biblical perspective and toward a more nuanced philosophical perspective. She notes that
“God leads the way in the creative advance, all the while supporting the creation in its
freedom and respecting its integrity. . . . The traditional theological idea of a ‘principle of
plentitude’ illumines this apparent directionality in the evolutionary process.”366 Yet, God
guides, she proposes, all levels of the creation, from the tiniest particle to the most complex
of all organisms, the human being, both allowing for freedom to thwart his plans and to
conform to his “luring.” Each level of the creation responds appropriately to God’s activity
at its own level.367 The eschatological problem that arises from this position is that God has
no ultimate goal for history—a problem that we will encounter again in our discussion of
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Bultmann—and responds only within the present evolutionary process. In other words, the
historical acts of God in history are not to intentionally direct history toward an
eschatological goal, but to make each act eschatological in the present moment. While there
is certainly a freeing of the historical future from the eternity of the past and a call for human
accountability in the present, both of which are needed, the focus seems more on human
action and involvement than on God’s directionality in history.
Anthropocentrism and Dualism
I also find Case-Winters’s second point to be helpful in which she calls into question
the problems of anthropocentrism and dualism that have become embedded in classical
Christian thought. In chapter 1, she presents the case for a new theology of nature by
offering a sampling of various ecological and economic crises with which the world is
currently contending. Her examples include the increasing consumption of nonrenewable
energy sources such as fossil fuels, global warming, diminished biodiversity, and armed
conflict over resources. While these examples are not new to environmental discussion, they
are helpful in reminding the reader of the need for reform and for providing a reminder of
the terrible impact that flagrant usage of natural resources has upon the poorest and most
vulnerable elements of society. Her examination of economic crisis in the global economy is
provocative and includes discussion of the ever-increasing gap between rich and poor (e.g.,
“In 2001, the average annual pay of USA CEOs was 350 times as much as the average
annual pay of a factory worker, who earned on average $31,260”), economic globalization
(e.g., globalization has led to “human exploitation and environmental degradation,” meaning
that there has been a “commodification,” in which people and their labor are treated as
commodities, nature is commodified as well,” while local cultures have been annihilated and
replaced with “a kind of consumer monoculture”), debt crisis (in which poor nations’ debts
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become a form of enslavement from which they can never escape), the AIDS pandemic (the
poor cannot pay for medication to treat the disease and young people are cut down in their
prime), and population explosion (Earth’s human population reached 6.2 billion in 2002, is
now at 7 billion, and is expected to reach 8.9 billion by 2050). The “neo-liberal economic
globalization” of economic trade includes “unrestrained competition and consumerism,
privatization of public utilities and natural resources (like water), unlimited economic growth
and accumulation of wealth—all without social obligation.” Of deep concern, then, is the
fact that “of the 100 largest economies in our world today, 49 are nation states and 51 are
corporations.” In such a society, “the transnationalization of corporations and capital” mean
that there is no “state” to provide moral or civil boundaries. There is no concept of
“common welfare,” leaving labor and nature open for exploitation.368
In the face of such difficulties, Case-Winters asks, “Where Do We Go from Here?”
Her first response is to re-envision the “Common Good.” Based on the research of Herman
Daly and John Cobb, she proposes that the common good is not something that is limited to
humans, but must take into account the wider community of all living organisms, of seeing
the world as a “community of communities.”369 Thus there is a need for understanding
wholeness of life on Earth, for understanding the interconnectedness of all the parts
together. Living organisms are valued not simply for their service potential for humans, but
for their intrinsic value. For Case-Winters, humans become a part of the whole process of
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the universe, “reframed as a ‘link in the vast communitarian chain of the cosmos’” and
“humans cannot be abstracted out of this larger web of being as a species apart.”370
For me, Case-Winters’s understanding of humans, as she expresses it here, is the
most disturbing part of her proposal. Coming, as I do, from a more traditional view of
humans as made in the image of God, it seems, by contrast, that she relinquishes too much
in her attempt to stress the point that humans need to become more eco- and enviro-centric
in their orientation and that in seeing humans as evolutionarily related to the rest of nature
they are better equipped to step into these roles. I am not ready to acquiesce to the notion
that there is no special difference between humans and other earthly life forms, although I
can relate to her concern that seeing humans as the crowning act of creation can lead to a
sense of entitlement over the so-called “lower” forms of creation. Nevertheless, her position
is not a necessary conclusion.
The Gen 1 account—or, in fact, any part of the Scriptures—does not in any way
condone human dominance over the creation. Rather, the Scriptures hold humans
responsible for care-taking as their divinely appointed task (Gen 1:26-28). Human beings
were intended to bear the image of God in the world in the carrying-out of their role as caretakers of their earthly home. That this was to be a role of care-taking rather than the
domination and exploitation of the natural realm is noted in Isa 11:8 (NIV), which describes
the “Peaceful Kingdom,” in which the law of God prevails supreme on Earth because
humans willingly observe it (“They will neither harm nor destroy on all my holy mountain,
for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the LORD as the waters cover the sea”), and in
Rev 11:18c (NIV), which underscores that in the final outpouring of God’s wrath on
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unrepentant humanity, a significant purpose for the final judgment is “for destroying those
who destroy the earth.” The connection between physical and moral perspectives is
important from the point of ecological and economic crisis—as humans move through the
world, their moral behavior, or lack thereof, has physical causal consequences, which put
into play a series of events that are thereafter out of their control and which may lead to
catastrophic consequences.
Such a view does not require Christian theology to fall into neo-animism, in which
God is virtually inseparable from the world. This perspective is also not only a rejection of
neo-animism, but of the Augustinian concept of the immortal soul. The relationship
between God and his creation cannot be reduced to mere spirituality, but is, particularly in
regard to human-divine relationships, of a personal nature. God comes to dwell personally
with his people (“Then have them make a sanctuary for me, and I will dwell among them,”
Exod 25:8, NIV; “‘The virgin will be with child and will give birth to a son, and they will call
him Immanuel,’ which means, ‘God with us,’” Matt 1:23, NIV).
This biblically based perspective also deals with the problem of original sin. While it
is true that the consequences of the sin of Adam and Eve have been passed to the entire
creation in the sense of cause and effect (cf. Rom 5:12ff.), the fate of individual humans is
not a matter of predetermined destiny, a point that I will return to in my discussion of
Bultmann.
A Scientifically Informed Natural Theology
Case-Winters’s proposal that natural theology should be scientifically informed is a
proposal that I can also agree with. Too often in the course of history, theology has relied
more heavily upon the moral lesson than on the accuracy of the natural phenomenon,
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bringing with this an interpretation that splits reality into spiritual and material elements.371
Originally, Augustine’s intent was not to splinter reality into types, but to find spiritual
lessons in natural phenomena. He notes in his treatise De Doctrina Christiana that
all doctrine concerns either things or signs, but things are learned by signs. Strictly
speaking, I have here called a ‘thing’ that which is not used to signify something else, like
wood, stone, cattle, and so on; but not that wood concerning which we read that Moses
cast it in bitter waters that their bitterness might be dispelled, nor that stone which Jacob
placed at his head, nor that beast which Abraham sacrificed in place of his son. For these
are things in such that they are also signs of other things.372
Therefore, Augustine’s intent is clear: he is attempting to draw together the spiritual
and physical things to draw moral lessons, or signs, from them.
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Eventually, however, Augustine’s intent was lost. With Descartes came an intentional
splitting of reality into moral and physical realms, the realms of mind and body. CaseWinters is correct in calling into question the truth of Descartes’s myth of the body/mind
dualism in which he contends that
I correctly conclude that my essence consists in this one thing: that I be a cogitating
thing. And, although I might perhaps . . . have a body which is very closely joined to me,
because I have—on the one hand—a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am
only a cogitating thing and not an extended one, and because I have—on the other
hand—a distinct idea of [the] body, in so far as it is only an extended thing and not a
cogitating one, it is still certain that I am really and truly distinct from my body, and that
I can exist without it.373
Not only does Descartes prioritize mind over body, but he makes existence immaterial. The
mind does not need the body to exist. Such a view is not in agreement with the scriptural
notion that “the LORD God formed the man from the dust of the ground and breathed into
his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living being” (Gen 2:7, NIV).
While we must be careful in the separating of moral, spiritual, and physical attributes
of human being,374 we must also take care not to over relate these attributes of the human
being either. First, it is not simply a God-of-the-gaps argument to say that we do not
understand the relation between these aspects of reality; their relationship is a deep and
intriguing mystery that beckons us to a contemplation that eschews simplistic answers.
Second, while I agree with Case-Winters’s reason for rejecting all forms of dualism—because
it ultimately leads to the subjugation of the weakest elements of nature—once again, I
propose that a thoughtful reconsideration of the Gen 1 account in tandem with the rest of
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Scripture should lead to similar conclusions. In other words, each of the concerns brought
forth by Case-Winters and the critics of Christian theology can be corrected by a fresh
reading of Scripture.
Rudolf Bultmann and the Authentic Self
Rudolf Bultmann, who critiques twentieth-century evangelicalism’s propensity
toward Augustinian theology, examines Augustine’s concept of time as it relates to history
and eschatology, the soul and freedom of the will, and the understanding of human being.
Citing Gerhard Krüger, Bultmann orients History and Eschatology: The Presence of
Eternity toward the statement, “‘Today history is our biggest problem’. Why is it so?” 375
Looking back on the recent events played out in his own life, Bultmann shuddered at how
history had, apparently, swept humanity along toward the cataclysmic events that resulted in
World War II. Reminiscing on the unlearned lessons from the French Revolution, he notes,
The powers which rule as fate over man are not only foreign powers opposed to his will
and plans but often such as grow out of his own will and plans. It is not only that “the
curse of the wrong deed ever must beget wrong,” as Schiller said, but good intentions
and well considered beginnings also have consequences which no one could foresee and
lead to deeds which nobody wanted to do.376
The lesson that Bultmann gleans from history is that “‘willed actions reach beyond the mark
of their intended goal, thus revealing an inner logic of things which overrules the will of
man.’” In the French Revolution, what was intended to result in “a liberal constitution and a
federation of free nations” led instead to military dictatorship and the death of countless
innocent bystanders; “it intended peace, and it led to war.”377 The question at stake, then, is
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“whether our personal existence still has a real meaning when our own deeds do not, so to
speak, belong to us.”378 If history is a mere coming to be and passing away, in which
humanity is “a ball in the play of the waves,” then history can be nothing more than the
playing out of fate.379
Christ’s entry into history forever changes the notion of time, Bultmann proposes.
Prior to Christ, time was the place in which preparation for his appearing, under the
guidance of Providence, took place. “The whole course of history has now a meaning.”380
However, history in both the Hebrew Bible and the Greek New Testament is seen as an
“organic unit,” a “unity of historical development.” The Christian church “amalgamates”
Greek and Hebraic traditions—medieval humanity finds freedom in the realization of God’s
order both in nature and history and through obedience to the laws of God given to the
church. It is here that Bultmann, as he contemplates Augustine’s new synthesis of history,
finds his true, authentic self and true existence.381
Augustine endorses this new teleological understanding of history, primarily on the
grounds of his belief in creation. Time and history are not “eternal cyclical movement”;
rather time has both beginning and ending that are determined by God. Bultmann notes that
“the Christian understanding of man is the decisive reason for this view. Augustine has taken
it over from Paul, and he unfolds it mainly in opposition to the ancient manner of thinking.
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For in ancient thought, man has to be distinguished in principle from the world.”382 It is here
that Augustine’s view of the soul and original sin comes to the fore. “Man as a being distinct
from world” and as a “free person” is now able with his own will to follow God or oppose
him. “He is free in his decision for good and evil, and therewith he has his own history.”383
As Bultmann studies the trajectory of Augustine’s view of history, now secularized as
it proceeds through time, he finds its ultimate expression to be progressivism.384 “This belief
in progress is not in accord with the Christian faith, indeed, it is opposed to it. It originated,”
Bultmann contends, “in the polemics against the Christian belief in providence.” Progress,
according to Voltaire, becomes “the progress of knowledge; and the meaning in history is
the fact that men become richer in knowledge and thereby in welfare.”385 This understanding
of history, combined with the discovery of civilizations that are older than the Hebraic one
and an “idea of progress promoted by science,” usher in biblical criticism and result in an
understanding of “eschatological perfection [that] is transformed into that of the everincreasing welfare of humanity.”386
However, even as the understanding of history as progress appears to bloom, its fate
is already sealed. This is because, Bultmann proposes, this teleological view of history,
expressed so eloquently in Augustine, asks that humans either “stand at the end or goal of
history and detect its meaning by looking backwards; or if we could stand outside history. . . .
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But man can neither stand at the goal, nor outside history. He stands within history. . . . And
this brings us again to the question: What is the core of history? What is its real object?”387
The answer, Bultmann states, is “man”; “to live in actions is the very essence of man,”
“history is constituted by human actions. ‘Action is distinguished from natural events in so
far as it does not merely happen, but has to be expressly performed, borne and animated by
some kind of consciousness.’”388 But it is a consciousness that is undoubtedly influenced by
natural events. Decisions about the present are influenced by past events and encounters
that bring about the future: “The future is open in so far as it brings the gain or the loss of
our genuine life and thereby gives to our present its character as moment of decision.”389
In seeing himself as a free being, Bultmann ultimately rejects the Augustinian view of
history, noting that in accepting a new life of grace, given by God, “I also decide on a new
understanding of my responsible acting. This does not mean that the responsible decision
demanded by the historical moment is taken away from me by faith, but it does mean that all
responsible decisions are born of love. For love consists in unreservedly being for one’s
neighbor, and this is possible only for the man who has become free from himself.”390
Bultmann’s view here is an echo of the apostle Paul’s second great statement on love in Rom
13:8-14. Paul’s central point in this passage is that love does not harm its neighbor;
therefore, it follows the moral law as set out in the Decalogue, which can be easily extended
to include Case-Winters’s concern for all living things. To care-take means to see other living
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things, including humans and natural resources, as more than things to be appropriated for
one’s own use. Rather, the goal of care-taking is to see also others’ intrinsic purposes for
being, granted through the creative acts of God.
Finally, and ultimately, Bultmann’s rejection of the Augustinian view of history is
also a radical rejection of the Augustinian conception of predestination. “To be historical,”
he asserts, “means to live from the future. . . . In principle, the future always offers to man
the gift of freedom; Christian faith is the power to grasp this gift. The freedom of man from
himself is always realised in the freedom of historical decision.”391 No longer a prisoner of
history and fate—of God’s eternal predestination—humanity is free to choose God’s
availing power to do what is good and right. Augustine’s proposal seals the individual’s
eschatological destiny from eternity. Bultmann, by contrast, recaptures the scriptural element
by making every moment an eschatological choice; the future is changed by the actions of
the present. For Bultmann, the “authentic self” is the moral being choosing to act under the
direction of God’s power to do right.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the Augustinian concept of human
being. It has been seen that there is a need to consider alternative possibilities that are more
compatible to a relational concept of human being. As suggested by Case-Winters, dualism
too often leads to the subjugation of the weaker elements both in society and nature.
Bultmann proposes that an understanding of free will and human accountability is virtually
nonexistent in the Augustinian concept of human being, and thereby abandons unelected
human beings to be pawns to fate.
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However, while a serious rethinking of the Augustinian concept of human being is
indeed called for, one does not need to be limited to arguing within the Augustinian tradition
itself. As I introduced at the beginning of this dissertation, we may re-examine the concept
of human being from within the Hebraic-Christian perspective, which bases its
understanding of humans as relational beings upon the ancient Hebrew cosmology found
throughout both the Hebrew Bible and the Greek New Testament.
Before I turn to the Hebraic-Christian perspective, it is important to first investigate
my hypothesis that there is a correlation between definitions of human being and the way
that humans interact with their environment, including other humans. In the following
chapter, I will explore how dualistic interpretations of human being carry baggage that
allowed for crimes against humanity. To neglect to consider the impact of human behavior
in historical terms would make this dissertation a mere academic exercise.
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CHAPTER 6
CREATION OF THE SOUL, CREATION OF THE BODY: THE
SOCIAL IMPACT OF DUAL CREATIONS IN CHRISTIAN
TRADITION AND THEIR RELATION TO
BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF
HUMAN BEING392
Introduction
The relationship between theology and science is deeply complex and, at points,
muddied, especially in regard to the question of human being. In this chapter, I will attempt
to better understand the relationship between theology and science in regard to human being
due to the heavy criticism that has been laid on theology for introducing terrible doctrines
about God and humans. Stephen Jay Gould, for example, is highly critical of the theological
justifications that lay behind racist views that came to life in the late eighteenth century and
continued unabated through the turn of the twentieth century. During this period, American
and European scholars in the behavioral sciences sought to institute a new scientific basis
that, consciously or unconsciously, upheld older types of racial profiling that had previously
justified the slavery and extermination of so-called savages. At stake in this profiling, Gould
believes, was the underlying hermeneutical horizon that continued, without change, to lay
392
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the foundation for the definition of human being.393 Arguments regarding human being
might run something like this, as noted by Adrian Desmond and James Moore:
Belief in Adam as the father of mankind was solid and the theological premise of antislavery. St. Paul’s message, ‘He . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men’ was
definitive. Every person of every race was descended from Adam and inherited his
‘original sin’. All men therefore needed to be saved. That was why the Church existed. If
all races were not of one species born of Adam, then the non-Adamic races would have
no original sin to be saved from. Missionaries to the heathen would be redundant. One
would no more need to convert those races or free their slaves than one would convert
or free domestic animals.394
This is a rather ambivalent understanding of human being. All humans might be descended
from Adam. If they were, they need to be saved from original sin; if they weren’t, they were
not really humans, at least not in an Adamic sense. Such a position raises questions such as,
Are all humanoid life forms really human? What makes a human completely human? Are
there more than one species or races of human beings? Does nature evolve the body, while
God provides the soul?
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ambiguity which surrounds the
question of human being at the point of intersection between theology and science. Both
theology and science work to understand how best to integrate science into theology,
especially in regard to the constitution of human being. As I propose, this problem is best
seen in dualistic conceptions of body and soul (i.e., monogenism, traducianism, and
polygenism) within the older orthodox traditions of the theology-and-science dialogue that
393
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arose as early as the late eighteenth century, but which did not rise to prominence until the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
I will begin by examining theological categories cited by G. C. Berkouwer on the
origin of the immortal soul. In Roman Catholicism and the mainline Protestant and
Reformed churches, there are two approaches to dual creations, which Berkouwer terms
“creationism” and “traducianism.” The problem that these approaches are concerned with
relates to the question of the “mysterious nature of man.”395 He proposes that the core of
the problem is “the immortality of the soul” and “the general questions relating to its
origins.”396 If this was simply a matter of theological choice, the problem would not be so
significant. However, as I will discuss in this chapter, there are social ramifications that come
out of the various interpretations of the dual creations and one’s orientation toward them.
What I hope to demonstrate in this chapter is that the concept of dual creations carries
certain baggage and that this baggage does not affect just how theology views human being,
but can also affect the way that science sees the world. In spite of the professed
“objectiveness” of the scientific platform, even it can succumb to underlying hermeneutical
presuppositions. However, this is not simply a matter of academic discourse. The way in
which the human being is conceived carries, as history makes plain, social ramifications that
impact everyone from the individual to the community.
We now turn to the question of dual creations of body and soul, examining how
theology approaches the question and then how science has applied these same ideas to real
individuals and communities.
395

G. C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1962), 279.
396

Ibid.
148

The Origin of the Immortal Soul in Humanity:
Traducianism versus Creationism
Berkouwer begins his discussion of the problem by noting that “it is indeed true that
both the Church and theology have been interested in the origin of man, in a sense; but this
interest was always directed to the origin of the human race.”397 However, he clarifies, the
ancestry of humanity is not directly the problem at hand. The crux of the problem lies in the
question of dual origins, that is, the origin of the material universe and the origin of the
immortal soul. Are there two separate creations of human body and of the human soul
(creationism), or does the immortal soul, following the first direct divine impartation, come
into existence with the body, i.e., the body and soul are inherited from the parents
(traducianism)? While the debate over these issues can become very complex, this chapter
will focus primarily on the question of one versus two origins.
Berkouwer notes that by separating the origin of the material universe from that of
the origin of the immortal soul, science and theology have managed to find room for
simultaneous, but discipline-oriented, discussion about the origins of humanity. Thus,
whereas the origin of the material universe is spoken of from within the Darwinian scientific
realm, the origin of the immortal soul falls within the purview of theology.398 However, he
questions the legitimacy of such a dualistic approach, stating: “It can hardly be denied that
the formulation of the two ‘questions of origin’ is quite different, and that this very fact
suggests the question as to how justified the usual treatment in dogmatics is; in how far the
dogmatician may legitimately speak of a duality of origin.”399
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Historically, questions regarding the creation and unity of the human race and the
Fall of humanity have been closely related. Berkouwer notes that “this is apparent already
from the fact that traducianism has always appealed, in its fight against creationism, to the
unity of the human race. . . . Both [traditionally] held to the unity of the human race in Adam
(in which not only the story of creation but especially Paul’s statement in Rom. 5, and the
text of Acts 17:2, played a role); and this was true in Catholicism (e.g., at Trent) as well as in
Protestantism.”400 Therefore, except for rare denials, the problems surrounding the question
of the unity of the human race were of an “incidental and peripheral nature until recently.”401
The Problem of Science and Theology in Relation
to the Immortal Soul: Monogenism
versus Polygenism
The change in the biological sciences that came as a result of the Darwinian and
Neo-Darwinian scientific proposals gave meaning to the related problem of monogenesis, or
the origin of humanity from a single pair, versus polygenesis, the origin of humanity from
multiple pairs.402 The terms may be applied to two separate, but related, issues: the issue of
human ancestry and the issue of a dual origin of material and immaterial elements of
creation.
Creationism versus Traducianism
Before turning to these two approaches to the origin of the immortal soul, it is first
necessary to briefly clarify the relationship between traducianism and creationism, on one
hand, and polygenism and monogenism, on the other. As noted briefly above, creationism
400
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refers to the idea of separate origins of the material and immaterial, or spiritual, aspects of
the human being, while traducianism contends that the soul comes into existence with the
body. The Catholic Encyclopedia helpfully notes that traducianism is
the doctrine that, in the process of generation, the human spiritual soul is transmitted to
the offspring by the parents. When a distinction is made between the terms
Traducianism and Generationism, the former denotes the materialistic doctrine of the
transmission of the soul by the organic process of generation, while the latter applies to
the doctrine according to which the soul of the offspring originates from the parental
soul in some mysterious way analogous to that in which the organism originates from
the parent’s organism.403
Whereas creationism posits the special impartation of the immortal soul in human
beings, “Traducianism is opposed to Creationism or the doctrine that every soul is created
by God.”404 Thus Berkouwer posits that, due to their respective orientations toward the
interpretation of Scripture, “we note in Lutheran theology a fairly general sympathy for
traducianism, while in Catholic and Calvinist theology preference is given to creationism.”405
Berkouwer clarifies how these two orientations differ:
Lutherans saw the image of God primarily in the spiritual attributes of man (justitia
originalis) and thus had little interest in what distinguishes man from animal after the Fall,
since the (lost) justitia originalis was for them the one thing that matters. Calvinists and
Catholics wished to concern themselves with ‘the wholly unique essence of man,’ and
thus with what remained human also after the Fall.406
The relationship between creationism and traducianism and monogenism and
polygenism is complex. However, as noted, both creationism and traducianism are grounded
upon the unity of humanity. Thus there is a unity in the coming together of bodily matter
403
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and immortal soul that creates a whole human being. The connection, then, to monogenism
and polygenism, which will be discussed below, is that monogenism refers to this
“mysterious way” in which the soul and body come together, either by being passed on from
the parents (as in traducianism) or via a special individual creative act by divine fiat (as in
creationism). As we will see, these ideas are not separate from ideas concerning the ancestral
origin of humans. In the following discussion of polygenesis and monogenesis, for the sake
of brevity, I will focus only on the Roman Catholic orientation and responses to these issues.
However, as noted, the Calvinist tradition shares a similar view, although it differs slightly in
its position from Roman Catholicism due to its orientation toward Scripture and tradition.407
Traditional Lutheranism tends more toward a position supporting traducianism.
Polygenesis as It Relates to Human Ancestry
The term “polygenesis” typically refers to the “origination of a race or species from a
number of independent stocks.”408 During the Renaissance, many traditional and orthodox
ideas were openly questioned.409 Among these was the idea of the unity of the human race,
which resulted in speculations that “only civilized men were descendents [sic] of Adam and
that ‘savage’ people had been separately created,” ideas that were “closely associated with
efforts to find a niche for the savage below civilized human beings on the elaborately graded
407
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hierarchy known as the ‘great chain of being,’ a traditional device for ranking all forms of life
inherited from the Middle Ages.”410
However, the attempt to fix a distinct and inferior species of humans was not made
until the Englishman William Petty, F.R.S., tried to do so in an unpublished paper of 16761677, but his “religious heterodoxy would preclude the widespread acceptance of such a
mode of thinking about the ‘types of mankind’ until the nineteenth century,” G. M.
Fredrickson proposes.411 Indeed Petty’s ideas about race did not begin to fully engage until
some fifty years later when, in Sweden, Carl Linnaeus laid out the different races of humans
in The System of Nature (1735). Homo Sapiens, he proposed, include a number of races, or
human subspecies: Ferus, Americanus, Europaeus, Asiaticus, Afer, and Monstrosus.412
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In late eighteenth-century Germany, Johann Gottfried Herder413 followed in the
steps of Petty and Linnaeus. Rudolf Bultmann points to Herder as the beginning of sorrows
for the German nation in Herder’s affirmation of the Völkische (or populist, ethnic)
Movement in Germany, noting that
it was Herder who broke away from the concept of the unity of human nature. He
distinguished types of humanity which differ not only in physical but also in mental
characteristics. In fact, he thought that the individual types were constant, namely, fixed
by nature; they are products of nature. From this it follows that human history must be
understood as natural history.414
Herder’s biological determinism not only became the excuse for the Holocaust of
the mid-twentieth century, but prior to this became the basis for a new type of racial
profiling that helped to lay the foundation of psychological racism in the United States.
Gould details how, in the search for new cheap labor following the emancipation of the
African slaves, a scheme was hit upon that ranked the European nations by intelligence. This
was accomplished by making the so-called “soft” sciences of psychology and sociology
empirically based by the creation of the intelligence quotient test.415 Already based upon
dubious notions of the correlation between cranium volume and intelligence,416 these tests
413
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supposedly proved that Anglo-Saxons were the standard by which all other human beings,
including other European “races,” were to be adjudged. The scientific conclusion was that
“European immigrants can be graded by their country of origin. The average man of many
nations is a moron. The darker peoples of southern Europe and the Slavs of eastern Europe
are less intelligent than the fair peoples of western and northern Europe. Nordic supremacy
is not a jingoistic prejudice. The average Russian has a mental age of 11.34 [years]; the
Italian, 11:01; the Pole, 10.74. The Polish joke attained the same legitimacy as the moron
joke—indeed, they described the same animal.” And needless to say, “the Negro lies at the
bottom of the scale with an average mental age of 10.41.” 417 No one, it seems, was safe from
profiling and no one was able to rise above his station in life. This was biological
determinism with the new ferocity of scientific validation.
The notion of polygenism, once stated, was not scientifically confounded until the
1980s with the discoveries made about the human genome and its rich historical value by
human population genetics.418
Polygenism as It Relates to the Origin of the Soul
Within Roman Catholicism, the question of polygenism arises in regard to the
impartation of the immortal soul into the material creation for the purpose of specially
creating human beings. Jesuit scholar Pierre Teilhard, who does not represent the orthodox
Roman Catholic view on the soul, once commented that “in the eyes of science, which at
long range can only see things in bulk, the ‘first man’ is and can only be a crowd, and his
417
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infancy is made up of thousands and thousands of years.”419 What Teilhard means here is
that Adam is a universal concept, the symbol of all fallen humanity which is marked by
original sin in the moment that they become human beings. There was, contra orthodox
Roman Catholic theology, no first Adam who committed original sin.420 Rather, humanity is
subject to original sin because this is the condition imposed upon it due to the evolutionary
nature of the world—original sin is the law of the universe.421 Teilhard’s justification for such
a proposal is that even though the problem of monogenism versus polygenism is ultimately a
theological problem, the fact that science studies populations rather than individuals means
that there should not be a contradiction between theological explanations and scientific
findings.422 Thus Teilhard appears to contradict the individual impartation of the immortal
soul, as understood by orthodox Roman Catholicism, by his reduction of Adam to a symbol
of an original population.
419
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Karl Rahner, S.J., who similarly accepted polygenesis as a reasonable answer to the
question of dual origins, stated, in contradiction to Popes Pius XII423 and Paul VI,424 that “In
the present state of theology and science it cannot be proved that polygenism conflicts with
orthodox teaching on original sin. It would be better therefore if the magisterium refrained
from censuring polygenism.”425 He continues:
It is doubtful, to say the least whether a bodily, historical unity of the first human beings
can be understood in terms of monogenism. It is a general principle of biology that true,
concrete genetic unity is not found in the individual but in the population . . . and in the
same biotype (organisms of the same genetic constitution). Only within such a situation
can evolution come about since selection can exercise its pressure only within such a
population and not in isolated individuals.426
Thus the question of dual origins of the body and immortal soul, as well as the
possibility of the dual origins of human beings as a result of evolutionary development, has
become increasingly important to Roman Catholics, especially those promoting a
relationship between evolutionary theory and the church’s teaching on the nature and
ontology of human beings. Such a view, its proponents believe, is not in conflict with a long
evolutionary process and can, according to some, allow for the accommodation of Roman
Catholic theology to evolutionary perspectives. However, as we will observe later, Roman
Catholicism has not pronounced any authoritative word on either the question of evolution
423
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or the issue of polygenesis, although several popes have commented, from a slightly lessthan-dogmatic position, in favor of monogenism and the “appropriate” use of evolutionary
theory, to say nothing of the fact that the church has consistently, in its orthodox position,
promoted monogenesis.427
Monogenism as It Relates to Human Ancestry
Monogenism is the notion that humans are descended from a single pair of
ancestors.428 It has not only a biblical-theological, but also a scientific definition. The
scientific understanding of monogenism is described by scientist Spencer Wells, who points
out that “any piece of DNA that is not shuffled through the action of recombination can be
traced back in time to an earlier ancestor.”429 Of the nearly seven billion pieces of mtDNA,
or in other words, the world’s current human population, and about half that number of Y427
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chromosomes, all can be traced back to a sole root.430 “This entity, known as the coalescence
point, is the single mtDNA or Y-chromosome type from which they all trace their descent.
In any given sample of nonrecombining DNA sequences there must be a single ancestor at
some point in the past.”431 This ancient pair has, evocatively, been named Adam and Eve.432
Wells is only too happy to promote his concept of monogenism because as recently
as the 1960s little was known about how the vast diversity observed in humans came about.
He points to the anthropological work of Carleton Coon, The Origin of Races,433 which became
a standard text for students of anthropology beginning in the late 1960s, as an example of
how the racial profiling of earlier generations continues to the present. Like others before
him, Coon used Darwinian evolution to explain how the races had once been united, but
separated over time to create such a wide diversity as seen today.434
Wells comments that Coon’s conclusions were based on
430
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very little, it turned out. Anthropologists of his era were largely limited to a method used
since the time of the Greeks—morphology, or appearance. Although morphologists
measured the physical traits they studied very carefully, derived complex formulae to
describe their measurements, and inferred processes from the data, they were working at
a disadvantage. This is because morphological variation is ultimately produced by genetic
variation, and the under-lying [sic] genetic changes required to produce a change in
morphology were (for the most part) still unknown.435
Thus it turns out that Coon, on the basis of morphology alone, was saying that “it would
have taken a million years of evolution to create the differences we see in different races.”436
Wells’s and others’ research into the mysteries of the human genome have revealed
“uncontrovertibly” that “only the tiniest sliver of [genetic] variation . . . served to distinguish
among the different races.”437 Further,
as Lewontin explained it, if someone were to drop an atomic bomb tomorrow, and the
only group of people left alive were the English—or the Australian Aborigines, or the
Pygmies of the Ituri Forest—that single population would still retain 85 percent of the
level of genetic variation found in our species as a whole. This incredible result provided
clear evidence that Linneaus and Coon were wrong. Rather than belonging to discrete
subspecies, humans are part of one big extended family.438
Wells’s proposals are a reaffirmation of the long-held belief in monogenesis as it
pertains to human ancestry. According to biblical theology, the human pair from which
humanity sprang was Adam and Eve (Gen 4:1: “Adam lay with his wife Eve, and she
became pregnant and gave birth to Cain. She said, ‘With the help of the LORD I have
brought forth a man.’”).439 However, the question of monogenesis as it pertains to the origin
435

Wells, Deep Ancestry, 18.

436

Ibid.

437

Ibid., 21.

438

Ibid., 21-22.

439

It must be clarified that Wells and Cann, among others, do not support the notion
that the biblical Adam and Eve were historical entities who brought forth humanity. Rather
this couple is merely a symbol, as noted above, of a universalized history of human origins.
160

of the immortal soul is still debated, as we have seen, by Roman Catholic scholars and others
who posit a form of polygenesis in order to accommodate the role of evolutionary science in
the origins of the material body and yet allow for the divine role in the originating of the
immortal soul.
Monogenism as It Relates to the Origin of the Soul
Due to its obvious sense of dualism in regard to the impartation of the immortal soul
in human beings, Roman Catholicism’s orthodox views, especially since the appearance of
Darwinian evolution, have called for clarification. The first serious papal pronouncement on
the topic of monogenesis took place with the publication of Humani Generis in 1950. Pius XII
seems to have made this statement in response to the growing encounter between theology
and science.440 However, as P. Schoonenberg notes, the discussion had come up in the 1870
Vatican Council, which prepared a canon positing monogenism in response to the direction
that biological science was then tending. However, because the issue was not brought up as
an agenda item during the council, monogenism never became official dogma.441
Darwin had published his Origin of Species in 1859, and would, just months after the
1870 Vatican Council, publish his long-awaited treatise, The Descent of Man (1871), in which
he proposed that no specialness separated human beings from any other living organism.
“Man’s intelligence, use of language, altruism, and so on, all could be derived from
rudimentary traits discernible in lower animals.”442 Darwin thus noted in the conclusion of
440

Berkouwer, Man, 280.

441

Schoonenberg, Het Geloof van ons Doopsel, 143-144; see Berkouwer, Man, 280, n. 3.

442

James D. Watson, “Commentary: The Descent of Man,” in Darwin: The Indelible Stamp: The
Evolution of an Idea, ed. and commentary by James D. Watson (Philadelphia: Running Press,
2005), 604.
161

his first chapter in The Descent of Man that “the time will before long come, when it will be
thought wonderful [i.e., incredulous] that naturalists, who were well acquainted with the
comparative structure and development of man, and other mammals, should have believed
that each was the work of a separate act of creation.”443 However, in The Descent of Man,
Darwin does not stop with the question of human ancestry, but pushes on to declare that
“we have seen that the study of the theory of expression confirms to a certain limited extent
the conclusion that man is derived from some lower animal form, and supports the belief of
the specific or subspecific unity of the several races. . . . We have also seen that expression in
itself, or the language of the emotions, as it has sometimes been called, is certainly of
importance for the welfare of mankind.”444
The response of the Roman Catholic Church to such types of proposals, while not
officially dogmatized, is one of concern for maintaining a clear proposal of monogenesis in
regard to the unity of humanity. Claudio Basevi states:
From the perspectives of the biblical doctrine of creation, the results are clearly sterile
and exegetically incorrect when one focuses the discussion about Scripture and scientific
thought on the fallacious dialectic between “creationism” and “evolutionism,” the first
understood as the affirmation of the “immediate” appearance of all the species of living
beings and the denial of any biological or even geological transformations, the second
understood as a philosophical paradigm that interprets the morphogenesis of all reality in
terms of a necessary and immanent development, or as the outcome of blind chance.
Biblical exegesis can confront and dialogue with the facts, and therefore with evolution,
physical or biological, explained in a scientific way and freed from presuppositions of an
aprioristic philosophical character. The presence of analogous presuppositions also
cannot be excluded in what concerns the theme of “monogenism,” i.e., the origin of the
whole human race from one sole couple of proto-parents. Supported by various biblical
passages and by the teaching of the Catholic Magisterium, this belief is presented at
times as something certainly denied by scientific results, without reflecting on the fact
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that, for obvious reasons, the scientific reconstruction, however accurate it may be, could
never attain irrefutable proofs for or against it. To this must be added the consideration
that scientific analysis can only deduce a posteriori if and when it finds itself in front of
remains that are certainly human, but it cannot conclude anything about the appearance
of a first couple of proto-parents in as much as the “final cause” of such an
appearance—the spiritual animation of a body, a new creative intervention of God,
etc.—does not belong to the empirical order, whereas only the consequences traceable
back to it are.445
Thus from the perspective of Roman Catholic orthodoxy, while there is room for scientific,
even evolutionary scientific, discussion about the physical origins of humans, there remains a
domain upon which science has little or nothing to add. This domain includes within it the
origin of the immortal soul.446 Basevi notes that the issue of monogenism is so important to
orthodoxy because it is connected with the “‘normative’ consequences of the proto-parents
for all of humanity, particularly to the doctrine of original sin, but also to the recapitulation
in Christianity of all that was signified in Adam, to the point that the abandonment of
monogenism would require a serious re-interpretation by theology of much of the content of
Revelation.”447
Summary
Roman Catholic theologians are thus divided on the issue of monogenesis, with
those who see science as dealing primarily with populations rather than individuals calling
for polygenesis (which they see having no conflict with the orthodox view of monogenesis
in regard to the soul), while those claiming theological orthodoxy proposing that although
there are separate creations of soul and body, these elements have a unified co-existence as
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the foundation of human ontology. Both allow for the introduction of evolutionary science
because in both the immortal soul, long considered to be the true essence of humanity,
remains distinct from its material counterpart. Herein lies the foundation of theistic
evolution.
The larger problem of polygenism, however, is found in the intersection between
science and theology. The issue of multiple races, with their varying levels of soul, created an
environment in which humans could be exterminated or bought and sold as livestock.448
Science has approached the question of human being similarly to that of theology in regard
to dual origins, with Desmond and Moore arguing that at least part of Darwin’s original
intent behind his theory of evolution was in response to the problem of African slavery. He
argued, on the basis of his theory of common descent, that there was only one race of
humans and no body-soul dualism.449 For Darwin, such a position was hopefully a way to
preserve his family’s belief in the Adamic unity of humanity without needing to refer to God.
However, part of the criticism heaped upon Darwin, Desmond and Moore suggest, was that
by embracing the whole of creation—breaking life’s shackles and allowing it too to
evolve, as black and white men had done from a joint ancestor—he ironically opened
himself to vilification by the Christian world whose belief in racial brotherhood he
shared. A major criticism of the Origin of Species (particularly during the American Civil
War) was that Darwin had now bestialized the white man, by contaminating his ancestral
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blood. Darwin had upturned the racist logic, only to ‘brutalize’ his own Anglo-Saxon
kind (as it was said), uniting them, not only with black people, but with black apes.450
Darwin, thus by doing away with a dualistic view of body and soul, “brutalized” his own
race by destroying the unique property (the immortal soul, created in the Adamic lineage)
that separated the Anglo-Saxon race from all other humanoid species. In view of such a
problem, it is important to keep in mind that people make choices about how they
understand and draw conclusions about particular issues, and that even Darwinian evolution,
and Darwin himself after his reading of Malthus,451 has been used to support scientific
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racism. Darwin’s abandonment of the image of God in humanity is not a satisfying solution;
nevertheless it became and has continued to be a powerful force in regard to the
understanding of human being. Now we will turn to Darwin and his contemporaries’
engagement with the immortal soul.
Early Scientific Discussion Concerning the Immortality of the Soul
Darwin’s Thoughts on the Question of the Immortal Soul
The debate between theology and science on the topic of origins, whether material
or immaterial, was interactive and two-way. Darwin was concerned with immaterial issues,
such as the emotions and the mind, which had generally fallen beyond the purview of
science up to that point. Significantly, behind the scenes his researches were not simply
dedicated to physical and psychological phenomena, but he also regularly included books on
the topic of the immortal soul to his reading list; for instance, he included in his “Books to be
Read” and “Books Read” Notebook Francis William Newman’s The Soul, Her Sorrows and Her
Aspirations: An Essay Towards the Natural History of the Soul as the True Basis of Theology (London,
1849); Alexander Copland’s Mortal Life: and the State of the Soul After Death: Conformable to
Divine Revelation; Oersted’s Soul of Nature (which he describes as “dreadful”); and he noted
Toland’s 1704 “account of immortality of Soul, amongst Ancients.”452
Darwin experienced considerable turmoil about the immortal soul. His turmoil lay in
part with his reluctance to hurt his closely knit family, especially his betrothed, Emma
Wedgwood, who was also his cousin. In a revealing paragraph, Desmond and Moore
recount Darwin’s struggle, noting that just prior to his engagement his father advised him
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to conceal his doubts about religion lest Emma fret for his ‘salvation’. (The Doctor
understood devout Wedgewood women, having married one himself.) But sharing so
much of an outlook, Darwin thought candour the better policy, and a week after the
engagement he went ahead and told her of his notebook heresies. Such shocking beliefs
were a negation of her deeply intuitive faith. He was erasing the line between body and
soul. To him, morality and religious feelings were inherited from beasts rather than
Breathed into the body. What need, then, for revelation of religious truth in the Bible? If
Jesus’s resurrection did not reveal the promise of immortality, how could she and
Charles belong to each other for ever? Traditional Unitarianism, as espoused by
Martineau, saw no necessary conflict here, and Darwin’s views might have been squared
with it. Not so Emma’s Anglicanized Unitarianism, with its belief in an immortal soul.
She sought reassurance and ‘every word’ he sent by return was a comfort. He said that
he did not consider his ‘opinions as formed’ (too late was he heeding the Doctor’s
advice), which gave her hope.453
Perhaps this reluctance to dash family expectations caused Darwin to work out his
convictions on the immortal soul in his personal notebooks. For instance, in Notebook B:
[Transmutation of species (1837-1838)], he notes:
The soul by consent of all is superadded, animals not got, not look forward. If we
choose to let conjecture run wild then our animals our fellow brethren in pain, disease,
death & suffering, & famine, our slave in the most laborious works, our companions in
our amusements, they may partake from our origin in these one common ancestor; we
may be all netted together.454
Thus Darwin questioned whether the addition of an immortal human soul was in fact a
reality. If all organisms were descended from one stock, then humans must have received the
same orientation toward pain and suffering, among other conditions generally regarded as
especially human, as did these lesser organisms.
In Notebook E [Transmutation of species (1838-1839)], Darwin finds a discontinuity
between the pronouncements of Plato and Socrates on the immortality of the soul and his
own conception of the “linear descendant” of “mammiferous animal.” He also struggles
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with the Platonic notion that “our ‘necessary ideas’ arise from the preexistence of the soul,
are not derivable from experience.”455
In his Old & Useless Notes about the Moral Sense & Some Metaphysical Points, Darwin
plays with the idea of instinct versus soul in his musings on William Kirby’s Bridgewater
Treatise, On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God.456 He notes: “As in animal no prejudices
about souls, we have particular trains of thoughts as far as man; crows fear of gun.—pointers
method standing—method of attacking peccary—retriever—produced as soon as brain
developed, and as I have said, no soul superadded.”457 A footnote states:
“[Lamarck] admits [man] to be the most perfect of animals, but instead of a son of God,
the root of his genealogical tree, according to him, is an animalcule, a creature without
sense or voluntary motion, or internal or external organs. . . . No wonder therefore that
he considers his intellectual powers, not as indicating a spiritual substance derived from
heaven though resident in his body, but merely as the result of his organization (N. Dict.
Nat. xvi. Artic. Intelligence, 344, comp Ibid.. Artic. Idéa, 78, 80.), and ascribes to him in
the place of a soul a certain interior sentiment . . .”
See also B 232, “The soul by consent of all is superadded . . .”458
Darwin does not take lightly the question of the immortal soul. His behind-the-scene
thinking on the subject eventually resulted in the denial of humans as special creations
endowed by God with immortal souls, leading him to conclude:
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We must acknowledge, as it seems to me, that man with all his noble qualities, with
sympathy which feels for the most debased, with benevolence which extends not only to
other men but to the humblest living creation, with his god-like intellect which had
penetrated into the movements and constitution of the solar system—with all these
exalted powers, man still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly
origin.459
Darwin’s Contemporaries’ Thoughts Regarding the Immortal Soul
and Its Relation to Evolutionary Theory
A brief sampling460 of Darwin’s contemporaries demonstrates that they also deeply
contemplated the issue of the immortal soul and its relation to their contemporary scientific
theory. For instance, John Frederick William Herschel, F.R.S., an English mathematician,
astronomer, chemist, experimental photographer/inventor and botanist, whose work in
scientific methodology (1840)461 greatly influenced Darwin, scoffed at those who believed
that science “fosters in its cultivators an undue and overweening self-conceit, [that] leads
them to doubt the immortality of the soul and to scoff at revealed religion.”462 Rather,
science, Herschel proposed,
by cherishing a vital principle an unbounded spirit of enquiry, and ardency of
expectation, . . . unfetters the mind from prejudices of every kind, and leaves it open and
free to every impression of a higher nature which it is susceptible of receiving, guarding
only against enthusiasm and self-deception by a habit of strict investigation, but
encouraging, rather than suppressing, every thing that can offer a prospect or a hope
beyond the present obscure and unsatisfactory state.463
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In 1844, Robert Chambers, F.R.S.E., who moved in highly influential scientific and
political circles, anonymously published his Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,464 which
claimed in the concluding chapter to be “the first attempt to connect the natural sciences in
a history of creation.”465 The book was highly criticized due to Chambers’s stance that God
might not be actively involved in the sustenance of the natural and social hierarchies. In
regard to the immortal soul, he contended that
a distinction is therefore [often] drawn between our mental manifestations and those of
the lower animals, the latter being comprehended under the term instinct, while ours are
collectively described as mind, mind being again a received synonyme [sic] with soul, the
immortal part of man. There is here a strange system of confusion and error, which it is
most imprudent to regard as essential to religion, since candid investigations of nature
tend to shew its untenableness. There is, in reality, nothing to prevent our regarding man
as specially endowed with an immortal spirit, at the same time that his ordinary mental
manifestations are looked upon as simple phenomena resulting from organization [i.e.,
purely physical processes], those of lower animals being phenomena absolutely the same
in character, though developed with much narrower limits.466
Significant for my concern in this chapter, Chambers’s remarks about the immortal
soul indicate his concern regarding the possibility of dual origins of immaterial soul and
material body. His footnote connected to this passage further strengthens this point, arguing
that God, as first cause, was the creator of not only immaterial soul and mind, but also
matter itself, through which these immaterial properties flow.467 However, he asks,
Can we say that God has not in matter itself laid the seeds of every faculty of mind,
rather than that he has made the first principle of mind entirely distinct from that of
matter? Cannot the first cause of all we see and know have fraught matter itself, from its
very beginning, with all the attributes necessary to develop into mind, as well as he has
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from the first made the attributes of mind wholly different from those of matter, only in
order afterwards, by an imperceptible and incomprehensible link, to join the two
together?468
This “imperceptible and incomprehensible link” between mind (i.e., immortal soul) and
matter seemed to Chambers to be unnecessary. Rather a scientific perspective appeared, to
him, to demonstrate the plausibility of an organic unity between the two elements, a unity
given by God himself. Pointing to the New Testament, Chambers then concludes that the
Scriptures do not present a soul, after death, having no connection with space and time,
having no connection with matter. Citing Thomas Hope, On the Origins and Prospects of Man
(1831), Chambers notes that the New Testament “‘promises a mind situated in portions of
time and space different from the present; a mind composed of elements of matter more
extended, more perfect, and more glorious,”469 thereby demonstrating his remaining reliance
upon older concepts of the immortal soul.
George Combe, a Scottish phrenologist, who, among other things, studied and
sought how to reform and punish the criminal classes, distinguished between his
understanding of the immortal soul and his view of death, which was similar to that
proposed by Darwin. Combe, in 1847, notes that “the true view of death, therefore, as a
natural institution is, that it is an essential part of the system of organisation. . . . Besides,
organized beings are constituted by the Creator to be the food of other organized beings, so
that some must die that others may live.”470 To clarify whence his argument regarding death
leads, he proposed that
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to prevent, however, all chance of being misapprehended, I repeat, that I do not at all
allude to the state of the soul or mind after death, but merely to the dissolution of
organized bodies; that, according to the soundest view which I am able to obtain of the
natural law, pain and death during youth and middle age, in the human species, are
consequences of departure from the Creator’s law, while death in old age, by insensible
decay, is an essential part of the system of organic existence as now constituted.471
Also in 1847, Richard Owen, English botanist, creator of the term “Dinosauria,” and
a fierce opponent of Darwin’s concept of evolution (he was himself an evolutionist, but felt
that Darwin’s proposal was too simplified), proposed that “this [bodily] frame is a temporary
trust, for the uses of which we are responsible to the Maker.”472 A monogenist, Owen
proposed that “the supreme work of Creation has been accomplished that you might possess
a body—the sole erect—of all animal bodies the most free—and for what? for the service of
the soul.”473
Reactions to Darwin’s The Descent of Man
When Darwin’s The Descent of Man was published in 1871, the response was
immediate and varied.474 A review in The Athenaeum, no. 2262, 4 March 1871, opined that “an
evolutionist of the Darwinian order is bound to be further than the moral sense and the
intellectual faculties if he believes in the existence of the human soul. . . . As certainly as we
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evolve sex, so certainly must we evolve soul. If the former be due purely to natural selection,
so is the latter.”
A review in The Saturday Analyst and Leader, dated 10 November 1860, proposed that
there was no “contradiction in the endowment of man with an immaterial soul, supposing
him to have originated according to the Darwinian theory, than if he had originated in any
other way. Put [sic] it broadly: was it more easy for Omnipotence, to which all possible things
are equally easy, to give man an immaterial soul, if made out of clay; than if he spring from
the next resembling animal type?” Further, the Mosaic account “does not conflict with the
indefinite modifiability of man, but on the contrary agrees with it.” The reviewer affirms this
point by noting the great diversity of humanity that has proceeded from Adam and Eve, “in
a word, all the different species of men on the face of the earth, must have developed and
differentiated out of one primitive type.”475
The New York Daily Tribune of 1 June 1871 noted that “Darwin himself admits that
somewhere in the vast line of human development, the soul, by Divine power, was made
immortal,” while The Saturday Review, 24 December 1859, postulated that
no conceivable amount of evidence derived from the growth and structure of animals
and plants would have the slightest bearing upon our convictions in regard to the origin
of conscience, or man’s belief in a Supreme Being and the immorality of his own soul.
. . . We know that there are limits which human reason is unable to overpass, but we
believe that those limits will be more surely ascertained and fixed by the right use of
reason itself than by the edict of an external authority.
Continuing in the vein of denigrating the “external authority” of Scripture, a review
from The Literary World, 17 March 1871, remarked condescendingly: “He who believes in the
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advancement of man from some lowly organised form, will naturally ask how does this bear
on the belief in the immortality of the soul. The barbarous races of man, as Sir J. Lubbock
has shown, possess no clear belief of this kind; but arguments derived from the primeval
beliefs of savages are, as we have just seen, of little or no avail.”
The Liverpool Leader, 18 March 1871, assured its readers that no danger was to come
to natural theology as proposed by Paley by Darwin’s concepts of humanity. The author
notes that no matter how one might conceive of the origin of things,
Our minds are so constituted that they cannot rest content with a mere sequence of
lifeless and mechanical causes; they must work back until they reach, as the ground and
cause of all these secondary causes, an intelligent volitional Being, in some way
resembling that which is highest in the soul of man. At this point our curiosity can and
does pause, not as comprehending, but as conscious that it has reached the end of its
tether. The mind, knowing that it cannot in the least comprehend, or get behind, one of
its own acts of free volition—every one of which is, on a smaller scale, a veritable
creation—is for that very reason prepared to acknowledge that, when it has reached such
a mystery as the will of an intelligent Creator, it has reached a limit which it cannot pass.
Till it has reached this point, however, the search for causes cannot stop.
This idea of the restless soul that must search to find its meaning is also reflected in a
review from The Nonconformist, 4 May 1871, which provides a fitting summation of the deeply
ingrained notions regarding the immortal soul and its place within scientific discussion,
especially in regard to the question of the essence of humanity. In a direct echo of William
Perry’s earlier pronouncements of polygenism, the review proposes that Darwin’s theory of
evolution must necessarily stop at the level of savage life because there Darwin
leaves humanity fixed, rigid, immoveable. In order to go beyond this, man must rise
‘above himself’ . . . . From this point the life of man is not simply human; it is Divine,
and cannot be completed without Divine intervention, which infantile science ignores,
and calls ‘a break,’ and leaves to be discussed in ‘another place.’ Yet here, if anywhere,
the noblest Biology commences, and science must yet find some way of bringing its
theories of evolution up to this better elevation. We do not ask this of Mr. Darwin, and
if the sense of deficiency has been forced upon us, he himself and his Psychology must
bear the blame.
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To be finally and completely human, one must possess that final element of humanness, the
immortal soul, or, as this reviewer posits, “Man is not simply human; it is Divine, and cannot
be completed without Divine intervention.
Conclusion
Darwin and his colleagues struggled with the question of the immortal soul and its
relation to Darwin’s evolutionary theory. However, these are not merely the ramblings of an
older, less-informed age. The debate over the immortal soul continues in contemporary
discussions among theologians and scientists. Some propose that the theological belief of
dual creations opens the door to a scientific view of physical origins, which it does.
However, as we have seen, this view brings serious problems in regard to the question of
human being, leading to views of polygenesis, in which there were multiple origins of
humans and thereby multiple species with varying levels of actual humanness. This led to the
extermination and mistreatment of so-called “savage” peoples by the “vastly superior” white
race. However, monogenism also brings its own problems.
Darwin’s initial reaction to such problems was to rethink the origins of human
beings as common descent from one stock. However, he also succumbed to the problem of
racial profiling on the basis of natural selection, adaptation, and intellectual advantage after
reading Malthus. After the freeing of the slaves, the United States, needing to replenish its
work force, extended the races of humans to Europeans, basing their views on the intellect
and justifying their conclusions on the development of inaccurate, though elaborately
designed, intelligence studies. Such studies further justified the cruel and inhumane treatment
of immigrant and black workers in the burgeoning sweat shops in places such as New York
City.
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The excess baggage of the concept of dual creations leaves much to be desired and
requires a re-envisioning. In the final chapter, I explore the possibility of the HebraicChristian concept of being, which provides an alternative foundation for the theology-andscience dialogue that is respectful of human beings, in all their wonderful diversity and
beauty, and of the natural resources that require care and preservation by relational human
beings.
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CHAPTER 7
THE HEBRAIC-CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF HUMAN BEING476
Introduction
In this dissertation, I have addressed two related issues. I began by examining the
problem of methodology between the disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue,
noting that while the dialogue community assumes that there is a methodology or cluster of
methodologies that allows for interdisciplinary conversation to take place among them, there
is no real consensus as to how to proceed. Therefore, I began by asking if it is possible to
surmount the problem of methodological compatibility and to generate mutually beneficial
and fruitful dialogue through seeking a point of commonality between all the disciplines of
the theology-and-science dialogue.
Answering in the affirmative, I then investigated what this common philosophical
ground might be, concluding that a point of commonality between all the disciplines of the
theology-and-science dialogue was the question of human being. In order to further orient
my methodology, I then restricted the concept of human being to humans as relational
beings. This restriction is important, for it allows us to immediately understand the impact of
humans on their environment, here understood to mean the totality of the natural (physical),
moral (philosophical and social), and spiritual (theological) aspects of reality.
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Therefore, by restricting my definition to humans as relational beings, a basis is
provided for scientific exploration of my hypothesis that there is a correlation between
definitions of human being and the way that human beings interact with their environment.
Second, it helps to create not only a common ground from which to investigate this
hypothesis, but it also provides an opportunity for developing a language that will be
understood across the disciplines so that interdisciplinary communication and exploration
may be more efficient.
Third, if it is true that humans have negatively impacted their environment, then
understanding the complex relations between them and the Other will be helpful for
approaching the current economic and ecological crises.
In this chapter, I will explore, first, the insights that I have gathered from my
investigation thus far by summarizing my conversations with my dialogue partners. Next, I
will consider my Hebraic-Christian perspective of humans as relational beings. In this task, I
will turn to my final dialogue partners in this dissertation, the Hebrew Bible and the Greek
New Testament, which are commonly known as the Scriptures. It is proposed here that the
Scriptures have a common definition of humans as relational beings that encompasses the
physical, moral, and spiritual attributes of human being, meaning that they are concerned
with (1) the physical, mental, and spiritual well-being of humans, (2) the interaction between
humans and other inanimate living things, including other humans, and (3) the relationship
between humans and God. Finally, I will consider the potentially positive implications of a
shared concept of humans as relational beings, especially the positive role that Christian
theology can bring to the theology-and-science dialogue.
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The Insights Gained from Interdisciplinary Dialogue
In this dissertation, I have addressed the question of humans as relational beings. We
have seen that it is possible to find a common philosophical ground by which to dialogue.
Further, we have seen the value of philosophy as it helps to provide a roundtable that the
disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue can gather around. At this roundtable, I
have dialogued with a number of individuals, who have provided important insights in
regard to both the possibility of beneficial interdisciplinary dialogue and for the question of
human being. I will now briefly reiterate their most significant insights:
Kant proposes that “two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration
and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and
the moral law within.”477 His elegant prose reminds us that humans are complex beings, who
can neither be considered purely physical nor purely moral, but some mysterious
combination of both. Although he clearly differentiates between the two realms, he
nevertheless proposes that there is a moral influence upon the physical realm.
Bhaskar builds upon the insights of Kant, but hopes to escape the potential problem
in idealism of making the individual the constructor of reality. He therefore takes Kant’s
ideas and recasts them from the perspective of the social observer, which is, for him, society,
understood here in a universal and irreducible sense and emphasizes that the social observer
has the potential for shaping and influencing, rather than creating, her environment. His
critical realism makes three significant contributions that may be applied to the theologyand-science dialogue: (1) that the flow of knowledge proceeds from ontology to
epistemology, or from “manifest phenomena to the structures that generate them”; (2) that
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social constructs, due to their ability to influence human behavior, have ontological
characteristics; and (3) that because reality is a unified stratification and that because
disciplines develop along these stratifications, it is possible to work across them along points
of commonality for the purpose of interdisciplinary dialogue. Bhaskar’s critical realism, then,
allows for the full spectrum of disciplines to participate, each in its own way, in the theologyand-science dialogue.
A further significant contribution that I will discuss in more detail below is the
critical-realist proposal of retroduction, which allows for the inferential process to begin with
where we are currently in history. Such a proposal allows for immediate preventive action to
be taken in the present, while still allowing for rigorous investigations of long-term effects.
Such an approach is important for initiating interdisciplinary work on economic and
ecological crises and for dealing with crimes against humanity.
Heidegger presents a radical description of human Being/being. In this conception,
there is a nexus and connexio between, on one hand, the physical being of humans and the rest
of the physical realm. Humans share in both its bounties and its crises. On the other hand, as
Beings, humans have a unique ability to reflect, contemplate, and make judgments about the
world that they are a part of. Because of their reflective abilities, they are a powerful and
influential force within their environment. Just as Bhaskar would later take inspiration from
the possibility of a social application to Kant’s ontology, so Heidegger sees the human
Being/being as having a powerful ability to shape the world into her own image. John D.
Barrow and Frank J. Tipler also support the idea that human beings play a powerful role as
observers who influence the flow of history. They attempt to demonstrate this proposal
from the perspective of the anthropic cosmological principle.
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In regard to the relation between human and divine being, Heidegger critiques
Friedrich Neitzsche’s theology and ontology. Neitzsche’s themes—“God is dead” and the
human “will to power”—led Heidegger to conclude that Western philosophy in its Platonic
form is concluded. Just as we expect Heidegger to turn to his apostolic Christian roots to
resolve the problem of human being, he instead embraces the materialistic god of the preSocratic philosopher Heraclitus. While Heidegger’s proposal of Being/being adequately and
helpfully provides a basis for considering the moral and physical elements of human being,
his theology is neither theistic nor sufficient for completing the construction of humans as
relational beings.
McGrath sees the possibility for theology as a full dialogue partner in the theologyand-science dialogue. He modifies and applies Bhaskar’s methodology in his scientific
theology of nature as creation, thereby beginning the process by which theological concepts
can become sources of scientific knowledge in their own right and within their disciplinary
constraints.
He grounds his ontological definition of nature as creation in the Augustinian
tradition. However, while Augustine provides a good justification for interdisciplinary
dialogue, his anthropology is lacking in two ways:
1. His concept of human being proposes a composite of body and immortal soul,
which have dual creations and, troublingly, allows for a hierarchy of being to be established.
Such dualism has led in the past and in the present to the suggestion that some apparent
humans are not completely human beings and thus may be targeted for slavery and other
crimes against humanity, such as genocide, gender discrimination, and racial profiling.
2. His understanding of history and predestination leaves humanity without any real
responsibility for their behavior. Anna Case-Winters, Rudolf Bultmann, Stephen Jay Gould, and
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Adrian Desmond and James Moore, along with others, help to demonstrate the historical
outcomes of such proposals.
These dialogue partners have helped to enlighten us in this investigation of humans
as relational beings. They have also helped me to realize that there is a need for something
more—a truly spiritual approach that is grounded in a Christian theology, which itself is
grounded in the Christian Scriptures. It is to this topic that we now turn.
The Hebraic-Christian Perspective: A CriticalRealist and Canonical Approach
One of the most striking features of Bhaskar’s critical realism is that its
methodological reflection begins with retroduction. As we saw in chapter 1, retroduction
involves beginning the process of inference with where we currently are in history. While
this does not in any way denigrate the past or make it inaccessible for the critical realist, it
does keep the conversation from becoming mired in debate over whether, for example, there
is a long enough history on the safety of a particular chemical to warrant discontinuing its
use. If workers who come into contact with the chemical appear to become sick from it, it is
sufficient to infer that its use should be suspended or otherwise controlled until rigorous
testing of the possible correlation between illness and exposure has been conducted.
But retroduction need not be a mere stopgap; it also tests the validity of whether a
conceptual approach may be considered scientific knowledge, which involves defining the
concept ontologically and the rigorous testing of it.
In this dissertation, I put forward the hypothesis that there is a correlation between
definitions of human being and the way that human beings interact with their environment.
Thus far in this dissertation, we have seen that humans are closely tied to their environment
as social observers. The fact that we are here, that we live and act in the environment, and
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that by doing so we impact nature either negatively or positively through our social concepts
seems to indicate that humans are world-formers and, as such, relational beings. If, as my
research in this dissertation seems to indicate, humans are indeed a large cause of the
economic and ecological crises of today, then perhaps a retroductive approach to the
problem would be helpful.
Further, as we have seen, respectful human-to-human interaction has been a struggle
to maintain. Having based their definitions of Others on false pretenses, “man’s inhumanity
to man” has brought about untold horror and the debasing of all humans through actions
such as genocide, slavery and human trafficking, and abuses of all kinds.
There is definitely a need to reassess who we are; there is a need to look at our
current self-definitions and bring them back into line with a kinder and gentler approach to
ourselves and Others. Insightful though my dialogue partners have been in this dissertation,
all too often they focus on defining humans by simply looking in the mirror. But if humans
become their own referent, then they will only and always reflect themselves. It seems that
something else is needed besides a merely moral and scientific approach. It seems that a
spiritual, theological approach is needed that causes us to see ourselves as others and God
do.
However, as we begin the process of defining human being, we are immediately
presented with a problem. In a long and protracted debate, stretching from Darwin’s Origin
of the Species to the present,478 Christian scholars have argued over the problem of human
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origins. Such debate is helpful in cosmological dialogue; however, it greatly detracts in this
discussion from focusing on the larger problem at hand—human culpability for the
economic and ecological crises that are overwhelming the planet and catastrophically
impinging upon its inhabitants’ qualities of life. E. O. Wilson, a sociobiologist, briefly
outlines these problems, which he summarizes with the acronym HIPPO:479
H
I

habitat loss, including that caused by human-induced climate change
invasive species (harmful aliens, including predators, disease organisms, and
dominant competitors that displace natives)
pollution
human overpopulation, a root cause of the other four factors
overharvesting (hunting, fishing, gathering)

P
p
O

A close examination of these problems reveals three things: (1) All have human
causes; (2) they all deal with problems that, due to their nature and severity, are
unprecedented; and (3) they all require immediate responses.
Wilson notes, for example, that pollution and loss of habitat are largely responsible
for the decline in the Haitian amphibian fauna, and for the decline and even extinction of
amphibians in the western United States, Spain, West Africa, and Indonesia. When
combined with climate change, the damage is even more severe, as evidenced in Central
America and the Atlantic rainforest of Brazil. And what is behind this decline? Human
beings, he proposes, who never set out intentionally to harm frogs, but who somehow ended
up doing so.480
If only it were the frogs alone who suffered, terrible as that might be, but evidence
suggests that when frogs come under severe hardship to the point of extinction, they are not
alone in their suffering. While it may appear to be a large leap from frog to human being, at
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the very least, Wilson contends, “we are creating a less stable and interesting place for our
descendants to inherit.”481
Another important revelation that comes from examining Wilson’s list of
catastrophic problems is their unprecedented nature and severity. Bill McKibben, a Christian
environmentalist, reminds us, we are losing the grand oasis called Earth. “We’re every day
less the oasis and more the desert. The world hasn’t ended, but the world as we know it
has—even if we don’t quite know it yet. We imagine we still live back on that old planet, that
the disturbances we see around us are the old random and freakish kind. But they’re not. It’s
a different place. A different planet. It needs a new name. Eaarth.”482
We are junking our only home and making it a toxic waste dump. McKibben points
to some of the varied and even seemingly unrelated problems that stem just from the
overuse of and overdependence upon fossil fuels:
So far humans, by burning fossil fuel, have raised the temperature of the planet nearly a
degree Celsius (more than a degree and a half Fahrenheit). A NASA study in December
2008 found that warming on that scale was enough to trigger a 45 percent increase in
thunderheads over the ocean, breeding the spectacular anvil-headed clouds that can rise
five miles above the sea, generating ‘super-cells’ with torrents of rain and hail. In fact,
total global rainfall is now increasing 1.5 percent a decade. Larger storms over land now
create more lightning; every degree Celsius brings about 6 percent more lightning,
according to climate scientist Amanda Staudt. In just one day in June 2008, lightning
sparked 1,700 different fires across California, burning a million acres and setting a new
state record. These blazes burned on the new earth, not the old one.483
At the time of the writing of this dissertation, a new megafire exploded across New
Mexico. Andrew Freedman of ClimateCentral.org reports that
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the largest wildfire in New Mexico’s history continues to burn, having already charred an
area the size of New York City [approximately 496 square miles or 1,214 square km].
Known as the Whitewater-Baldy Fire Complex, the wildfire has become another in a
series of “megafires” to torch the American West due to an unprecedented combination
of drought conditions, climate change, and alterations in land-management practices. To
make matters worse, according to The Guardian newspaper, congressional budget cuts
may restrict the federal government’s firefighting efforts.484
A number of elements make this fire unprecedented, including:
1. The size and scope of the burn—two fires, which merged in late May 2012 to create
this megafire, burned 70,000 acres in just one day. With the fire only 10 percent contained as
of 1 June 2012, it had already burned 216,000 acres.
2. Difference in kind of burn—Freedman notes that climate studies demonstrate that
“long-burning, massive wildfires have become more common in the U.S. in recent years,”
and that these fires ‘burn differently’ from fires of the past.”
3. Humans are the cause—the article cites Christopher I. Roos, an assistant professor of
anthropology at Southern Methodist University, who states: “The U.S. would not be
experiencing massive large-canopy-killing crown fires today if human activities had not
begun to suppress the low-severity surface fires that were so common more than a century
ago.”485
Such disasters point us to Wilson’s third revelation. These types of disasters and
crises require immediate action. At this point, we return to my hypothesis of the correlation
between definitions of human being and their behavior toward the environment. It seems
that human beings have forgotten both their Being and being. They have forgotten that they
are creatures of this world, whose cognitive abilities give them powerful influence over their
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environment. Perhaps it is time to think more simply about the world and our relationship to
it and to reconsider that we have been created in the image of God. Then, perhaps, we may
be able to begin formulating some profitable solutions to these very immediate crises.
But before we turn to this idea that humans have been created in the image of God,
we need to linger a moment longer on the power of humans to impact their environment. It
seems to me that human beings set a dangerous precedent by not taking care of the other
creatures with whose care they have been entrusted. The real danger is the potential for
exhibiting some form of sociopathy.
While in the past sociopathic behavior was considered to be primarily the study of
clinical and abnormal psychology, Louis A. Penner and Charles D. Spielberger suggest that
in order to understand the phenomenon of sociopathy it is best to approach it from “the
theoretical perspective of personality and social psychology.”486 This is because “sociopathy
is a general trait, or collection of traits (syndrome), which is manifested to a greater or lesser
extent in the behavior of all people. Although sociopathic behaviors are antisocial, and
therefore, undesirable from a societal point of view, they do not invariably get the actor into
‘trouble,’ and may even sometimes produce considerable benefit for him or her.”487
Therefore, “a lack of empathy and a lack of concern with the welfare of others were the best
indicators of sociopathy.”488
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As I have suggested, human beings create concepts that express their own
perceptions about themselves as humans. Part of this process of social-concept building is
the creation of value systems. Penner and Spielberger note that a value system “is comprised
of beliefs about modes of conduct or end-states of existence that are ordered in terms of
their relative importance to the person. Values have their origins in and are reflective of a
person’s self-concept; they directly and indirectly influence a person’s attitudes and
behavior.”489 The authors’ proposal that “sociopathic tendencies may manifest themselves in
the social behaviors of people who have never received the clinical diagnosis of sociopathy
or been institutionalized because of sociopathic behaviors”490 is important because it
awakens us to the need for understanding such tendencies in the practice of everyday life.
It was found in regard to social behavior that those within the general population
who expressed sociopathic tendencies in standardized psychological tests were more likely to
engage in antisocial actions such as stealing and lying,491 were “generally speaking, callous,
egocentric, and selfish,” and more immune to reacting positively to “distress in other
persons.”492 Finally, the authors investigated how individuals with sociopathic tendencies
react to inequity. The Equity Theory, they note, “provides one of the most widely accepted
social psychological analysis of facts that influence people’s behavior during social
interactions.” They explain that
greatly simplified, this theory proposes that people desire fair or equitable treatment
when they deal with other people. They expect that what they contribute to an exchange
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will be matched by what they get out of it. If this does not happen, people will
experience distress whether they are the victim or the exploiter in the exchange. As a
result of this distress, people attempt to restore equity in one of two general ways. First,
the person can use physical means, for example, victims could reduce the amount of
effort they expend in an interaction. Second, the person can use psychological means to
restore equity by rationalizing away the unfair treatment. For example, victims might
increase their evaluation of the exploiter and, thus, justify the treatment they received at
his or her hands. It should be noted that physical restoration of equity typically benefits
the victim; psychological restoration of equity typically benefits the exploiter.493
What is significant about these findings is that “consistent with the [official
handbook of psychological diagnoses, the] DSM-II description of sociopaths, they were
willing to rationalize the wrongs they committed against another person, but were unwilling
to do this when they themselves were the victim of the same injustice. Apparently, for
sociopathic individuals, it makes a considerable difference whose ‘ox is being gored.’”494
If we think about the problem of sociopathy, then, from a general character trait that
is present in some degree in all human beings, then it speaks to the interaction of humans
with their environment. How do we justify our actions with the Other? Could it be that even
the act of everyday living is a statement about how antisocial human beings are becoming.
Heidegger’s concern about the human ability to make nature a “standing-reserve,”
which I spoke of in chapter 3, becomes urgent in this regard. Treatment of the Other,
especially in regard to the treatment of so-called “lesser” animals, has been found to be
related in some cases to criminal antisocial behavior.495 But if Penner and Spielberger are
correct, this problem could be manifest in more socially acceptable ways in the general
population.
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If we consider, for example, the problem of meat production for most Americans, it
is possible to better understand how humans are potentially creating sociopathic tendencies
just by how they choose to eat. In the past, meat production was a family or small
community effort. Generally, animals were slaughtered from within one’s own herd, in
which they were treated quite humanely both in their upbringing and slaughter. Cattle were
not kept enclosed or fed waste products, but grazed in open pastures during spring, summer,
and fall, and if needed were kept in barns and fed grains and hay during the winter. Today,
mass production is something quite different. First, animals from slaughter have been
removed from our immediate sight and, second, the overcrowded, unsanitary, and even cruel
conditions of their “shelter” and upbringing are often beyond imagination. Michael Pollan,
who describes meat production, asks, “when’s the last time you saw a pig in person? Meat
comes from the grocery store, where it is cut and packaged to look as little like parts of
animals as possible. . . . The disappearance of animals from our lives has opened a space in
which there’s no reality check on the sentiment or the brutality.” He, then, points to an essay
written by John Berger, “Why Look at Animals?” In this essay, Berger suggests that losing
contact with animals—specifically he refers to losing eye contact—
has left us deeply confused about the terms of our relationship to other species. That eye
contact, always slightly uncanny, had brought the vivid daily reminder that animals were
both crucially like and unlike us; in their eyes we glimpsed something unmistakably
familiar (pain, fear, courage) but also something irretrievably other (?!). Upon this
paradox people built a relationship in which they felt they could both honor and eat
animals without looking away. But that accommodation has pretty much broken down;
nowadays it seems we either look away or become vegetarians.496
If we can tolerate the inhumane treatment of animals because they have been
removed from our immediate purview, what does this say about who we are as human
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beings? What does it say about how we view our relationships with the Other? Does it
endanger who we are? So, yes, the history of where we came from does matter, but if we
become mired in this discussion, then we lose the possibility of dealing with where we are
right now.
My goal, therefore, is not to start somewhere in the distant past to try to uncover
where we all came from. I simply accept here that, however God did it, human beings come
from his hand and are to be a reflection of his image. As such, they are relational beings. By
beginning with the not-so-controversial perspective that humans are relational beings, there
is room for all disciplines to make their specific contributions about human relationality and
its impact on the environment. As we saw also in chapter 1, all of the disciplines of the
theology-and-science dialogue are concerned in some way about how humans relate to the
natural environment, to the things of nature (i.e., the flora and fauna), to other humans, and
to God. So with these delimitations and with a sense of the impending crises that assail us,
we now turn to the Hebrew Bible and the Greek New Testament and allow them to tell us
for themselves their view on human being. In this, I will use a canonical approach and I will
not, in the spirit of critical realism, be concerned unduly with the history of criticism of the
Scriptures.
The Hebrew Bible and Human Being
Serious reflection on Gen 1 and the initial conditions laid out by God, in which
humans would participate in protecting the beauty and goodness of the world through their
own ethical choices, is helpful as we consider how to respond to nature. Ellen White,
reflecting on the events leading to sin as portrayed in Gen 1–3, notes that
if the [human] race had ceased to fall when Adam was driven from Eden, we should now
be in a far more elevated condition physically, mentally, and morally. . . . Men will not
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take warning from Adam’s experience. They will indulge appetite and passion in direct
violation of the law of God. . . .
From Adam’s day to ours there has been a succession of falls, each greater than the last,
in every species of crime. God did not create a race of beings so devoid of health,
beauty, and moral power as now exists in the world. Disease of every kind has been
fearfully increasing upon the race. This has not been God’s especial providence, but
directly contrary to His will. It has come by man’s disregard of the very means which
God has ordained to shield him from the terrible evils existing.497
There are two important reasons why the creation accounts were included at the
beginning of the Torah, which provides an explication of law, demonstrating outcomes
through narrative.498 First, it was to remind its readers that the initial conditions which
brought about the world matter and set the tone for what will come, and that human beings
as moral, creative creatures have a stake in determining how history flows through time.
Bultmann realized this point, freeing himself from the deterministic Augustinian worldview
in which the responsibility of human behavior was ultimately removed from the acting
human because her fate had already been determined from eternity. While I do not agree
with Bultmann’s eschatology, which proposes that the heavenly kingdom is realized in this
Earth as it is and without a personal, historical advent of Christ that results in the re-creation
of a new Earth, I do agree that each decision humans make is eschatological in the sense of
creating an initial condition that potentially has far-reaching consequences as it moves
history toward a new state of being.
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While it may be argued that the Torah contains many different genres, the Torah
as an explication of law is foundational for understanding these other genres. As discussed
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A second reason for including the creation accounts at the beginning of the Torah is
due to the legal nature of God’s covenant with humanity. In contrast to the theologia civilis of
classical Greece, in which the rituals were concerned primarily “with the divine cults,
religious institutions, figureheads, and rites, which offered society social change” and the
theologia fabulosa, with the often immoral actions of the gods,499 the rituals of ancient Israel
were to have lasting personal and communal impact on the behavior of the worshiper both
in society and in relationship to God. In the laying-on of hands upon the head of the
sacrificial lamb, the one offering the sacrifice would be forced to stop and contemplate the
personal impact of his sin upon his relationship with God, with humans, and even the
creation as he took part in the lamb’s sacrifice (Lev 1:1-4).
As Roy Gane points out, “Ritual consists of rule-governed activity (Staal 1989: 260,
452). That activities are rule-governed means that they exhibit regularities for which rules
may be postulated to account for them.” As Gane notes, Staal delineates a potential problem
with ritual: “The concern of ritualists is with performing activities in a certain manner
according to rules rather than with achieving results in any possible manner.”500 Ritual that
has become mere activity becomes devoid of meaning; however, a ritual imbued with
meaning can provide a hierarchical system that contains meaning throughout.501 He proposes
that God’s character of love is demonstrated in the cultic rituals and that humans, by
practicing the rituals and laws given in the Torah, demonstrate God’s character, or being, in
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their own lives and thereby place a boundary or limit upon the types of activities that they
participate in, the lifestyles they choose to live, the relationships that they have with other
humans and with God.502
It is not unreasonable, then, to extend this idea of ritual and law to all living and
nonliving things that exist in this world. If we apply this ritual construct to the creation event
itself as the opening statement of God’s character, then it is possible to see that human
physicality and morality are intimately related to one another from the very beginning. The
creation account comes at the beginning of the Torah because God as the Creator of all
things is the source of all law, not just moral and civil. While Genesis does not speak of
physical law in scientific terms, it nevertheless points to the metaphysical foundation upon
which natural, moral, and civil law is grounded, a point that Philo articulates (see below). As
I argue above, there is an intimate relationship between the human behavior and the health
and well-being of both the economy and ecosystem.
Thus it is that humans are a system of hierarchical processes and subsystems. As
pointed out by Ian Barbour, they are not simply physical beings, but are also moral beings
who live together in communities and who are governed by cultural, societal, and religious
rules for living together.503 The Genesis creation accounts endorse this sense of community
(1) by creating an appropriate environment for creatures to live in, (2) by placing these
creatures together in integrated and dependent relationships, (3) by commanding them to
reproduce and fill this environment, (4) by giving humans the ability to make moral decisions
that would help to sustain and maintain the environment, and (5) by placing humans within
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stable family groups that would provide a continuing resource for moral growth and
development. These initial conditions, even though shattered by the fall of Gen 3, were to be
reaffirmed by daily choosing to endorse the initial conditions of the Gen 1 account:
Hear, Israel, and be careful to obey so that it may go well with you and that you may
increase greatly in a land flowing with milk and honey, just as the LORD, the God of your
fathers, promised you. Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one. Love the
LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength.
These commandments that I give you today are to be upon your hearts. Impress them
on your children. Talk about them when you sit at home and when you walk along the
road, when you lie down and when you get up. Tie them as symbols on your hands and
bind them on your foreheads. Write them on the doorframes of your houses and on
your gates. (Deut 6:3-8, NIV)
This recounting of God’s law was not simply the remembering of moral and civil law, but
also natural. Humans were meant to look upon nature and see its lessons for life and to
enjoy the blessings granted by nature and given to them by God. Thus it is that HebraicChristian perspective is strongly grounded in a belief in the Scriptures and the practice of a
holistic reading of them. Some Christians are seeking for answers to the economic and
ecological crises by turning toward pantheistic perspectives, such as found in Native
American and Eastern religions. However, the Scriptures provide lessons on how to live
balanced and joyful lives that are in relationship not only with God and others, but also with
nature. God is above, rather than a part of, his creation (i.e., God is not in a pantheistic
relationship with his creation). His character of love is, ultimately, his law: God’s “law is a
transcript of His own character, and it is the standard of all character.”504 By following his
law in the essence in which it is intended, humans become successful relational beings.
But there is an even deeper lesson to be contemplated here in the first chapters of
Genesis. There is a deep relationship between human behavior and nature. In the recounting
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of the great Deluge, the lesson is that as humans fell out of relationship with God, one
another, and nature, so nature became degraded. Nature and human degradation mirror one
another. Interestingly, science is learning this same lesson.505
The climactic point toward which the Preacher of Ecclesiastes drives is that humans
may choose to live their lives as they choose, believing that they are islands isolated from the
rest of the world. However, in the end, it is revealed, God has been observing their actions
all along (“Now all has been heard; here is the conclusion of the matter: Fear God and keep
his commandments, for this is the duty of all mankind. For God will bring every deed into
judgment, including every hidden thing, whether it is good or evil,” Eccl 12:13-14, NIV). In
view of this reality, the Preacher urges the young to “remember your Creator in the days of
your youth, before the days of trouble come and the years approach when you will say, ‘I
find no pleasure in them’” (Eccl 12:1, NIV).
As one of the most influential passages of Scripture to both Christians and Jews,
Gen 1 proposes that the path to the creation of humans was, first, purposeful—each
organism existed not only for its own intrinsic purpose, but also for the sustenance and
welfare of the planet (each type of organism comes into being in a hierarchical fashion,506
each day’s creation adding a layer of complexity and structure to the framework of life on
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Earth) and for the glory of God (revealed in the celebration of the creation [i.e., the action of
God in the world] and the worship of God on the Sabbath). The individual and yet
harmonious roles that organisms were to play were meant to be lasting ones, with each step
of the process being blessed and living organisms being bid to carry out their roles into
perpetuity through their multiplying and filling the Earth (each day is called “good” by God
after its completion, with the final, seventh affirmation of the Earth being “very good”).
Importantly, in the naming of the animals (Gen 2:19) humanity was to recognize the
uniqueness and intrinsic role(s) of each creature; in other words, there was to be no excuse
for “destroying the earth” through the exploitation of the creation. While the first recorded
sin, in Gen 3, is about listening to and heeding the lies of the serpent, it might be suggested
that there is also the sin of exploiting nature to obtain knowledge for one’s own personal
gain; of making nature a “standing-reserve” or inventory507 by perverting its intrinsic
meaning—eating the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil to gain the wisdom of God.
Similarly, the appearance of the evil one as a beautiful creature called a serpent was for the
purpose of deliberately deceiving humanity (Gen 3).
Genesis 1, then, viewed from a global perspective, shows a world that becomes
increasingly complex and ordered throughout the creation account. However, it also points
to a moral beginning, which correspondingly becomes increasingly complex and ordered as
the layers of physical and biological complexity grow. In this account, there is no separation
of the moral and physical elements of the natural realm. Rather the success of one realm is
dependent upon the other.
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By thinking of Gen 1 qualitatively, we are then able to see the potential for viewing it
not only globally, for the purpose of understanding how order flows throughout the entire
creative process, but also for understanding that the process described there is not simply a
demythologized version of Babylonian mythology.508 There is no struggle between God and
the forces of chaos. Nor is the account a mere recitation of quasi-historical events, given
only for the purpose of narrating a story of origins for the Israelite people, but is meant to
convey a sense of reality. Further, the God of the Scriptures is a personal God, who draws
near to humans and without the need of any visual representation of him (Dan 2:11) than a
human being who has been restored into his own image.
Philo of Alexandria asserts in the introduction to his work “On the Creation” that
other “lawgivers . . . have sought to bewilder the people, by burying the truth under a heap
of fabulous invention.”509 Moses, in contrast, “made the beginning of his laws entirely
beautiful, and in all respects admirable, neither at once declaring what ought to be done or
the contrary, nor (since it was necessary to mould beforehand the dispositions of those who
were to use his laws) inventing fables himself or adopting those which had been invented by
others.”510 Philo proposes that Moses did not make use of fables or myths because “the law
corresponds to the world and the world to the law, and that a man who is obedient to the
law, being, by so doing, a citizen of the world, arranges his actions with reference to the
508
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intention of nature, in harmony with which the whole world is regulated.”511 He surmises
that neither historian nor poet could surpass the statement of law and creation given by
Moses, although we ought to exert ourselves to describe nature. The problem is, however,
that
for some men, admiring the world itself rather than the Creator of the world, have
represented it as existing without any maker, and eternal; and as impiously as falsely have
represented God as existing in a state of complete inactivity, while it would have been
right on the other hand to marvel at the might of God as the creator and father of all
and to admire the world in a degree not exceeding the bounds of moderation.512
Without the historical nature of God’s actions in the creation, which are carried out
according to his law, there would be no basis for obedience of the law by the people (“the
law corresponds to the world and the world to the law,” and as citizens of the world,
humanity observes the law).513
Law, then, in all its aspects—moral, civil, and natural—becomes the basis for a better
life for all living things.
Law and Restoration of the Creation by God
and the Human Free Will
The Psalmist, contemplating his own place among the wonders of nature, asks God,
“When I consider your heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and the stars, which you
have set in place, what is mankind that you are mindful of them, human beings that you care
for them?” (8:3-4, NIV). His answer echoes the words of God at the creation of humanity in
Gen 1:26-28: “You have made them a little lower than the angels and crowned them with
glory and honor. You made them rulers over the works of your hands; you put everything
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under their feet: all flocks and herds, and the animals of the wild, the birds in the sky, and
the fish in the sea, all that swim the paths of the seas” (Ps 8:5-8, NIV). In Ps 89, after
affirming God’s “rule over the surging sea” (i.e., primordial chaos, vv. 9-10) and his role as
Creator of heaven and earth (v. 11), the Psalmist praises God for his law: “Righteousness
and justice are the foundation of your throne; love and faithfulness go before you. Blessed
are those who have learned to acclaim you, who walk in the light of your presence, LORD”
(vv. 14-15). There is a reason why the physical and moral realms are not separated in the
Gen 1 creation account. This global approach recognizes that natural law and order,
morality, and even chaotic creative changes from one state to another have their roots in
God’s law.
Proverbs 8 describes the role of wisdom personified, asking:
Does not wisdom call out? Does not understanding raise her voice? At the highest point
along the way, where the paths meet, she takes her stand; beside the gate leading into the
city, at the entrance, she cries aloud: . . . “I raise my voice to all mankind. . . . All the
words of my mouth are just; none of them is crooked or perverse. . . . Choose my
instruction instead of silver, knowledge rather than choice gold, for wisdom is more
precious than rubies, and nothing you desire can compare with her. I, wisdom, dwell
together with prudence; I possess knowledge and discretion. I hate pride and arrogance,
evil behavior and perverse speech. Counsel and sound judgment are mine; I have insight,
I have power. By me kings reign and rulers issue decrees that are just; by me princes
govern, and nobles—all who rule on earth.” (vv. 1-4, 8, 10-16, NIV)
Here wisdom and law may be equated—wisdom is just, having knowledge and
discretion, counsel, and sound judgment. It is the foundation of law, both moral (choose
prudence and abhor pride, arrogance, and evil behavior) and civil (kings reign and rulers
issue decrees by wisdom).
But wisdom is also the foundation of natural law:
“The LORD brought me forth as the first of his works, before his deeds of old; I was
formed long ages ago, at the very beginning, when the world came to be. When there
were no watery depths, I was given birth, when there were no springs overflowing with
water; before the mountains were settled in place, before the hills, I was given birth,
before he made the world or its fields or any of the dust of the earth. I was there when
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he set the heavens in place, when he marked out the horizon on the face of the deep,
when he established the clouds above and fixed securely the fountains of the deep, when
he gave the sea its boundary so the water would not overstep his command, and when
he marked out the foundations of the earth. Then I was constantly at his side. . . .
Blessed are those who listen to me, watching daily at my doors, waiting at my doorway,
For those who find me find life.” (Prov 8:22-30a, 34-35a, NIV)514
Without the context of Scripture, the Hebraic-Christian perspectives about reality
and human origins would be left only partially answered, for science, as we have seen, limits
itself to an examination of the physical causes, knowing even then that human ability falls far
short of even a complete physical answer, let alone a moral one. It struggles then to form an
idea of morality based upon what it does know about reality. Without Scripture, the divine
activities that preceded and accompanied the origin of the physical act of creation would
remain forever in the shadows.
The correspondence between moral and physical law within the animal kingdom is
demonstrated in the establishment of the new creation following the reign of Messiah. In Isa
11:1-3, the Messiah is presented as one who comes from the “stump of Jesse,” having a
Branch that bears the fruit of the Spirit of God: “the Spirit of wisdom and of understanding,
the Spirit of counsel and of might, the Spirit of the knowledge and fear of the Lord.”
Further, he will be a wise ruler, who sees beyond the deeds and actions of humanity to their
innermost motivations and who will judge according to his righteous law (vv. 3-4, NIV).
“Righteousness will be his belt and faithfulness the sash around his waist” (v. 5, NIV).
Messiah’s actions in the animal kingdom result in the return of peace to animals once
antagonistic to one another in the previous fallen world:
The wolf will live with the lamb, the leopard will lie down with the goat, the calf and the
lion and the yearling together; and a little child will lead them. The cow will feed with the
bear, their young will lie down together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox. The infant
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will play near the cobra’s den, the child will put its hand into the viper’s nest. They will
neither harm nor destroy on all my holy mountain, for the earth will be filled with
knowledge of the LORD as the waters cover the sea. (Isa 11:6-9, NIV)
Thus even the created organisms other than humans experience the benefits and
rewards of a restored divine law.515 The image of the infant playing among serpents is
striking. The adder, symbolizing the tearing down of the moral element of the creation,
which results in its physical damage and destruction, is once again restored to its original
position as a beautiful creature by its place beside the infant. The curse placed upon the
serpent for its role in the deceiving of humanity in Gen 3:14b-15 (NIV) (“Cursed are you
above all livestock and all wild animals! You will crawl on your belly and you will eat dust all
the days of your life. And I will put enmity between you and the woman and between your
offspring and hers; he will crush your head, and you will strike his heel”) is now lifted, the
relationship restored. This simple illustration points to the fact that each entity within nature
has its own intrinsic value and reason for being. Though the unmoral behavior of humans
often misappropriates and uses the natural resources and even one another as inventory,
each creature retains its original identity and reason for being in the mind of God. Part of
the role of God’s people is to help uplift these original intents and one of the activities of
God in the new Earth will be to fully restore the creation to its original form.
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Part of the process of salvation is that God wants to restore enmity between humans
and evil and to remove the misconception that nature itself is intrinsically evil. God says: “I
will give you a new heart and put a new spirit in you; I will remove from you your heart of
stone and give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit in you and move you to follow
my decrees and be careful to keep my laws” (Ezek 36:26-27, NIV). God is depicted in the
Hebrew Bible as one who loves the natural realm. Here in Ezekiel, he wants to restore the
humanness, that is, the “flesh,” to human beings. Further, some of the most beautiful poetry
ever written is credited to God’s direct speech in celebration of the wonders of his creation
in the closing chapters of Job (38–41).516 Here God stands at the side of Job, pointing out to
him the wonders of nature, pointing to the roaring seas, the brilliant flashes of lightning, and
the delightful antics of the animal world. In restoring the image of God in human beings
through the salvific process, God helps humans to come to love and appreciate the natural
world as he does. When this happens, God promises that “I will call for the grain and make
it plentiful and will not bring famine upon you. I will increase the fruit of the trees and the
crops of the field, so that you will no longer suffer disgrace among the nations because of
famine” (Ezek 36:29b-30, NIV). Here is a way for humans to help combat the problem of
global warming by restoring their relationship with God; having done so, there is then a
desire and ability to restore our relationship with the rest of nature.
Genesis 1 proposes that the creation was orderly and hierarchically structured. But
the moment of creation, that is, the biological beginning of life, becomes a chaotic moment
of creative activity in which the Earth that was “without form, and void” and a place of
darkness (Gen 1:2a) transitions into a new physical, biological, and moral state—a place of
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light and life as God himself provides the motion that creates and sustains life. Even during
periods of terrible evil in the present world, following the Fall of humanity (Gen 3), the law
remains effective and working, while the perpetrators of evil are held accountable for their
actions.517 The fact that the law remains active, effective, and authoritative in all aspects of
life—moral, civil, and natural—makes possible the restoration and transformation to a final
state in which there is a new Earth void of death (1 Cor 15), evil (both moral and natural),
and tears (Rev 22).
Since the book of nature and the book of revelation bear the impress of the same master
mind, they cannot but speak in harmony. By different methods, and in different
languages, they witness to the same great truths. Science is ever discovering new
wonders; but she brings from research nothing that, rightly understood, conflicts with
divine revelation. The book of nature and the written word shed light upon each other.
They make us acquainted with God by teaching us something of the laws through which
He works.518
By taking our cues for care-taking of the Earth from Scripture, we can help to
preserve and protect the creation and, at the same time, learn to read nature as God’s
creation. Such a view of the relationship of Scripture and nature moves us away from the
Augustinian perspective that leads ultimately to an unknown fate. It forces us, as Bultmann
desired, to reconsider our own responsibility and accountability not only to God, but to
those living and inanimate things that we have been divinely charged to care for. To
accomplish this task is to fulfill Case-Winters’s desire for a life of relational transcendence.
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Finally, eschatology mirrors the original creation (Gen 1): a massive fall at the
beginning of time requires a massive restoration and re-creation at the end (Gen 3; Rev 21–
22:7).519 However, simply because this present world will come to an end does not imply that
humans are not to continue in their roles of care-takers of the planet; nor does it mean that
in taking care of the Earth that we are helping to perpetuate the Fall or imply that we no
longer believe in a personal and historical second advent. Rather, by care-taking we
demonstrate to God and others that we cherish our current and only home, prepared with
care and forethought at the creation by God. We also demonstrate how we would take care
of a fully restored new Earth. In honor of this loving act, we may celebrate the Sabbath
weekly, looking both to the past (the Creation week) and to the future (the re-creation and
restoration), which ushers in an eternity of harmony (cf. Rev 21).
Between the beginning and the end of all things, there is the present. So that we can
better understand how to live between the beginning and the end of life, God sent his only
Son to be an example of how this relationality with the Other might take place. It would
seem that this is at least partly what attracts McGrath to the idea of a Trinitarian theology, as
we saw in chapter 2. How do we, then, bring together the ancient Hebrew cosmology with
the exemplar life of Jesus Christ? It is to this task that we now turn.
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The Roots of the Hebraic-Christian Theology of
Human Being in the Greek New Testament
Nancey Murphy criticizes New Testament scholars who turn to extrabiblical texts in
order to define what the New Testament means when it speaks of being, asking: “Do
Christians really need to work through a long list of non-Canonical books [such as the
intertestamental, or Second Jewish Temple writings, the Apocrypha, Pseudopigrapha, or the
Greek philosophers] in order to determine what the Bible teaches on this issue?” Her
response is: “The New Testament authors are not intending to teach anything about humans’
metaphysical composition. If they were, surely they could have done so much more
clearly!”520 Rather, she concludes they defined being in terms of
the whole person thought of from a certain angle. For example, “spirit” stands for the
whole person in relation to God. What the New Testament authors are concerned with,
then, is human beings in relationship to the natural world, to the community, and to
God. Paul’s distinction between spirit and flesh is not our later distinction between soul
and body.521
Murphy’s statement provides a baseline for my approach to the Greek New
Testament concept of being. Here there are no lightning flashes that impute being into
matter. Rather, the Hebrew Bible’s understanding of the image of God and of the personal
God who stoops down to create human beings that I discussed in the previous section holds
sway, as exemplified in two New Testament passages: John 1:1-14 and Acts 17:22-32.
In the first passage, the ground of all beings—Jesus, who is rooted in the Hebrew
Bible as the Word who was at the very beginning (Gen 1:1) and who helped to create the
world, but who is now in the flesh of human beings—is introduced. In the second passage,
once again a deep connection with the Hebrew Bible is demonstrated. God is presented as
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the one “in whom we live and breathe and have our being” (Acts 17:28, NIV). In these two
passages, we can observe the intimate relationship between the Hebrew Bible’s conception
of human being and that of the Greek New Testament, as I continue to build the HebraicChristian concept of being.
God as Word
The prologue to the Gospel of John begins: “In the beginning was the Word, and
the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning.
Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made” (vv.
1-3, NIV). In a manner reflective of the opening words of the Hebrew Bible (“In the
beginning God created the heavens and the earth,” Gen 1:1, NIV), John connects his
Gospel of Jesus Christ with that of the Torah, the explication of the Law given to Israel.
This “Word” is neither the materialistic force of nature, nor the anthropomorphism of that
force as exemplified by the Greek gods of mythology. He was instead “the true light that
gives light to everyone” (John 1:9, NIV), but although “he was in the world, and though the
world was made through him, the world did not recognize him” (v. 10, NIV). He is both
ancient, having been with God in the beginning before the creation of the world, and he is
alive and personal—in the flesh and dwelling among us (1:14).
In a twist to the story of Zeus, who is the anthropomorphism of the powerful bolt
of lightning that differentiates eternal matter by investing it with being from the divine
lo,goj,522 Jesus plays out a role that is both familiar and foreign to the ear attuned to Greek
theology. First, he is personal, both as a real human being and as a divine God. But he is not
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of the nature of the heroic gods of the ancient Greeks.523 As the divine One, he sends out a
messenger (who should be a bolt of lightning as it was in the Greek tradition), whose name
is John, who is also a man. But John is not the lightning and does not act as Zeus did—he
does not move people in the generative and metaphysical sense of the word; “he came only
as a witness to the light” (v. 7) so that people might be prepared when the real Light came
(v. 6). Further, the real One of Greek theology would never appear to humans directly, but
only in the form of avatars. The mythological Greek gods came down to earth as various
manifestations or avatars of some aspect of the divine One; for example, Aphrodite as the
goddess of love, Apollo as the god associated with light and truth, Hermes as the god of
language and writing, and Zeus as the king of the gods, who is the representation of thunder,
lightning, law, order, and fate.524
Thus the Word, Jesus, must have seemed a very strange sort of God to the Greeks.
The Apostle Paul notes this in his first epistle to the Corinthians (1:18-25, NIV):
For the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are
being saved it is the power of God. For it is written: “I will destroy the wisdom of the
wise; the intelligence of the intelligent I will frustrate.” Where is the wise person? Where
is the teacher of the law? Where is the philosopher of this age? Has not God made
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foolish the wisdom of the world? 21 For since in the wisdom of God the world through
its wisdom did not know him, God was pleased through the foolishness of what was
preached to save those who believe. Jews demand signs and Greeks look for wisdom,
but we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles,
but to those whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and
the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than human wisdom, and the
weakness of God is stronger than human strength.
Jesus is the eternal Word, who not only creates alongside the other members of the
Trinity, but who offers his life and death for the salvation of all people—even for people
who find his story to be foolish. The apparent foolishness of the apostles becomes even
more evident in Paul’s address to the Areopagus as Paul applies this concept of the Word to
the creative, generative process that brings forth human being.
Paul’s Speech to the Areopagus
Paul’s speech before the Areopagus contains a number of important features: “the
most important features in the conception of God; the attack on idolatry; and the aspects of
universalism and the Divine plan of salvation.”525 Central to my discussion is his assertion
concerning the relationship between God as the Creator and the nature of human being
(Acts 17:24-31, NIV):
24

The God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and earth and
does not live in temples built by human hands. 25And he is not served by human hands,
as if he needed anything. Rather, he himself gives everyone life and breath and
everything else. 26From one man he made all the nations, that they should inhabit the
whole earth; and he marked out their appointed times in history and the boundaries of
their lands. 27God did this so that they would seek him and perhaps reach out for him
and find him, though he is not far from any one of us. 28 “For in him we live and move
and have our being.” As some of your own poets have said, “We are his offspring.”
29

Therefore since we are God’s offspring, we should not think that the divine being is
like gold or silver or stone—an image made by human design and skill. 30 In the past
God overlooked such ignorance, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent.
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31

For he has set a day when he will judge the world with justice by the man he has
appointed. He has given proof of this to everyone by raising him from the dead.

In this passage, Paul lays out the properties of the God of the Hebrew Bible, who remains
the God of Christianity and who has been manifested in the person of Jesus Christ. Paul sets
a standard for defining God in the New Testament in this passage: All the properties of God
in this address reference directly back to the Hebrew Bible. Here I will examine three points
from this passage that help to demonstrate the Greek New Testament’s dependence upon
the Hebrew Bible’s conception of human being.
1. God made the world and all its contents (Genesis 1–2). Paul begins with establishing that
human being is created, along with everything else in the world, by God. He is singular in
that he has no avatars who represent his various attributes or carry out his creative acts as
demiurges; he is “the Lord of heaven and earth” and there is no other. Both the Hebrew
Bible and the Greek New Testament point to God as the Lord and Creator of all things and
as the foundation of moral and natural law (see, e.g., Jonah 1:9: “I am a Hebrew and I
worship the LORD, YHWH Elōhīm, the God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land,”
NIV; Rev 14:7: “Fear God and give him glory, because the hour of his judgment has come.
Worship him who made the heavens, the earth, the sea and the springs of water,” NIV). The
use of YHWH Elōhīm, used in Jonah and implied in the Greek text of Acts 17:24 and Rev
14:7, acknowledges the moral imperative that goes along with the name. YHWH Elōhīm is
the personal God of all people. Umberto Cassuto, who examines the use of the names of
God in the Torah, proposes that each creation account demonstrates a particular aspect of
God. Therefore, Gen 1
vouchsafed a sublime vision of the totality of creation [“the God of heaven, who made
the sea and the dry land”], portrayed with great synthetic power, which unifies into a
clear and comprehensible order all the endlessly changing categories of existence. . . .
God reveals Himself . . . as a transcendental being dwelling in His supernal abode
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without direct contact with the creatures. On the other hand, the second section
[Genesis 2:4ff.] contains a graphic and dramatic narrative that . . . seeks to inculcate
religion and ethical teachings under the guise of actual happenings. . . . YHWH appears
there . . . in direct touch with His creature man and with the other created beings of His
world.526
Two important points come to the fore here: (1) Gen 1 is concerned with Godcreated order (i.e., that which may be studied by the natural sciences or Heidegger’s ontic
knowledge), and (2) Gen 2:4ff. is concerned with the moral elements of God and his
creation (i.e., that studied by theology and metaphysics or Heidegger’s ontological
knowledge).
If I understand Cassuto correctly, that the cosmological features of the Genesis
creation accounts were similar in structure to those of the ancient Near Eastern cultures,
then it is possible that Jonah’s companions, in Jonah 1, would have understood the moral
significance of this use of God’s name—the God of all things is also the judge of all
things.527 Similarly, in Rev 14:7 three angels are sent to bring a message to all humanity. Here
the people are told to fear God and give him glory. To fear God “conveys the idea of taking
God seriously in life by following him and obeying his commandments. Fearing God
denotes a relationship with God and full surrender to his will (cf. 1 Sam. 12:14, 24; 2 Chron.
6:31; Neh. 7:2; Job 1:9; Ps. 40:3; Jer. 32:39; 44:10; Hag. 1:12).”528 To give glory is the result of
taking one’s relationship with God seriously, but it also implies treating others as we would
treat God (Matt 25:31-46). Therefore, “when a person fears God, he lives a life of glorifying
526

Umberto Cassuto, The Documentary Hypothesis and the Composition of the Pentateuch:
Eight Lectures, trans. Israel Abrahams (New York: Shalem Press, 2006), 85-86.
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God by keeping his commandments. Jesus made it clear to his disciples: ‘By this is My
Father glorified, that you bear much fruit, and so prove to be My disciples” (John 15:8).
. . . It is in the sense of obeying God and his commandments that the giving of glory to God
in Revelation 14:7 must be understood.”529 As in the book of Jonah, the identity of God is
given in sweeping terms that encompass all things and once again carries deep moral
significance. In echoing the language of the Decalogue, the written foundation of all law in
the Scriptures (Exod 20:11), which itself uses the language of creation, the importance of
God’s law is emphasized. The construction of the Decalogue itself is reflective of the allencompassing nature of this law, for it extends not only to respect for and obedience to God
(Exod 20:2-7), but to the family (vv. 12), others (vv. 13-17) who are “strangers,” servants,
and even animals (v. 10).
2. He does not “live in temples built by human hands” (1 Kgs 8:27-31). He is “not served by
human hands, as if he needed anything.” Instead, he gives “life and breath and everything
else” (1 Sam 5; Isa 46:1-4).
In Heidegger, absolute Being itself is separate from being. It is, as Rudolf Otto
describes the One, “‘wholly other’, something which has no place in our scheme of reality
but belongs to an absolutely different one, and which at the same time arouses an
irrepressible interest in the mind.”530 But the God of the Hebraic-Christian understanding,
though separate and distinct from his creation, is near. As Solomon addresses in his
dedicatory prayer of the newly constructed Temple in Jerusalem, there is deep trust and faith
that when one prays from the Temple, God will hear from his throne in heaven, thereby
529
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Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of
the Divine, trans. John W. Harvey (White Fish, MT: reprint, Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 25.
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implying a God who is personally interested in the affairs of human beings (1 Kgs 8:22-54;
for a full text of this passage, see the Appendix B at the end of this dissertation).
When 1 Kgs 8:22-54 is contrasted with the text of Nietzsche’s madman,531 there is no
similarities between the two descriptions of God. In Nietzsche’s depiction, God is dead.
Thoroughly mortal and anthropomorphic, he cannot be of any help to his subjects.
In Solomon’s prayer, however, God is not only uplifted (sitting on his throne in
heaven), but he is bent forward, listening and watching attentively in behalf of humans.
Solomon asks, “But will God really dwell on earth? The heavens, even the highest heaven,
cannot contain you. How much less this temple I have built!” (1 Kgs 8:27). But there is
confidence that God not only will dwell, but will hear and act on behalf of those who pray to
God: “Yet give attention to your servant’s prayer and his plea for mercy, O LORD my God.
Hear the cry and the prayer that your servant is praying in your presence this day” (v. 28).
Solomon does not have to go seeking a dead God; he finds God alive and listening in the
Temple. As Paul states to the Athenians: “Therefore since we are God’s offspring, we
should not think that the divine being is like gold or silver or stone—an image made by
human design and skill” (Acts 17:29; cf. Isa 46).
As for God’s human subjects, there is a moral imperative that they must follow, but
the Temple is the place where justice and mercy come together so that when an individual,
or even the whole nation, breaks God’s moral law, they are able to turn to God in his
Temple and ask forgiveness and seek restitution for the wrongs they have committed against
God and others. Solomon repeatedly emphasizes this point, extending God’s forgiveness
even to the “foreigner” who seeks out the God of Israel (1 Kgs 8:41-43).
531

The full text of this passage is also in the Appendix A at the end of this
dissertation; see discussion in chap. 4.
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3. From one man [one blood, KJV] he created all nations” (Acts 17:26a; Gen 1–2), “that
they should inhabit the whole earth; and he marked out their appointed times in history and
the boundaries of their lands” (Acts 17:26b; cf. Deuteronomy and Joshua). “God did this so
that they would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him, though he is not far
from any one of us” (cf. Deut 30). “‘For in him we live and move and have our being.’ As
some of your own poets have said, ‘we are his offspring’” (Acts 17:27-28).
In Paul’s affirmation that all human beings come from one source, are of one blood,
there is an allusion to God’s personal creative act of bringing forth humanity in Gen 2:7.
There is no magic here; no denial of his use of the laws of nature to accomplish his task.
Equally important is that God does not simply allow unbounded forces to create human
beings. Instead, there is a personal element involved: “For in him we live and move and have
our being,” for “We are [all] his offspring.”532
Paul refers to this child-parent relationship in his letter to the Ephesians, proposing
that God “chose us in him before the creation of the world to be holy and blameless in his
sight. In love he predestined us to be adopted as his sons through Jesus Christ, in
accordance with his pleasure and will” (Eph 1:34-5, NIV). God never had any plan to
abandon a single human being. Nor was he selective in eternity, or thereafter in the time
after the creation. There are no subhumans or a few elect in God’s eyes. All are required to
choose their relationship with him. His desire is to save all people (“For God so loved the
world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but
have eternal life. For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to
532
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save the world through him. Whoever believes in him is not condemned, but whoever does
not believe stands condemned already because he has not believed in the name of God’s one
and only Son”; John 3:16-18, NIV). God respects human choice and as Solomon’s prayer
demonstrates, he provides every opportunity for human beings to come into a good
relationship with himself and with others.
What, then, does it mean to be created in the image of God? What are the roots that
ground the Hebraic-Christian theology of human being? According to the apostle Paul, the
root of being is the Holy Spirit, and the effects of his work in the one in which he has
worked are “love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness” (Gal 5:22, NASB).
These characteristics or attributes of the human being created in the image of God are
related through the physical body.
In the creation of man was manifest the agency of a personal God. When God had made
man in His image, the human form was perfect in all its arrangements, but it was without
life. Then a personal, self-existing God breathed into that form the breath of life, and
man became a living, breathing, intelligent being. All parts of the human organism were
put in action. The heart, the arteries, the veins, the tongue, the hands, the feet, the
senses, the perceptions of the mind—all began their work, and all were placed under law.
Man became a living soul. Through Jesus a personal God created man and endowed him
with intelligence and power.533
In the coming together of the physical and moral attributes of human being there is a moral
imperative, and the salvific relationship with God is for the express purpose of restoring the
image of God that has become tarnished from living in this world where humans often make
the wrong decisions that harm their relationship with God and others. To be created in
God’s image is to live and act in the way that God would if he were present. It is to celebrate
both the moral goodness of God and the goodness of his creation—to embrace both the
physical and the spiritual elements of our human being (Ezek 36:27).
533
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A human being in the Hebraic-Christian sense lives respectfully in the world, taking
care of it and its many and varied life forms and natural resources. In doing so, through
God’s power, she becomes a force for good in this world. Though she lives in expectation of
a better, recreated universe,534 she never forgets that this is her only home for the present.
She thus “brings . . . good, not harm, all the days of her life. . . . She speaks with wisdom and
faithful instruction is on her tongue. . . . Charm is deceptive, and beauty is fleeting; but a
woman [or a man] who fears the Lord is to be praised” (Prov 31:12, 26, 30, NIV).
The Possibilities of Applying a Hebraic-Christian
Perspective of Human Being
The problem this dissertation has examined is the need for grounding theology-andscience dialogue on the hermeneutical foundation of human being for the purpose of
understanding the correlation between human being as a relational being and, as human
beings created in the image of God, their interaction with their environment, including the
moral, spiritual, and physical aspects of reality. As we come to the conclusion of this
dissertation, it is appropriate to ask whether this Hebraic-Christian concept of human being
can be of any help to the larger theology-and-science dialogue.
It is, undoubtedly, not the most common choice to take the Hebrew cosmology
seriously in its depiction of human being in a nondualistic sense. However, as we have seen
in this dissertation, the disciplines, whether theological, natural, human, or philosophical, are
concerned with the economic and ecological crises that currently assail the planet on every
side. It is increasingly acknowledged that many (if not all, at least indirectly) of these crises
534
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are the result of human behavior gone awry. How, then, might we embrace this common
ground of human being so as to address these types of problems?
I suggest in this dissertation that a nondualistic concept of human being is helpful in
four ways: (1) it is relational, (2) it is purposeful, (3) it is holistic, (4) it is stable and unifying.
1. Relational. To say that the Hebraic-Christian concept of being is relational means
that human beings do not live for themselves alone. Rather there is a vertical relationship
between human beings and God and a horizontal relationship with other living creatures. I
intentionally extend this horizontal relationship to creatures other than humans, for they
have been given to us as gifts, to care for and tend to their needs. They are not gifts in the
sense of using them in any manner in which we choose. Rather they are gifts, as the
anthropic cosmological principle teaches, because they are a part of those necessary elements
needed for life to exist. God, in his abundant goodness, has endowed this universe with
profound wealth and on this Earth human beings are to be the trustees of this vast treasure.
2. Purposeful. One may quibble over whether purpose exists in this world. However, if
human beings are to be good trustees, they must find purpose for carrying out this task, for
it will greatly impact the way in which we approach nature and other human beings. As was
discussed in chapter 3, there are three possible suggestions for acting purposefully in our
relationships with other creatures: (a) the telos supports the notion that Earth’s resources are
limited and proposes seeking more than a simply instrumental, economic approach toward
natural resources, of which humans are a part; (b) because the ontological being of each
object of nature is acknowledged within the concept of telos, there is a moral imperative to
care for all natural resources with respect and not simply as a means to an end; and (c) the
extreme anthropocentrism of a purely instrumentalist technology may be called into a
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responsible relationship with nature, including humanity itself, through a cooperative effort
on the part of all disciplines.
3. Holistic. Even though the human sciences, particularly the neurosciences, are
discovering the wholeness of human being, we struggle to understand how two seemingly
different aspects of humanity—the mind or immortal soul and the body—can
simultaneously be one whole unit rather than a composite of parts. Yet an abundance of
historical documentation, as we saw in chapters 5 and 6, demonstrates how destructive a
dualistic concept can be. As chapter 3 also helps to demonstrate, a view of humans as mere
machines also leaves much to be desired.
However, if humans are complete beings from the very beginning of their existence,
then one can never say that another humanoid life-form is subhuman on the basis of lacking
some aspect of being or on the basis of some inherited morphological characteristic such as
skin color. We did not need the Radical Enlightenment to tell us that all human beings were
created equal, or genetics to tell us that we all come from the same proto-parents. Science
confirms and clarifies what the ancient Hebrew cosmology already knew.
4. Stable and unifying. As Umberto Cassuto points out (chap. 7), the God of Hebrew
cosmology celebrates, and wishes human beings to celebrate, the goodness of his creation.
While there is certainly a moral and spiritual element that calls for ethical living and
worshipful praise to God in Gen 2, there is a celebration of the physical creation as well in
Gen 1. This universe has been designed in such a way that the human observer may find
endless possibilities for discovery and delight. Even though there is evil in the world, it does
not change the goodness of God’s creation or our ability to view God’s signature there.
Importantly, it demonstrates that there are not two separate realms—the moral, spiritual,
and physical, the good and evil—but rather there is, as Bhaskar argues in chapter 1, a single
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stratified reality that invites interdisciplinary dialogue. As such, the Hebraic-Christian
perspective calls for deeper collaborative reflection across the disciplines.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have explored how Heidegger’s concept of Being/being, while
instructive, must be rethought to include the personal God of the Hebrew Bible and the
Greek New Testament. To be created in the image of God brings with it an imperative to
celebrate the spiritual, moral, and physical aspects of human being. It also means recognizing
the importance of the relational attributes of human being both in terms of our relationship
with God and with the rest of the creation. God, as a personal being, is interested in the
actions and behavior of all people. There are no so-called humanoid life-forms; there are
only human beings who have come from his hand complete. Beautiful and varied, they each
in their own way may choose to reflect back God’s moral being by following his law, an
expression that is revealed in their phenomenal acts.
Finally, a Hebraic-Christian concept of being works well as a common philosophical
ground for theology-and-science dialogue. Although the moral and physical attributes have
been damaged and obscured, in the words of Betsie ten Boom, with which I began this
dissertation, “there is no pit so deep that He is not deeper still.”535
The concept “humans as relational beings,” then, addresses the totality of what it
means to be human. No one discipline can adequately address all three basic attributes—
physical, moral, and spiritual. Therefore, in order to address (1) the question of human
being, and (2) the question of human behavior on the environment, there is need for the
collaboration and insights from all the disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have discovered and constructed a Hebraic-Christian
ontological definition of human being to serve as a common philosophical ground for
fruitful interdisciplinary conversation within the theology-and-science dialogue. In doing so,
I suggest that the definition should be restricted to humans as relational beings for the
purpose of allowing all disciplines within the dialogue to (1) participate from within their
own approaches, and (2) for helping to develop a common language by which to enter more
efficiently into mutually beneficial communication.
The underlying purpose behind this exercise is to provide a basis for testing my
hypothesis that there is a correlation between the way in which human being is defined and
how humans interact with their environment. My definition of human being attends to the
physical (natural sciences), moral (philosophy and social sciences), and spiritual (theology)
attributes of human being, indicating that an interdisciplinary approach to the study of
human being would be profitable, especially when considering the ways in which the
definition of human being may affect how humans interact with their environment. Central
to this process of defining human beings is the addition of a spiritual element because it is
only in having a referent beyond themselves that is both exemplar and a source of
transformative power can humans ever truly come into a care-taking relationship with
nature.
In order to move conceptual ideas toward scientific knowledge, we must consider
our concept along three broad lines: epistemology, logic, and metaphysics. Foundational to
220

them all is ontology. In this dissertation, I have sought to ontologically define humans as
relational beings. I have allowed each discipline to bring its own aspect and context to this
question: The natural sciences point out the complex nature of human physicality and point
toward its mysterious ability to produce cognitive, relational beings. The philosophical and
social sciences point toward the relationship between humans and their environment.
Theology points toward the relationship between humans and God.
Having thus accomplished this first step for the movement of conceptual ideas to
scientific knowledge by ontologically defining them and having demonstrated this
definition’s usefulness across the disciplines of the theology-and-science dialogue, I have
now laid the ground for the second part of the movement toward scientific knowledge,
which requires comparing and contrasting my hypothesis with other approaches and for
submitting it to rigorous testing. These will be the tasks of later work beyond this
dissertation.
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APPENDIX A
NIETZSCHE’S MADMAN
The Madman. Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright
morning hours, ran to the market place and cried incessantly, “I seek God! I seek God!” As
many of those who not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much
laughter. Why, did he get lost? said one. Did he lose his way like a child? said another, Or is
he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they yelled and
laughed. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his glances.
“Whither is God” he cried. “I shall tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us
are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who
gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained the
earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all
sun? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is
there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not
hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell
anything yet of God’s decomposition? God too decomposes. God is dead. God remains
dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, comfort
ourselves? What was holiest and most powerful of all that the world has yet owned has bled
to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to
clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is
not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods simply
222

to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever will be born after
us—for the sake of this deed he will be part of a higher history than all history hitherto.”
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they too were silent
and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke
and went out. “I come too early,” he said then; “my time has not come yet. This tremendous
event is still on its way, still wandering—it has not yet reached the ears of man. Lightning
and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after
they are done, before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them
than the most distant stars—and yet they have done it themselves.”
It has been related further that on that same day the madman entered divers
churches and there sang his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and called to account, he is said to
have replied each time, “What are these churches now if they are not the tombs and
sepulchers of God?”536
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APPENDIX B
SOLOMON’S PRAYER OF DEDICATION:
1 KINGS 8:22-54 (NIV)
22

Then Solomon stood before the altar of the LORD in front of the whole assembly

of Israel, spread out his hands toward heaven 23 and said: “O LORD, God of Israel, there is
no God like you in heaven above or on earth below—you who keep your covenant of love
with your servants who continue wholeheartedly in your way. 24 You have kept your promise
to your servant David my father; with your mouth you have promised and with your hand
you have fulfilled it—as it is today.
25

“Now LORD, God of Israel, keep for your servant David my father the promises

you made to him when you said, ‘You shall never fail to have a man to sit before me on the
throne of Israel, if only your sons are careful in all they do to walk before me as you have
done.’

26

And now, O God of Israel, let your word that you promised your servant David

my father come true.
27

“But will God really dwell on earth? The heavens, even the highest heaven, cannot

contain you. How much less this temple I have built!

28

Yet give attention to your servant’s

prayer and his plea for mercy, O LORD my God. Hear the cry and the prayer that your
servant is praying in your presence this day.
29

“May your eyes be open toward this temple night and day, this place of which you

said, ‘My Name shall be there,’ so that you will hear the prayer your servant prays toward this
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place. 30 Hear the supplication of your servant and of your people Israel when they pray
toward this place. Hear from heaven, your dwelling place, and when you hear, forgive.
31

“When a man wrongs his neighbor and is required to take an oath and he comes

and swears the oath before your altar in this temple, 32 then hear from heaven and act. Judge
between your servants, condemning the guilty and bringing down on his own head what he
has done. Declare the innocent not guilty, and so establish his innocence.
33

“When your people Israel have been defeated by an enemy because they have

sinned against you, and when they turn back to you and confess your name, praying and
making supplication to you in this temple, 34 then hear from heaven and forgive the sin of
your people Israel and bring them back to the land you gave to their fathers.
35

“When the heavens are shut up and there is no rain because your people have

sinned against you, and when they pray toward this place and confess your name and turn
from their sin because you have afflicted them,

36

then hear from heaven and forgive the sin

of your servants, your people Israel. Teach them the right way to live, and send rain on the
land you gave your people for an inheritance.
37

“When famine or plague comes to the land, or blight or mildew, locusts or

grasshoppers, or when an enemy besieges them in any of their cities, whatever disaster or
disease may come, 38 and when a prayer or plea is made by any of your people Israel—each
one aware of the afflictions of his own heart, and spreading out his hands toward this
temple—39 then hear from heaven, your dwelling place. Forgive and act; deal with each man
according to all he does, since you know his heart (for you alone know the hearts of all men),
40

so that they will fear you all the time they live in the land you gave our fathers.
41

“As for the foreigner who does not belong to your people Israel but has come

from a distant land because of your name—42 for men will hear of your great name and your
225

mighty hand and your outstretched arm—when he comes and prays toward this temple, 43
then hear from heaven, your dwelling place, and do whatever the foreigner asks of you, so
that all the peoples of the earth may know your name and fear you, as do your own people
Israel, and may know that this house I have built bears your Name.
44

“When your people go to war against their enemies, wherever you send them, and

when they pray to the LORD toward the city you have chosen and the temple I have built for
your Name, 45 then hear from heaven their prayer and their plea, and uphold their cause.
46

“When they sin against you—for there is no one who does not sin—and you

become angry with them and give them over to the enemy, who takes them captive to his
own land, far away or near; 47 and if they have a change of heart in the land where they are
held captive, and repent and plead with you in the land of their conquerors and say, ‘We
have sinned, we have done wrong, we have acted wickedly’;

48

and if they turn back to you

with all their heart and soul in the land of their enemies who took them captive, and pray to
you toward the land you gave their fathers, toward the city you have chosen and the temple I
have built for your Name;

49

then from heaven, your dwelling place, hear their prayer and

their plea, and uphold their cause. 50 And forgive your people, who have sinned against you;
forgive all the offenses they have committed against you, and cause their conquerors to show
them mercy; 51 for they are your people and your inheritance, whom you brought out of
Egypt, out of that iron-smelting furnace.
52

“May your eyes be open to your servant’s plea and to the plea of your people

Israel, and may you listen to them whenever they cry out to you.

53

For you singled them out

from all the nations of the world to be your own inheritance, just as you declared through
your servant Moses when you, O Sovereign LORD, brought our fathers out of Egypt.”
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54

When Solomon had finished all these prayers and supplications to the LORD, he

rose from before the altar of the LORD, where he had been kneeling with his hands spread
out toward heaven.
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